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Crisis management has become one of the most important public policy areas in recent 
decades with greater numbers of manmade and natural disasters. History showed that well-
implemented crisis management policies can save lives and reduce costs in a disaster. Literature 
offered various suggestions for more effective crisis management policies with different 
techniques utilizing different theoretical frameworks. Informal relationships among crisis 
management employees were suggested to have a positive impact on crisis management 
effectiveness. Yet it was not demonstrated with advanced statistical tools if there is such a 
relationship.  
This study considers crisis management effort as a network effort and employs complex 
adaptive systems theory in order to understand factors influencing effectiveness of crisis 
management networks. Complex adaptive systems theory presents that more open 
communication lines in a given network or an organization would increase effectiveness of it 
since inner processes of the network or organization would obtain more information from the 
chaotic environment. Quality of informal relationships (casual relationships, social capital etc.) 
was hypothesized as a tool to open more communication lines within an agency which would 
eventually increase effectiveness of the network constructed by the organization. Based on the 
theoretical framework, adaptiveness capacity of the agencies was also tested in order to 
understand a correlation between adaptation and effectiveness of crisis management networks.  
Multiple case-study method was employed to identify incidents that can represent crisis 
management in full perspective. Terrorist attacks carried upon by the same terrorist network hit 
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New York in 2001, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005 were selected. First 
response phase of crisis management and policy changes after and before the attacks were 
discussed. Public administration processes and other social-economical conditions of countries 
were examined in terms of crisis management structure.  
Names of key agencies of selected crisis management systems were suggested by a social 
network analysis tool-UCINET. Six key agencies per incident were targeted for surveys. Surveys 
included a nine-item-quality of informal relationships, four-item-adaptiveness capability, and 
ten-item-perceived effectiveness of crisis management networks-scales. Respondents were asked 
to fill in online surveys where they could refer to their colleagues in the same incidents. 230 
respondents were aimed and 246 survey responses were obtained as a result. Surveys formed a 
structural equation model representing 23 observed factors and 2 latent constructs. Confirmatory 
factor analysis was utilized to validate hypothesis-driven conceptual models.  
Quality of informal relationships was found to have a significant positive impact on 
perceived crisis management network effectiveness (Standardized regression coefficient = .39). 
Two of the adaptiveness variables, openness to change and intra-organizational training were 
also positively correlated with the dependent variable of the study (Standardized regression 
coefficient = .40 and .26 respectively). Turkish and American groups‘ differences suggested a 
social-economical difference in societies. Majority of the respondents were some type of 
managers which made it possible to generalize the results for all phases of crisis management. 
Discussions suggested improved informal relationships among crisis management 
employees to provide a better crisis management during an extreme event. Collaborative social 
events were offered to improve crisis management effectiveness. An agency‘s openness to 
change proposed that a crisis management organization should be flexible in rules and structure 
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to gain more efficacy. The other adaptiveness variable, intra-organizational training efforts were 
proposed to have certain influence on effectiveness of crisis management network.  Factors built 
latent construct of perceived crisis management effectiveness were also found out to be 
important on crisis management, which of some are ability to carry out generic crisis 
management functions, mobilize personnel and resources efficiently, process information 
adequately, blend emergent and established entities, provide appropriate reports for news media 
etc.  
Study contributed to the complex adaptive system theory since the fundamentals of the 
theory were tested with an advanced quantitative method. Non-linear relationships within a 
system were tested in order to reveal a correlation as the theory suggested, where the results were 
convincingly positive. Crisis management networks‘ effectiveness was demonstrated to be 
validated by a ten-item-scale successfully. Future research might utilize more disaster cases both 
natural and manmade, search for impact of different communication tools within a system, and 
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1.1 Statement of the Study Problem 
 Crisis management (CM) has received increasing attention in public policy research due 
to an increase in the number of natural and manmade disasters and casualties, as well as the 
damage caused by those events (IRIN, 2005). Different suggestions have been made to improve 
CM policy and administration (Quarantelli, 1987; Stern & Sundelius, 2002; Gillespie, Robards, 
& Cho, 2004; Perry & Lindell, 2003; Alexander, 2005; Jaeger, Shneiderman, Fleischmann, 
Preece, Qua, & Wu, 2007; Farazmand, 2007). There is no doubt that CM efforts should be 
improved in order to handle those events more effectively, as the public has been pushing 
governments to improve CM policies (Kapucu & Van Mart, 2006). There is, however, no 
consensus on universally applicable best-practice policies among the cited studies.  
Research has shown that well-implemented crisis management policies can save human 
lives and reduce damage to property (McEntire & Myers, 2004). Inefficient crisis management 
efforts result in excessive property damage and an increase in lives lost (Alexander, 2005). The 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) reported that in 
underdeveloped or developing countries, citizens were more vulnerable to disasters because of 
inadequate preparedness and mitigation efforts (IFRC, 2002). 
Birkland defines disasters and crises as ―focusing events,‖ which are ―rare, harmful, 
sudden event(s) that become known to the mass public and policy elites virtually 
simultaneously‖ (1997, p. 3). Disasters and crises are focusing events; however, the term crisis 
has a broader meaning that includes change and learning processes in policies (Birkland, 2006, p. 
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5; Boin & Hart, 2006, p. 52). Although crises after disasters create devastating outcomes, they 
can still be neutralized and even routinized with mitigation and preparedness studies (Birkland, 
2006; Alexander, 2005). Crisis management consists of hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, 
response, and recovery operations (Petak, 1985; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Perry & Lindell, 2003). 
The term crisis management (CM) will be used in this paper instead of the terms emergency 
management and disaster management, which are also used in the literature to explain the same 
four-phase process, because this study also looked for the policy-changing aspects of CM 
(Birkland, 2006). 
Research shows that boundary spanners among or within organizations can have an 
impact on the effectiveness of collective action (Kapucu, 2006; Rusaw & Rusaw, 2008); 
however, this perspective was not fully utilized specifically for crisis management organizations 
using different cases as examples. This study researched the relationship between the quality of 
informal relationships within CM organizations and the interorganizational effectiveness of CM 
networks. The adaptation of organizational rules and structures was also examined in terms of 
CM network effectiveness. 
In order to understand the conditions affecting the effectiveness of interorganizational 
response efforts, various real-life crisis management operations worldwide were examined. The 
9/11 WTC Attacks in 2001, the Istanbul Bombings in 2003, the Madrid Train Bombings in 2004, 
and the London Metro Bombings in 2005 were employed as case studies. The most interacting 
agencies in those incidents were obtained by UCINET Analysis (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 
2002). The employees of selected CM organizations were surveyed. The survey results formed a 
dataset that was used to construct a Structural Equation Model (SEM). The SEM results enable 
researchers to identify how the perceived effectiveness of interorganizational networks relates to 
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the quality of informal relationships and adaptation, using the measurement scale for CM 
organizations derived from Quarantelli (1997).  
If this study verifies that an increase in the quality of informal relationships within CM 
organizations can increase interorganizational effectiveness during different emergencies, it can 
be used as a best-policy suggestion that will allow CM efforts to benefit more people. It will be a 
great success even if only one person is saved in a response/recovery effort of CM organizations 
backed up by developed informal relationships as a result of this study. Furthermore, the study 
will contribute to the network theory and the complex adaptive systems theory, as the theoretical 
constructs will be utilized and tested in a multivariate statistical model.  
1.2 Definition of the Terms 
Crisis management can be defined as the rescue, preparedness, and mitigation efforts 
accomplished by governments, volunteer organizations, or other local governments before, 
during, and after an ―unexpected, uncontrolled public damage that disrupts or impedes normal 
operations, draws public and media attention, threaten public trust‖ (Smith, 2006, p. 7). Public 
damage can be anticipated and prepared for (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Alexander, 2005). 
Petak (1985) classifies the four CM phases as ―mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery.‖ By contrast, CM generally refers to response efforts initiated immediately after a 
disaster. However, the response phase is actually just a smaller portion of CM (Waugh, 2000). 
Mitigation is considered a ―risk reduction program‖ (Petak, 1985) that targets an area known to 
be source of a public danger. Mileti (1999) argues that mitigation is conducted to reduce the 
destructive effects of disasters. Land use planning, establishing warning systems, developing 
newer engineering codes, and the utilization of advanced technology to predict future hazards are 
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examples of mitigation (Gillespie, Robards, & Cho, 2003). Thousands of public and private 
organizations take place in mitigation efforts, which can require several decades or even more. 
Mitigation policies are not conducted against a specific hazard; they are applied in an all-hazard 
concept (Mileti, 1999; Waugh, 2000). 
Preparedness, on the other hand, is a narrower term for a more specific risk area, which 
includes planning a disaster management policy, training first responders and volunteers, and 
developing essential agreements among public, local, and nonprofit organizations that are 
supposed to act together in a crisis situation (Petak, 1985, p. 3). Christoplos et al. (2001) also add 
ensuring the readiness of the society to the preparedness phase. Mitigation and preparedness 
efforts can seriously reduce the damaging effects of an emergency or disaster (McEntire & 
Myers, 2004; Alexander, 2005). Since crisis management is performed by public, private, and 
nonprofit organizations, and since these organizations‘ structures are different from one country 
to another, the emergency response systems of different countries are also different. There are, 
however, some best practices discussed in this study that increase the effectiveness of any CM 
organizations dramatically. 
The recovery phase begins with the disaster. This phase includes the processes that return 
the society to a normal condition (Petak, 1985). Waugh (2000) suggests that the recovery phase 
is increasingly becoming a ―long-term reconstruction of the community‖ (p. 12). Temporary 
housing, providing emergency food and energy, debris clearance, and even loaning to small 
businesses after a disaster are cited under the recovery phase in CM (Waugh, 2000). The 
response phase includes the immediate search and rescue operations. Professional and volunteer 
first responders provide emergency aid to the victims in this phase. Evacuation, medical 
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operations, and firefighting are frequent procedures used in this phase to minimize damage and 
save lives (Waugh, 2000). 
The mitigation, recovery, and preparedness phases take more time than the response 
phase. A quantitative assessment of CM therefore requires decades of observation and 
measurement. Moreover, many public and private organizations take part in those CM phases for 
a very long time. On the other hand, the response phase is about ―providing emergency aid and 
assistance, reducing the probability of secondary damage, and minimizing problems for recovery 
operations‖ (Petak, 1985, p. 3). It is also known that the majority of crisis management 
organizations showed their greatest efforts during those incidents, which makes it easier to define 
and measure their effectiveness in this phase alone. In order to measure the CM network 
effectiveness in a short period of time with the highest efficiency, this study utilized quantitative 
evaluations only about the response phase of CM efforts in cities that had been targets of terrorist 
attacks.  
In order to reveal the first study variable, quality of informal relationships, the study 
utilized surveys filled out by CM first responders who were either managers or team members 
who actually took part in response efforts in each studied country case. The survey employed a 
nine-question scale that Nielsen, Jex, and Adams (2000) and Morrison (2004) created to indicate 
the quality of informal relationships within selected organizations. In conducting the surveys, the 
employees were selected from the CM organizations that played the most significant roles during 
the emergencies.  
The perceived effectiveness of the CM Network is the dependent variable of the study, 
which indicated how effectively interorganizational CM networks operated according to the 
survey respondents selected from CM employees. It was difficult to build a scale to measure CM 
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networks‘ effectiveness since these efforts took a very long time, included numerous participant 
organizations, and occurred in a chaotic environment. Various dimensions of network 
effectiveness can be considered in the measurement process (Provan & Milward, 1995). 
However, Quarantelli (1997) suggests ten criteria to measure and evaluate the crisis management 
efforts of interorganizational actions. These criteria include having a crisis coordination center, 
the existence of crisis management training centers before major devastating events, and legal 
arrangements related to crisis management. This study applied all ten of those evaluation criteria 
to an SEM model to grade the effectiveness levels of case countries‘ CM organizations. 
Additionally, the adaptation processes of CM networks were used as predicting variables 
to estimate effectiveness perception. In other words, interorganizational efforts were also 
examined in terms of organizational learning and adaptation processes (Comfort, Sungu, 
Johnson, & Dunn, 2001). Organizational changes after drastic events in the environment were 
important discussion points for this study. Because these changes may have positive or negative 
impacts on effectiveness, organizations should be aware of the ways in which environmental 
events have changed their operation in order to keep themselves on the right track. The harm 
caused by such drastic changes can be minimized with the help of a successful learning and 
adaptation implementation system (Comfort et al., 2001). Four adaptation variables derived from 
the complex adaptive systems literature quantified the adaptation capability of agencies. From 




1.3 Purpose of the Study 
  The variables having the greatest impact on the effectiveness of crisis management were 
revealed by quantified results, which led to a clearer understanding of CM research. The 
effectiveness of interorganizational networks was examined in terms of informal relationships 
and organizational adaptiveness, which was based on the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
theory and network theory literature. Different countries were studied to provide global insight to 
the study. Thus, a broader generalization of the results could be applied in the development of 
generic strategies for CM. 
 Studying different CM operations and different public administration systems in terms of 
interorganizational effectiveness would provide a comparative perception of crisis management 
action. If possible, efficient strategies could be suggested to improve crisis management efforts. 
These suggestions could provide more cognitive tools to first responders in crisis situations. As 
with mitigation efforts, this study will also reduce the devastating impact of crises and lead to the 
improvement of crisis management organizations‘ performance.  
Research Questions 
1. What constitutes the general difference among the case countries in terms of crisis 
management effectiveness? What can be suggested to improve CM actions 
universally? 
2. Does the quality of informal relationships within crisis management organizations 
affect the effectiveness of the crisis management organizations? 
a. If there is a relationship between the quality of informal relationships and the 
effectiveness of CM, what is its direction? 
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b. If there is a relationship, what is the strength of that relationship? 
3. Does the adaptation capability of organizations have any impact on the effectiveness 
of crisis management organizations?  
a. Does the adaptation capacity of an organization have any impact on informal 
networks? 
b. If such an impact exists, what is the magnitude of the correlation?  
1.4 Significance of the Study 
It was discussed above that the literature provides extensive qualitative information about 
methods for improving crisis management. The researchers did a great deal to indicate which 
method is more effective than the others to improve crisis management. National response plans 
or frameworks, professional public crisis management foundations, training facilities for first-
responder agencies, and more collaborative CM policies replaced conventional Cold War civil 
defense tactics and methods with the help of studies performed in developed countries 
(Quarantelli, Lagadec, & Boin, 2006).  
This study, on the other hand, combined different methodologies, which is distinct to the 
disaster management research area. SEM modeling was used to quantify the perceived 
effectiveness, the quality of informal relationships, and the adaptation capacity of agencies that 
took part in interorganizational CM networks formed during four different terrorist bombings 
that targeted civilians in the most possible destructive way. Such a multivariate statistical study 




2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Complex Adaptive Systems Theory 
Dooley (1997) argued that a paradigm shift has taken place in organization science over 
the last century. The deterministic Newtonian approach was used to understand the future 
scheme of an organization by utilizing the current environment and structure of that organization. 
The basic assumption of this approach was that the systems would continue to do the things that 
they are supposed to do if they were provided with a suitable situation, adequate resources, and 
convenient environmental conditions. Managerial theories in the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
depended on this assumption (Dooley, 1997); Taylor, Fayol and other scientific management 
theorists built their mechanical metaphor for organizations on this deterministic approach 
(Morgan, 2006). Unlike mechanical approaches, complexity theory defends the notion that 
stability stands between order and disorder, firmness and chaos—what is called ―edge of chaos‖ 
(Kauffman, 1993). 
Quantum theory‘s uncertainty clause altered the deterministic-Newtonian approach not 
only in physics but also in the social sciences (Dooley, 1997). Moffat (2003) argued that 
organizations exist in complex environments (p. 42). These complexities are related to the 
nonlinear interactions (nonequilibrium order), decentralized control (or self-organization), 
adaptation, and collectivist dynamics of the organization (Moffat, 2003). Complex adaptive 
systems have some common attributes, such as parallelism, conditional action, modularity, and 
adaptation. Parallelism explains the simultaneous relationships existing among the systems. 
Conditional action is the responsive strategic ties‘ reporting feedbacks to the system. Modularity 
suggests some predetermined batch commands by which a system can overcome a problem. 
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Adaptation and evolution is the final phase for a CAS, because the learned patterns become 
involved in the system, which means a change in structures and goals (Holland, 2001, 2006). 
Non-hierarchical relationships such as friendships, social contacts, and even accidental 
communications can directly affect the effectiveness of complex adaptive systems (Krackhardt & 
Stern, 1988). Morel and Ramanujam (1999) defined complex adaptive systems as an 
interdisciplinary area from which organizational behavior can benefit. Complexity and 
organizations are inevitably and naturally related (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999), but the relationship 
between these two concepts is complicated. Large numbers of non-linear elements make the 
study of complex adaptive systems difficult (Morel & Ramanujam, 1999).  
Anderson (1999) examined the complex adaptive systems theory as a product of open 
systems theory because of its inclusion of environmental dependence as a factor. Interactions 
with the organizational environment cannot be accomplished through conventional hierarchical 
ties. Thus, organizations set up non-linear relations within and outside the system body to 
increase communication channels. These ―strategic ties‖ that exist both inside and outside the 
system follow a descent path to increase efficiency and decrease dependency on the environment 
(Stacey, 1995). Stacey (1995) called the ties ―strategic‖ because they provide both negative and 
positive feedback that helps the organization stay in an equilibrium state, which means that the 
organization can survive the situation despite detrimental effects. 
Scholars interpret the steps of complexity in similar terms. Anderson (1999) defines the 
key elements of the complexity theory as ―agents with schemata‖ (1999, p. 221), ―self-
organizing networks sustained by importing energy‖ (1999, p. 221), ―coevolution to the edge of 
chaos‖ (1999, p. 223) and finally ―system evolution based on recombination‖ (1999, p. 225). 
McKelvey (1999) argues that four fundamental forces replace Scott‘s (2003) organization 
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metaphors, which are ―adaptive tension, self-organization, interdependency effects, and 
multilevel coevolution‖ (1999, 302). In complex adaptive systems, the agents interact with each 
other regarding their perceptions, actions, and social roles in organizations. The first element of 
complexity is that the interactions will influence every single agent‘s thinking and behaviors. 
These changes in agent thinking and behavior will alter the process principles of the entire 
organization (Rouse, 2000). The second element explains the self-organization of the system. 
After affecting and changing each other‘s behaviors in the system, agents‘ interactions create 
positive feedbacks; therefore, they do not need to be changed. Stability in interaction and 
organizing makes it possible to stay steady for the system without the involvement of a central or 
outside impact (Anderson, 1999). 
The third element uses the Darwinian ecological evolution metaphor to explain the 
evolution process in the complex adaptive systems to adapt the changes in the environment and 
in the system itself (Anderson, 1999). Interestingly, small changes can result in great changes, 
while carefully implemented significant policy changes can produce insignificant change 
(Vogelsang, 2002). This evolution can even change an organization‘s goals (Anderson, 1999), 
which form the final element of complex adaptive systems. Agents‘ behaviors, interactions, 
organizational culture, inner processes, and goals are subject to change along with changes in the 
environment (Anderson, 1999; Vogelsang, 2002). Self-organized, agent-based, environmentally 
driven system rules are evaluated on an evolutionary basis; thus the system stands in the 
organizational environment with its strategic ties. 
Kiel (1997) argued that CM agencies operate within dynamic and disproportionate 
systems. These organizations are complex systems by themselves because numerous 
organizations take part in the CM action randomly (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999). Irreducibility 
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(―knowing a system is not the same as knowing its elements‖) is an important component of 
complex systems (Overman, 1996, p. 78). In any extreme event, local, regional, national, 
international, nonprofit, public, and private actors all play a critical role within the same 
environment for preparedness, mitigation, rescue, and recovery operations (Comfort, 1994). 
Even individuals moderately affected by events take part in those efforts independently. These 
emerging groups make CM a complex effort.  
The relationships of these organizations with the other elements in the environment make 
CM action even more complex. Each CM organization in the crisis scene is connected to a 
different organizational entity, which produces a complex relationship web. For example, some 
local CM organizations, including first responders such as police and fire brigades connected to 
local municipalities, and some international disaster relief organizations, such as the German 
Technisches Hilfswerk (THW, Technical Help Service) connected to the German Government 
and the European Union, participated in the Hurricane Katrina rescue efforts that occurred in 
2005 in the U.S. (Sherraden et al., 2006). Another reason for the complexity is that the exact 
timing of disasters is unknown before the incidents. The suddenness of manmade and natural 
disasters adds another dimension to the complexity of CM. 
Chaos and unpredictability in the crisis environment increase nonlinearity in the systems 
(Carley, 2002) operating within it, including CM agencies. Even the best calculations and 
estimates in mitigation and preparedness efforts can result in big failures (Kiel, 1997). The 
policies formed for linearly operating systems may not work in chaotic times; normal procedures 
do not necessarily produce the expected results in nonlinear systems. However, Kiel (1991) 
suggested that the fluctuations caused by the chaos within and outside of an agency can be 
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repetitive or rhythmic. As a result, the nonlinearity of those systems does not necessarily form 
completely unknowable characteristics (Kiel, 1997). 
Chaos is not detrimental to complex systems; it actually serves a useful function in 
providing stability. Organizations usually use entrainment to stabilize their processes and goals 
for as long as possible. Chaos breaks this rule and forces organizations to change this ―mode 
lock-in‖ (1997, 191) since the only way to survive in chaotic times is to look for new process 
forms. Chaotic cycles also work as a learning opportunity, because in a chaotic situation the 
organization tries every possible method to survive. Successful methods are recorded in positive 
feedbacks, which results in organizational learning (1997, 192). Looking at these functions of 
chaos, it is clear that chaos offers both danger and opportunity (Overman, 1996).  
Based on these assumptions, Kiel (1989) suggests that policy makers should consider 
both traditionalistic linear processes and the nonlinear relationship mechanics of complex and 
chaotic systems. Chaotic complex systems can be understood and managed properly once the 
definable boundaries of chaotic behavior are typified (Kiel, 1997). ―Deterministic chaos‖ (Kiel, 
1997, 190) defines the probability of chaotic cycles, which can be prepared for beforehand and 
managed in a simple and mechanical way. Rosendhead (1998) argued that the managers of 
complex systems should try to keep the agency in bounded instability instead of a perfect 
equilibrium mode. Chaos and unpredictability should, in other words, be employed as partners.  
Kiel (1997) suggests two methods for controlling chaos. The first method is tightening 
the borders of agents‘ actions. The limited freedom of agents will provide stability and reduce 
the unpredictability of the system. This conservative management style is a solution provided by 
the old deterministic ideology that considers linear hierarchies among and within the agencies. 
Limiting self-organization and increasing the central command authority appears to increase the 
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predictability of a system‘s actions. Kiel (1997) argued, however, that unconsidered nonlinear 
processes in a complex adaptive system will fail the processes used to regulate linear 
relationships. 
Rosenhead (1998) and Kiel (1997) suggest another method for organizations that will 
employ complexity and chaos as an element. Constant feedback from the members of a system 
will make the administrative and executive branches aware of changes in system‘s environment. 
Comfort (1994) emphasized the importance of open lines of communication during chaos. More 
communication within and among the organizations in a CM system will grant faster and more 
reliable feedbacks. Eventually, nonlinearity would have been employed as an organizational 
attribute. The suddenness of positive and negative feedbacks can increase the effectiveness of 





Figure 1. Proposed Theoretical Model 
 
Cohen et al. (2002) blamed the communication failure between the New York City Police 
(NYPD) Department and the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) for the deaths of 
firefighters at Ground Zero on September 11, 2001. Rosenhead (1998) introduces the idea of 
extraordinary management (1998, p. 7) to explain how administrators should absorb chaotic 
shocks from the environment. Extraordinary management also requires more open 
 























































Changes in External Environment 







communication lines among members. Continuous learning is the only tool for coping with the 
maximum-uncertainty situations that CM agencies face (Kiel, 1997). 
Human organizations, like CM entities, learn from the outside world with the help of 
employees. The employees interact with the environment, which causes organizational learning 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988). The learning process makes CM organizations more 
prepared for future incidents because the lessons learned affect the structures and processes in an 
evolutionary way (Kauffman, 1993). Local and national CM organizations learn not only from 
their own experiences but also from other countries‘ practices with the help of developed 
communication tools. Successful CM tools and organizational structures in different places are 
copied and imitated to increase effectiveness in CM efforts (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). The 
paradigm shift in CM from Cold War‘s notion of civil defense to the present model of resilience 
also indicates the adaptation process in CM systems.  
Some CM systems are more responsive to negative or positive feedbacks than others, 
depending on the limitations of the self-organizing capabilities of agencies in different public 
management systems. Centralistic management makes it difficult for organizations to evolve 
easily, because strict hierarchy resists change by any means. Carroll and Burton (2000) showed 
that centralized structures can be as successful as decentralized ones in terms of the CAS 
framework as long as they maintain a state of adequate information exchange. As discussed 
below, this study‘s survey utilizes questions about the perception of the adaptation capability of a 
general management understanding of CM systems.  
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2.2 Validity Discussions of Variables in the Study 
In this part of the study, the measurement for each dependent, independent, and predictor 
variables was explained. Two latent constructs were defined and operationalized in the analytical 
model of this study. These are the perceived effectiveness of CM networks and the informal 
relationships within them, which were discussed in this chapter comprehensively. Primarily, 
interviews and the literature review helped formalize the theoretical constructs. Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) enables the researchers to identify the strength and integrity of the 
study variables and their causal relationships (Byrne, 2001).  
2.2.1 Perceived Effectiveness of Crisis Management Networks 
Network studies have recently formed a new research area in the social sciences. The 
organizational effectiveness measurement cannot be used to evaluate network performance; 
therefore, the literature offers newer and better techniques (Provan & Milward, 1995). Since CM 
is an interorganizational network effort, the quantification process of this latent construct should 
include performance measurement methods specifically designed for networks. Before this 
process, the study briefly explains the conventional organizational performance measurement 
literature in order to provide a better understanding of network effectiveness consept. 
A. Organizational Effectiveness 
Effectiveness measurement studies for organizations have been conducted since the first 
organization was built. Numerous theories based on various assumptions and cultures were used 
to verify those effectiveness methods. Generally, different input-output comparisons were 
employed to grade effectiveness results. Kirchhoff (1977) summarized the organizational 
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effectiveness literature and suggested an assortment of measurement rubrics for ―organizational 
effectiveness, managerial effectiveness, and manager and subordinate behaviors and attitudes‖ 
(1977, p. 348). He stood against the oversimplification of effectiveness measurement. His study 
made it clear that researchers will acquire different effectiveness results for the same 
organization if they apply different measurement methods, such as goal-oriented or evaluation-
oriented tests; however, the effectiveness measurement test will fail if only one of those criteria 
is applied. Therefore, one should utilize a unique measurement set to understand the 
effectiveness of an organization, since the complex organizations pursue complex goals. The 
measurement scale should be related to a particular set of derived or prescribed goals for the 
organization (Kirchhoff, 1977). 
Steers also (1975) defined some problems in effectiveness measurement procedures. 
Some of the 17 effectiveness measurements he established as evaluation criteria were 
adaptability-flexibility, productivity, and satisfaction. Steers (1975) also stated that the 
evaluation criteria for organizational effectiveness evolved in time. The classical way of thinking 
favored basic cost-benefit analyses, or sometimes more retrospective cost-effectiveness analyses. 
Basically, the inputs and outcomes of an organizational effort were compared to each other in a 
cost-benefit analysis. Cost-effectiveness, on the other hand, was based on evaluating different 
strategies by comparing them to other alternatives. This is, however, no longer the case in 
organizational science literature. 
Organizational effectiveness has more often been evaluated with other variables such as 
adaptability-flexibility, consumer satisfaction, and employee retention recently. Social values in 
societies and organizational norms are the best predictors for those evolving effectiveness 
criteria. For that reason, measuring organizational effectiveness needs a contingent approach 
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more than a predetermined one. In other words, there is no single universal way to evaluate the 
criteria for an effectiveness measurement model. The criteria should evaluate different 
characteristics of organizational effort in terms of the organization and its environment 
(Kirchhoff, 1977; Steers, 1975).  
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) also dealt with the criteria selection systems for measuring 
effectiveness in organizational studies in terms of complex systems. If one suggests too many 
various organizational variables by which to measure effectiveness, it is possible that no 
evaluation will be performed because of the impossibility of gathering all those variables into a 
single test (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). Social values and norms within an organization are also 
a part of those criteria, which toughens the job for researchers. An integrating, multiple-variable, 
contingent test seems to be the best alternative for effectiveness measurement, although it will 
raise many objectivity problems as well. Effectiveness analysis is simultaneously organizational 
analysis. One should know about the processes, policies, structures, and goals of an organization 
in order to assess it (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
Scott (2003) suggests three different perspectives from which to analyze organizations: 
the rational, natural, and open-systems models. These models suggest different attributes for 
organizations, and thus different effectiveness criteria. Scott (2003) also discussed combined 
approaches. The structures and goals of organizations mainly defined the types besides the 
dependency factor to resources.  
Rational organizations are defined using a ―machine‖ metaphor (Morgan, 2006, p. 15). 
There are specific rules for rational organizations (Goal Specificity, 2003, p. 29). An 
organization is constructed to achieve a specific goal. The other important characteristic of 
rational organizations is ―formalization‖ (2003, p. 33). There are strict and certain rules by which 
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rational organizations achieve their goals; these rules are followed through the whole structure of 
the organization. Scott (2003) gives examples of the successful implementation of rational 
organizational rules, such as Scientific Management (Taylor), Administrative Theory (Fayol), 
Bureaucratic Theory (Weber), and Rational Decision Making (Simon). ―Scientific management‖ 
focused on increased efficiency, while the others focused more on the processes of an 
organization (2003, p. 49).  
Natural organizations, on the other hand, have complex goals. They are like ―living 
organisms‖ (Morgan, 2006, p. 33); they try to ―survive‖ in the organizational environment 
(Scott, 2003, p. 73). Unlike rational organizations, natural organizations depend on informal 
relationships more than formal ones. ―Processes‖ and policy implementation are more important 
than decision making. Scott (2003, p. 54) discusses the informal relationships among employees 
in formal organizations and its importance. Goal complexity is another issue that natural systems 
deal with differently from rational ones. There are real goals and ―professed goals‖ (p. 52). Even 
though an organization can have written, rational-type rules, it can, for the sake of surviving, 
follow other rules that are not clearly defined. Like a living organism, social evolution can 
change the structure of the organization dramatically. New structures can be established to adapt 
to the change in the environment, while some structures can be abandoned for the same reason 
(pp. 52-73). 
The open system is the third and the last structure type that Scott (2003) discusses while 
classifying organizations. Basically, organizations and, in a broader sense, systems are formed by 
different components that are independent and/or interdependent. Open systems theory has the 
greatest complexity among other types in terms of its ―analogy‖ (Morgan, 2006, p. 38). The 
theory suggests that present organizations are interdependent with the other organizations in the 
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environment. Organizations are like components in a system, which interact with each other. 
Some systems use others‘ products as inputs. This creates ―interdependency on the others‖ 
(Scott, 2003, p. 25). Systems cannot survive without others‘ existence. The networks theory also 
suggests the organizational networks‘ dependence on environmental factors. 
B. Network Effectiveness 
Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) argue that networks cannot be understood unless they 
are evaluated as ―whole networks.‖ In order to explain networks, the literature utilized ―common 
themes (such as) social interactions, relationships, connectedness, collaboration, collective 
action, trust, and cooperation‖ (Provan et al., 2007). Networks theory takes its strength from the 
theory‘s suggestions for contingency, imperfect environment information, and interdependency 
clauses (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). However, measuring the effectiveness of networks is more 
complex than simply measuring the effectiveness of single organizations. The satisfaction of 
stakeholders is a primary criterion for network effectiveness. Public organizational networks‘ 
common stakeholder is the public; thus, the community‘s satisfaction rate is the most common 
measurement tool for public networks (Provan & Milward, 1995). For that reason, any 
environment-driven policy tool that will bring customer satisfaction is supposed to achieve a 
significant level of network effectiveness.  
Some stakeholders may be special; their concerns may be different from the rest of 
society. For example, Provan and Milward (1995) argue that special interest groups such as 
prison inmates or school children constitute different kinds of stakeholders that can have 
concerns that are completely different from—or even contrary to—the public. Thus, political 
concerns are also important to address when evaluating network effectiveness. Provan and 
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Milward (1995) summarize this idea as follows: ―Networks must be evaluated as service-
delivery vehicles that provide value to local communities in ways that could not have been 
achieved through the uncoordinated provision of services by fragmented and autonomous 
agencies‖ (p. 25). 
 Evaluations based on the services delivered made network effectiveness measurement 
scales unique. For example, Siegel, Clayton, and Kavoor (1990) defined a measurement set to 
evaluate the institutions educating students in public administration in the U.S that only included 
variables related to the processes of those departments (p. 221). Thomson, Perry, and Miller 
(2007) also suggested a contingent method for measuring the collaboration among the 
organizations in a network. Despite the low response rate (32%) of the surveys and insignificant 
statistical results (p for Chi-Square > 0.05) of the SEM structural model, the authors argued that 
reciprocity played a significant role in collaboration and governance. They suggested a more 
contingent measurement scale for the future research agenda in collaboration (Thomson et al., 
2007). 
Networks should be evaluated to understand whether they really work (O‘Toole, 1997). 
The evaluation requires a comprehensive study regarding stakeholders, as well as the 
environment, structures, and rules of the network. The numerous difficulties discussed above 
force this study to have a contingent standpoint in terms of CM networks. The contingent 
network variables were assorted in Provan and Milward‘s (2001) study in regard to the 
organizational and network level. Using Quarantelli‘s ten criteria (1997), the study utilized the 
contingent approach suggested. 
23 
 
C. Perceived Effectiveness of Crisis Management Networks   
Since the four phases of crisis management (Petak, 1985) include very different and 
complex labor and all these efforts are too difficult for a single entity to conduct (even when that 
entity is a government), society needs specialized and professionalized organizations for these 
operations. This is the basic reason why crisis management effort is a network effort; no single 
body can accomplish all the phases of crisis management by itself (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). 
As suggested in the previous chapter, CM effectiveness could be measured first by defining the 
stakeholders. In the New York WTC Attacks (2001), the Istanbul Bombings (2003), the Madrid 
Train Bombings (2004), and the London Metro Bombings (2005), the CM networks‘ 
stakeholders were the organizations that took part in the response and recovery efforts and the 
victims who suffered from the attacks. Victims are the people directly affected by the attacks, 
whether physically or psychologically. In essence, entire nations can be counted as victims, and 
thus as stakeholders. 
Measuring crisis management organizations‘ effectiveness is challenging because of the 
presence of complicated results, chaotic environments, incomparable or non-standardizable 
inputs and outputs, and numerous participants and stakeholders. CAS theory suggested that the 
complexity in non-linear interactions will increase with a greater number of interorganizational 
relationships (Alexander, 2005). Emergencies or extreme events leave a lot of people dead, 
injured, or incommunicado; destroy coordination routes such as roads, telecommunication lines, 
and the like; and halt the normal flow of life, which shocks the victims badly (Samardjieva & 
Badal, 2002; Helbing, Ammoser, & KÄuhnert, 2005; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1976). The 
stakeholders have very complex and immediate needs; thus the effectiveness measurement 
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should take as many of those variables as necessary into account to achieve a significant 
validation level for the proposed latent construct.  
The effectiveness measurement scale should be designed to fit in a way that demonstrates 
the characteristics of CM networks. The structures, relationships, basic rules, processes, standard 
exercises, attributes, and any other traits of CM systems should be addressed in the scale. Several 
studies evaluated crisis management responses quantitatively. Drabek et al. (1981) is the pioneer 
of such studies; the study in question utilized a detailed questionnaire administered to both the 
emergency management officials and victims of selected fourteen case studies. They selected the 
target organizations by using a block modeling technique similar to the UCINET method. Block 
modeling is a tool used to reveal the relationships in a network (Drabek et al., 1981). The survey 
questions were related to organizational attributes more than to network effectiveness.   
Quarantelli (1997) suggests a scale for empirical studies. The study operated on these 
―ten criteria‖ (Quarantelli, 1997): 
1. Correctly recognizing differences between response and agent-
generated demands 
2. Adequately carrying out generic functions 
3. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources 
4. Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of labor 
5. Adequately processing information 
6. Properly exercising decision making 
7. Developing overall co-ordination 
8. Blending emergent and established organizational behaviors 
9. Providing appropriate reports for the news media 
10. Having a well-functioning emergency operations centre. (p. 41-54) 
 
The first statement is about the preparedness phase. It controls whether the CM 
organization is aware of the reason for the crisis. If the CM employees‘ behaviors are based on a 
management crisis resulting from the chaotic environment, then CM will not be successful. If the 
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disaster agent (whether it is a flood, a terrorist attack, or something else) is clearly known and the 
CM efforts are based on that specific agent, then the CM operates effectively. The second 
criterion more specifically assesses CM capability. Generic functions such as evacuation, 
temporary housing, and the like are basic operations that a CM system should be capable of 
performing in the most extreme events. The third criterion concerns resource allocation in a 
crisis environment. If the CM system is ready to deliver those services and resources to the 
victims effectively, then the CM strategy is efficient.  
The fourth criterion is more about the management of the CM effort. The organizations 
should have the specifics of division of labor and delegation of authority codified in writing 
before extreme events occur. The fifth statement tests whether the information transmittal 
process during a crisis is successful. Communication has been seen as the main problem in many 
disaster recovery actions; however, it was not due to the communication tools, it was about the 
things that were communicated. Quarantelli (1997) suggested that the fifth criterion has three 
dimensions: processing information within an agency, with other agencies, and with affected 
citizens. The surveys included different questions for each dimension, and another variable 
combined all these in one factor. 
The sixth and seventh criteria concern the CM network process during an extreme event. 
Proper decision making and efficient coordination among the CM organizations is crucial, since 
the continuity of life depends on them. The eighth criterion may be seen in the same light; 
however, it is very different because it includes emergent groups besides CM organizations. 
Emergent groups are volunteers and affected citizens. Those groups should take part in CM plans 
as first responders for an effective CM. Otherwise, CM networks would not only lose an 
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important resource in the response and recovery phases, but would also face difficulties because 
of jurisdictional conflicts, authority problems, and lack of public support.  
The last two criteria are the most concrete indicators of CM effectiveness. Appropriate 
and routine press meetings during an extreme event will provide accurate information to the 
press and eventually to the public. Quarantelli (1997) argues that the media will continue to 
disseminate information even if they do not receive accurate information from CM officials, 
which will lead to the public receiving inaccurate information. Press meetings can also be 
important for informing the public, as governments do not have adequate news channels to 
disseminate as much as the media can. The last criterion is a well-established coordination center 
for CM organizations. This center is not just the common infrastructure, but also a social system 
with which different organizations interact with each other via liaison personnel.  
As seen above, the Quarantelli (1997) scale deals with the networks, coordination, 
communication, effectiveness, performance, cognitive skills, validity, and operability of CM 
efforts. The scale includes conventional organizational efficiency criteria (Kirchhoff, 1977; 
Steers, 1975) and advanced network performance criteria (Provan & Milward, 2001). It is also 
contingent, as the variables are only related to CM efforts. The ―ten criteria‖ (Quarantelli, 1997) 
were used in this study‘s survey with Likert scale questions in five response categories. 
2.2.2 Quality of Informal Relationships 
The quality of informal relationships within crisis management organizations is easier to 
measure with respect to the network‘s effectiveness level. Selected organizations‘ employees 
were surveyed to understand the degree of informal relationships among personnel. Friendship 
relationships were found out for each participant organization. A high quality in informal 
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relationships was assumed to be a predictor for better network effectiveness perception since 
more friendships were assumed as having more open communication lines.  
Informal relationships involve friendships, casual encounters, and other social ties among 
employees of organizations, which can be made quantifiable with competent scales (Nielsen et 
al., 2000; Morrison, 2004). Friendships generally occur in the subunits of an organization. They 
can create dysfunctional results if uncontrolled. However, when correctly applied, informal ties 
among and within networks can bring efficiency to the related organizations (Krackhardt & 
Stern, 1988). Informal ties also provide trust among and within the agencies; they may even 
replace formal relationships. Additionally, increasing numbers of organizations employ teams for 
efficiency, another factor that reveals the importance of informal relationships (Nielsen et al., 
2000). Informal relationships within an organization can directly affect the performance of the 
whole organization (Morrison, 2004). Both Nielsen et al. (2000) and Morrison (2004) built scales 
that measure informal relationships in the organizations they examined. This study evaluated 
those scales for selected CM organizations‘ personnel.  
Informal ―relationships are voluntary, reciprocal, and equal‖ (Morrison, 2004, p. 115). 
The more informal collaborative structure an organization has, the better it can withstand a crisis 
(Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Nielsen et al. (2000) also suggested that informal relationships 
among employees can enable significantly better work-related outcomes. Thus, it can be 
theoretically accepted that friendships in a workplace can increase the effectiveness of an 
organization (Morrison, 2004).  
The survey utilized the same questions Nielsen et al. (2004) used: 
I am able to work with my coworkers to collectively solve problems. 
In my organization, I have the chance to talk informally and visit with others. 
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I socialize with coworkers outside of the workplace. 
I feel I can trust many coworkers a great deal. 
I do not feel that anyone I work with is a true friend. 
I have formed strong friendships at work. (2004, p. 635) 
Nielsen et al. (2004) found that the internal consistency reliability of the utilized 
questionnaire estimated (with Cronbach's alpha) the ―prevalence of friendship‖ at eighty-nine 
percent. The survey also used additional related questions from Morrison‘s (2004) questionnaire. 
Morrison asked more than 100 questions in his study; however, this study used only the three 
most important of them that Morrison (2004) clearly emphasized, which are: 
 I personally work for this organization because she/he (a special peer) still works 
 here. 
 Friendships make it [work] a happier place with friendly environment and 1 enjoy 
 catching up with them each day.   
 Friendships help us to work cooperatively with each other and support each other 
 at times of stress. (2000, p. 121) 
Combined with Nielsen et al.‘s (2000) questions, the questionnaire revealed the presence 
of informal relationships among crisis management organization employees. Responses to each 
of these items were made on a Likert scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The results were evaluated with the SEM model (Figure 2). The study proposed the 
following statement based on literature findings: 
H1 – A higher quality of informal relationships within crisis management organizations 
will increase the effectiveness of crisis management efforts. 
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2.2.3 Organizational Adaptation in Crisis Management Networks 
Organizational learning phases were incorporated as the adaptive responses of 
interorganizational efforts. Stacey (1995) suggested that the evolutionary changes in a system 
happen within the structural relationships within and outside the organization and/or in changes 
in the goals pursued. In the learning phase, the organization ―can restructure itself and acquire 
and implement new competences‖ (Rochet, Keramidas, & Bout, 2008, p. 66). The experience is 
recorded to the organizational memory, ―which will allow it, among other things, to identify the 
warning signs of any future crisis‖ (2008, p. 66).  
Researchers measured organizational adaptation in different ways. For instance, Chiva-
Gómez (2003) processed nine organizational learning and adaptation measurement studies and 
summarized the evaluation criteria of organizational learning as ―experimenting with new ideas,‖ 
―continuous improvement,‖ rewarding,‖ ―openness to change,‖ ―interaction with environment,‖ 
―mistake and/or risk acceptance,‖ ―dialogue,‖ ―communication and social construction,‖ 
―continuous training‖, ―empowerment, teamwork, and collective spirit,‖ ―workers that want to 
learn and improve,‖ the existence of leadership committed to teaching, a non-strict and flexible 
organizational environment, and the like (2003, p. 112). 
Spector and Davidsen (1998), on the other hand,  list ―actions as reflected in terms of 
information flow,‖ ―goal formation processes,‖ ―instances of goal cohesion and goal erosion,‖ 
nonhierarchical exchanges, reflective activities, ―sentiments as reflected in attitudes and 
preferences,‖ respect, support, and trust, ―team processes,‖ communication and co-mentoring,  
―tolerance for errors,‖ and the like. Their study compared numerous organizational learning 
evaluations (Spector & Davidsen, 1998, p. 120). The similarities between these two research 
efforts give this study a clear direction for selecting a predicting variable: adaptation. Since 
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adaptation is referred to in CAS theory and was only employed as a predictor variable, it did not 
serve as a unique latent construct. Instead, most of the important organizational adaptation 
variables that Chiva-Gómez (2003) and Spector and Davidsen (1998) suggested were utilized as 
predictor variables for the investigation of the relationship between the perceived effectiveness 
and quality of informal relationships. 
On the other hand, organizational adaptation is generally thought to be exactly the same 
as organizational learning, despite the fact that the two terms refer to completely different 
phenomena (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Organizational learning is an ―insightful‖ experience that is 
hard to quantify and measure. Organizational adaptation is formed by basic reactions that the 
organization created against the changes in the environment. The study utilized changing 
capability and changes in the organization as experimental learning tools. Thus, surveys were 
also conducted to generate the measures for adaptation capability. The variables presented in the 
SEM model are ―openness to change,‖ ―change in the policies after important events,‖ ―intra-
organizational education efforts,‖ and ―frequency of collaborative events,‖ as suggested in the 
two studies aforementioned (Chiva-Gómez, 2003; Spector & Davidsen, 1998). 
All four of those variables represent a different aspect of organizational adaptation in 
terms of CAS theory. Openness to change is the starting component of adaptation. CM systems 
are open systems because they are highly affected by the environment. For example, Corbacioglu 
and Kapucu (2006) argued that the Turkish Disaster Management System was highly affected by 
major earthquakes that hit different regions of Turkey and left a great number of casualties. 
Birkland (2006) also discussed the importance of focusing events in terms of CM policy 
changes. The World Trade Center attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001 changed CM 
policies in the U.S. and throughout the world. Since then, terrorism events have been discussed 
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as crises that need to be taken care of more efficiently and with more adequately planned policies 
(Birkland, 2006). Based on the literature reviewed, the following hypothesis was made: 
 H2 – The openness of CM organizations to change has a positive effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of CM networks. 
Policy changes after important events constitute the other adaptation variable in the SEM 
model (Figure 2). This variable is different from the first adaptation variable because openness 
merely defines the ability to change. However, concrete changes may not take place even if the 
CM organizations are capable of doing so. During the Cold War, CM policies were essentially 
locally operated civil defense strategies (Waugh & Streib, 2006; Birkland, 1997). CM 
organizations were the same first responders that acted with a more comprehensive 
understanding of CM right after the Cold War. This means that CM organizations were capable 
of change; however, the CM policies did not change, due to government pressure to maintain the 
status quo. In time, organizations learn lessons from their ―routine‖ experiences and then codify 
the necessary changes in preparation for later crises (Levitt & March, 1988). Changes in policy 
indicate an organization‘s willingness to keep an equilibrium state in the environment, which 
will eventually improve organizational effectiveness (Anderson, 1999; Kauffman, 1993; Stacey, 
1995).Therefore; the next hypothesis is: 
H3 – Changes in CM policies due to important events will positively affect CM 
effectiveness. 
Intra-organizational training efforts are suggested to be helpful and performance-
enhancing for organizations. Chiva-Gómez (2003) argued that continuous training for all 
personnel was encouraged by researched private companies. Moreover, in a report criticizing the 
poor intervention of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the response and 
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recovery efforts for Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) asserted that more advanced training and professional education were needed for 
improved CM. The report made it clear that intra-organizational training for effective CM is not 
only needed for the local CM personnel but also for FEMA‘s federal employees (GAO, 1993). 
This information led the study to the following hypothesis: 
H4 – Intra-organizational training of CM personnel will lead to more effective CM.  
Levitt and March (1988) examined the methods for keeping routine experiences in the 
organizational memory. They found that sharing exercises with other organizations can help to 
improve organizational memory and capacity. In fact, collaborative team processes and real-time 
CM efforts are suggested by many scholars to have a positive impact on CM (Alexander, 2005; 
Perry & Lindell, 2003; Rodriguez, Quarantelli, & Dynes, 2006). By ―collaboration,‖ the study 
refers to CM experiences conducted with other organizations. Real experiences will create an 
organizational memory that increases effectiveness in later extreme events. 
The study proposed that actual events can increase the effectiveness of CM organizations 
because the organizations will gain practical knowledge of real incidents. The more the 
organizations deal with crises, the more experience they will obtain. Thus, the hypothesis 
evaluating this adaptation variable is: 
H5 – Frequent actual CM experiences increase CM effectiveness. 
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
1. A higher quality of informal relationships within crisis management organizations 
will increase the effectiveness of crisis management efforts. 
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2. The openness of CM organizations to change has a positive effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of CM networks. 
3.  Changes in CM policies due to important events will positively affect CM 
effectiveness. 
4. Intra-organizational training of CM personnel will lead to more effective CM. 




3.1 Analytical Model 
Previous studies have found that informal relationships developed before crises and 
emergencies have a significant positive impact on crisis management efforts (Handmer, 2003; 
Comfort, 2005; Kapucu, 2006). In those studies, CAS theory was not internationally utilized to 
address this problem by scholars because a limited number of cases (for example, 9/11) were 
used to explain informal relationships. It was suggested that casual friendships and informal 
relationships increase the information about incidents in complex environments. Because 
complexity and bounded rationality increase in the environment during emergencies due to the 
increased number of participants and damaged communication lines (Dynes & Quarantelli, 
1976), it is crucial that emergency management organizations strengthen their social capital 
(Kapucu, 2006).  
Voorhees (2008) asserted that local emergency workers performed better than authorized 
emergency organization employees during the WTC attack because of the informal social 
relationships they had before the incident. Voorhees (2008) also suggested that social skills 
should be increased among rescue workers to increase the effectiveness of emergency efforts. 
The analytical model in this study focused on the basic suggestion of open communication lines 
offered by the CAS theory. However, this study is different because it employs four different 
emergency cases from around the world and compares them in terms of correlations among 
quality of informal relationships, adaptation, and network effectiveness. Finally, the study has 
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gathered evidence to show how informal relationships among crisis management workers can 
improve response and recovery efforts during an emergency. 
The differences in crisis management systems and organizations among several countries 
were addressed in order to explain the effect of the structures and rules of crisis management 
organizations. Four countries‘ crisis management organizations were examined for their efforts 
during catastrophic terrorist events, including New York in 2001, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 
2004, and London in 2005. Multi-organizational terrorism response and the coordination 
perspective were used to show the comparative effectiveness of CM organizations when 
engaging different management skills and efforts.  
The organizational learning and adaptation processes of crisis management organizations 
in the related countries were examined to discern best practices in effective crisis management 
operations. Ten effectiveness, nine informal relationship, and four adaptation variables were 
included. An SEM model was formulated and validated (Figure 2). 
3.2 Methods 
Emergency management is a four-phase occasion that can take decades to occur (Perry & 
Lindell, 2003). Many different local, federal, governmental, non-governmental, public, and 
private organizations or individuals can take part in any CM stage. Quantifying selected study 
variables for such an occasion, which requires decades and involves thousands of organizations 
and individuals, is a challenge this study faced. Assessments of emergency management 
effectiveness are generally qualitative and descriptive (Paton & Flin, 1999; Buckland & Rahman, 
1999; Williams, Batho, & Russell, 2000), or quasi-quantitative (Comfort & Haase, 2006). All of 
these studies used case analyses focusing on specific natural or manmade disasters. 
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Selecting and examining the rescue and recovery phase of crisis management makes 
sense when the following points are considered. Firstly, as discussed above, other phases of 
crisis management can take several decades to complete. Research requiring several decades 
would be too costly and time-consuming for the purposes of this project. Secondly, thousands of 
organizations and individuals take part in those phases at different times. This is an important 
challenge, since a researcher cannot keep records of such a large amount of input in a crisis 
management system. Lastly, almost all of the organizations and individuals taking part in other 
phases of crisis management have a role in the response and recovery phases. Therefore, 
capturing and examining the response and recovery phase enhances the efficiency of this 
research. 
3.2.1 Multiple Case Study Analysis 
―Focusing events‖ (Birkland, 1997, p. 3) are natural or manmade disasters. Terrorist 
attacks against civilians are the greatest manmade disasters in terms of social panic and public 
outcry. The fear of another attack has a psychological effect on society that is difficult to 
overcome. The emergency management systems of most countries in the world have generally 
been prepared for natural disasters. However, terrorist attacks create another kind of threat that 
these systems have not experienced before (Aguirre, 2004). Terrorist attacks are different 
because they are unexpected and unpredictable, the attackers‘ methods and the public‘s reaction 
are unknown to public administrators, and the scope of attacks cannot be understood 
immediately (Wise & Nader, 2002). This difference led this study to focus on terrorist events 
more than on other catastrophes.  
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There were and still are many different terrorist organizations in the world fighting for 
various reasons. Many of these terrorist networks carry out deadly attacks on civilians and 
government officials in different countries. The ETA in Spain, the IRA in the UK, and the PKK 
in Turkey, as well as some others in South American countries (Abrahms, 2008), can be said to 
be the most violent up to now. However, none of them operated worldwide as much as Al-Qaeda 
did. Al-Qaeda, after its founding during the Afghan-Russian war, operated violently in many 
European, Asian, African, and American countries. Using the U.S. occupation of the Middle East 
as a base for its attacks, this terrorist network used car bombings and suicide attacks in its 
military campaigns. Drugs, blood diamonds, and human trafficking in different countries have 
been financial resources for this network (Hoffman, 2007).  
The sample for this study is members of agencies that operated in interorganizational 
crisis management efforts in response to four different terrorist attack cases. The study used a 
multiple-case study guide. Yin (2003) argued that the multiple cases selected in a research 
should replicate each other to provide consistency. This replication can occur literally by 
―predicting similar results‖ or theoretically by ―contrasting results for predictable results‖ (2003, 
p. 5). For that reason, the study utilized the terrorist cases assumed to be organized by the same 
terrorist organization. Moreover, the attacks were conducted in the busiest time of the targets to 
kill as many people as people possible. Another similarity was the simultaneity of the attacks.  
Literature generally cites these four cases together as major Al-Qaeda attacks against 
Western civilization (Riedel, 2007; Stevenson, 2006; Hoffman, 2007; Atwan, 2006, p. 10). 
However, besides the four attacks that were utilized by the study, the Bali bombings in 2002 and 
2005 and the Jakarta Bombings in 2004 are also thought to have been major Al-Qaeda attacks. 
Nonetheless, there is no conclusive evidence tying those attacks to Al-Qaeda (International 
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Crisis Group, 2006). On the other hand, the attacks in areas like Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and 
some other African countries took place in cities that did not have proper emergency 
management systems in place to respond to such disasters. Some international efforts were cited 
in the studies coming from the Australian government and some other western countries, 
including the U.S. (International Crisis Group, 2006); therefore, the Bali bombings and others 
were not considered a part of this study. 
3.2.1.1 The New York WTC Attacks, 2001 
Two different airplanes plowed into the North and South Towers of the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001, at 8.46 AM and 9:03 AM respectively. Within 90 minutes, both 
towers collapsed, causing the deaths of thousands of people including employees in the towers, 
people working close to the WTC towers, crisis management organization employees, police and 
fire department officials, and others. On the same day, another plane hit the Pentagon building in 
Washington, D.C. at 9:37 AM, killing dozens in the building and all the passengers on board. 
The last plane fell, with the passengers aboard, into a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 AM (Kean 
& Hamilton, 2004). Nearly 3,000 people died, and the damage was calculated in the billions of 
dollars. 
There were problems in New York with the emergency operations. The 9/11 Commission 
Report argues that there were problems especially in the Fire Department and Port Authority 
Department, neither of which were prepared for such an attack. Their equipment and 
communication tools were inadequate. Many of their employees lost connection and control 
during the emergency. The higher-ranked officials could not stay in touch with their teams, 
which caused inefficiency in the response efforts (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).  
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A significant amount of legislation was passed in the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Combining intelligence tools, uniting crisis management organizations, and toughening 
protective measures were the primary goals of those new policies. Combining intelligence 
sources was intended to integrate centralized government law enforcement agencies in one 
database. In this way, the government hoped to make central and local agencies more aware of 
imminent threats in the future. However, such a transition could not be accomplished because of 
reasons that ―merit examining‖ (Comfort, 2005). The Patriot Act was also questioned heavily by 
the public because of specific codes that seemed designed to limit individual freedom. 
The most important aspect of this government restructuring, as far this study is 
concerned, was the effort to unite all crisis management departments under one centralized 
department dubbed ―Homeland Security.‖ A department chief was appointed by the President; 
however, the department was officially without either budget or authority. A significant number 
of agencies involved with the White House opposed the department‘s creation, because they 
thought that such a structure would fail local emergency efforts (Comfort, 2005). It is still 
unclear whether centralized or decentralized governmental efforts are more successful in 
preventing casualties and damages during disasters. 9/11 was the most horrifying terror incident 
ever. It shaped many crisis management policies both in the U.S. and abroad. 
3.2.1.2 The Istanbul Bombings, 2003 
On November 15, 2003, two trucks full of explosives were detonated by suicide bomber 
terrorists in order to attack two synagogues simultaneously in Istanbul at 9.29 AM. It was 
Saturday, and the terrorists aimed to kill Jewish people at prayer time. The attack killed 30 
people, mostly Muslim Turkish citizens, and injured approximately 300 individuals. The second 
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attack came five days later, on November 20, and targeted both the largest HSBC Bank building 
in Turkey and the British Consulate in Istanbul with two trucks at 10.55 AM. The bloody 
terrorist attack killed 33 people, including the British Consul, and injured another four hundred 
fifty. The attacks created a crime scene dozens of miles square. The Turkish National Police was 
assisted by Israeli and British law enforcement agents during the crime scene investigation 
(Rodoplu, Arnold, Tokyay, Ersoy, & Cetiner, 2005; Tatil, 2005).  
The centralized structure of the law enforcement agency in Turkey helped the police to 
define all the suspects immediately after the attacks. All criminals linked to the bombings were 
apprehended within weeks (Tatil, 2005). The police force was the first to arrive at the crime 
scenes with other first responders—medical operators. These first responders immediately 
secured the area, although it was a huge crime scene, and processed the victims in the crime 
scene. A few people were sent to the hospitals; many of them were discharged after a small 
medical intervention (Rodoplu et al., 2005).  
The scale of these attacks was smaller than that of 9/11; however, it was the largest series 
of terrorist attacks the Turkish Republic had ever experienced. Communication and power lines 
were disrupted in the attack sites, which significantly undermined the rescue efforts. Four 
different attacks within five days affected the Turkish people psychologically and economically. 
The stock market fell 7.4% immediately after the attack. The chaotic environment remained until 
the roads were opened to service after CSI (Rodoplu et al., 2005).  
It was clear that Medical Emergency Management Services (MEMS) were not ready for 
the attacks. Similarly to 9/11 and other cases that will be discussed later, resources were used 
inefficiently. Every MEMS ambulance was sent to the crime scene, which only increased the 
chaos. Other parts of Istanbul were left without immediate medical services as a result. The 
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MEMS ambulances were not aware of triage application, which may have led to greater 
problems. Public announcements about the incidents were also not conducted by government 
officials, which led to disinformation among the public (Rodoplu et al., 2005). 
3.2.1.3 The Madrid Train Bombings, 2004 
This incident was Europe‘s worst-ever terrorist attack. Fourteen different bombs were 
located in different locations on Madrid train lines. Ten of them exploded simultaneously; trains 
going to different locations in Madrid were targeted by the terrorists. One hundred ninety-one 
people, including the perpetrators, died, and more than 1,500 were injured. Similarly to the 
Istanbul, London, and New York bombings, the terrorists aimed to cause the greatest number of 
casualties possible and attacked the transportation system at the busiest time of the day: 7:39 AM 
(Bolling et al., 2007).  
Spain‘s response was unprecedented. National and regional crisis management 
organizations worked together to help the people affected by the attack and find the criminals 
behind the attacks. The national authorities were involved in the case approximately one hour 
after the attack; by this time, the regional commanders had taken the injured to the nearest 
hospitals and secured the crime scenes for official investigation. Tent hospitals were established 
to mitigate the workload of the regular hospitals, and only 12 people died after being brought to 
the emergency health departments (Cornall, 2005). The Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan 
was well established to handle this kind of emergencies. 
Preparedness against terrorist activities in Spain is a result of the existence of the Basque 
Separatists and the ETA threat. Regional and national emergency officials were well aware of 
the extreme need for manpower in these situations, and for that reason, even though the incident 
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took place at the night-to-day shift change, neither the police nor health officials left for home, 
which doubled the emergency response force (Bolling et al., 2007). Medical groups, security 
officials, and police organizations worked in coordination with other governmental departments, 
according to the Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan. Ninety minutes after the first blast, there 
were no injured people in the area. After 11 hours, the transportation system was running as 
before (Cornall, 2005). 
3.2.1.4  The London Metro Bombings, 2005 
Because of the Istanbul attacks targeting the British Consulate, the UK government was 
aware of the possibility that a terror incident would target British Civilians (HMG, 2006). The 
terrorist contingency difference in the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) had been legislated, and 
related resilience efforts were being implemented. On the morning of July 7, 2005, at 8:50 AM, 
three different terrorists detonated their hand-made bombs in London Tube trains on their way to 
different destinations around London. The explosions in the trains killed 42 people, including the 
perpetrators, and injured hundreds of them. Approximately one hour later after the incident, 
another terrorist detonated his bomb on a bus, killing 14, including himself, and injuring 110 
others (HC, 2006). 
The government‘s preparedness can be understood from the timing of the first Cabinet 
Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) meeting formed by related Central Governmental agencies and 
Metropolitan Police. The COBR meeting started at 9:30 on the same morning, 15 minutes before 
the second attack. Even though the attack was not immediately confirmed as a terrorist attack, 
COBR remained steady. The Home Secretary and Metropolitan Police Commissioner made their 
statements on the incidents by adding that ―everything [wa]s under control and transportation 
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w[ould] be halted for a moment‖ at 11:00 AM. Later, the police investigation uncovered the 
identities of the terrorists who took part in the incident by using CCTV records and crime scene 
investigation techniques (HC, 2006). 
The central governmental approach to such an incident is important because of the need 
for public access to accurate, useful information (Rockett, 1994). A completely decentralized, 
local reaction to a major terror incident can create the danger of conflict between information 
sources, which can lead to greater chaos than the incident itself creates. Thus, COBR‘s early and 
accurate statements were useful in handle the public pressure (HC, 2006). The local police‘s and 
health officials‘ immediate response to the incident decreased the casualties. More than 350 
injured people were sent to the nearest hospitals. The coordination of the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat (CCS) saved lives and helped solve the case (HC, 2006). 
3.2.2 Social Network Analysis  
In each country, thousands of organizations operated to respond to the selected incidents. 
It is not possible to examine and survey all of the organizations participated. Random or 
stratified sampling of the organizations could distort the results of the study, since very important 
organizations could be left out of the sample if those methods were used. Instead, the study 
proposed to find the agencies that played a central part in rescue and recovery operations in 
selected cases. Social network analysis can be used to determine the most interacting members of 
a network; it was the secondary method of this study. Different software designs have recently 
been developed to conduct social network analysis. This study utilized UCINET (Borgatti et al., 
2002) which is widely accepted in the literature. 
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Scott (1988, p. 109) defines social networks as a reflection of a strange and powerful 
social reality that is generated by webs, grids, and textiles. These grids (or relationships) can be 
revealed with the help of computer software such as UCINET. UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) 
produces various scores to the relationships among elements in a network after a content analysis 
of the network examined. Such scores are generally provided by all social network analysis tools. 
Density and centrality scores are the most important outputs of a social network analysis. Degree 
centrality was seen as the immediate influence measurer by programmers of UCINET (Borgatti, 
2005), which made it the most appropriate scale for this study‘s sampling purposes.  
UCINET offers the centrality scores of networks based on the content analysis provided 
by researchers. Therefore, unless meticulously picked out, the content analysis and the results of 
UCINET can be misleading. The criteria for selecting UCINET content should be clarified. The 
objectivity of the selected content material will directly affect the possibility of objective 
research results and vice versa. Since the selected cases were generally the most important 
manmade disasters in the selected countries, the content was selected from governmental reports, 
non-governmental official reports, and news media reports. The UCINET analysis for each case 
selected was already conducted by a research team headed by Dr. Naim Kapucu at the University 
of Central Florida. The results of the network analysis data were used to identify agencies in 
response operations for the case countries. 
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3.2.3 Surveys and Structural Equation Modeling 
3.2.3.1 Survey Instruments 
The surveys involve personal questions about informal relationships. The questions on 
the adaptive capability and perceived effectiveness of organizations also required the privacy and 
confidentiality of the respondents. For that reason, surveys did not collect personal information 
such as names, email addresses, contact information, and so on. On the other hand, in order to 
have a description of the respondents, the administrative position each respondent held 
(Supervisor, Assistant Supervisor, Middle Manager, Team Leader, Frontline Manager, and 
Frontline Worker) and the type of first-responder organization to which each respondent 
belonged (Health, Nonprofit agencies such as the Red Cross, Law Enforcement, Education 
Facility, Search and Rescue Team, Fire Department, and Emergency Operation Center) were 
asked in surveys.  
In order to provide unity in the selected cases, the actual names of organizations were not 
asked. Instead, respondents selected the type of agency that was the most relevant to the group 
named in the surveys. This provided better results because some large agencies have employees 
from different expertise areas. For example, FEMA has more than 6,500 employees, including 
administrative bureau personnel, search and rescue teams, medical emergency staff, and training 
assistants. Moreover, this agency operated only in the 9/11 WTC Attacks in selected cases. 
Therefore, a classification based on agency type is more logical than collecting the actual names 
of agencies.  
Appendix A-1 presents the survey applied to American CM employees. Appendix A-1 
was used as a base for translated versions for other countries. The Turkish version (Appendix A-
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2) and Spanish version (Appendix A-3) were translated by bilingual independent translators. The 
British version (Appendix A-4) was also prepared with attention to the differences between 
British and American English. 
3.2.3.2 Sample Size 
Muthén and Muthén (2002) argued that the statistical models that employ structural 
equation modeling requires different sample sizes depending on the research study. There are 
rules of thumbs such as five (Bentler & Chou, 1987) and fifteen (Stevens, 1996) observations per 
used model variable. Loehlin (1992) suggests that an SEM model that has two to four 
endogenous variables should have at least one hundred observations. Loehlin (1992) also adds 
that two hundred observations will produce optimal results. However, all these rules of thumbs 
can mislead researchers and research results based on the discussed estimations. Muthén and 
Muthén (2002) cite the number of missing variables, the size of the model, the reliability of 
selected variables, and some other statistical characteristics as important factors for determining 
a sample size.  
This study collected ten survey responses per variable in SEM model (Figure 2). Since 
there are 23 observed variables in the model, the study needed 230 survey responses. This 
amount is more than what cited researchers suggested. There are four case-study countries; 
therefore, it was proposed to gather 57.5 responses for each country. The question of the number 
of agencies to select per country was another problem. There is not a clear answer to this 
question in the literature. The number should be more than one, as the content analysis could 
mislead the research as discussed above—a disadvantage of UCINET use. Considering the 
importance of network effort during a terrorist bombing, the study suggested reaching out to the 
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top six agencies that received the highest centrality scores in the social network analysis tables 
provided (Table 2, 3, 4, and 5). Therefore, the surveys would receive 10 (~9.6) responses per 
selected agency from each country. 
The selected organizations in the target countries were contacted via letters, e-mails, and 
telephones provided in the official websites. Periship Hazard Foundation provided a grant for the 
dissertation research which made it possible for the researcher to visit the selected countries in 
person. Agencies were asked to deliver the survey to their employees. Because the emergencies 
examined took place several years ago (New York-2001, Istanbul-2003, Madrid-2004, and 
London-2005), it would have been difficult to find all the members on the emergency worker 
lists at the time of this study. The snowball sampling method, a sampling method used for hidden 
or hard-to-find respondents, was therefore employed. Snowball sampling relies on referrals from 
initial subjects to generate additional subjects (Kalton & Anderson, 1986). As it had been some 
time since the attacks at each target location, employees who had retired or changed jobs were 
also targeted by sending out emails to related email newsletter groups and retiree foundations 
and organizations. The surveys also included an optional referral section. Using referrals, emails 
were sent out to those who had been referred directly.  
3.2.3.3 Operationalization of the Variables 
The study employed 23 factors and 2 estimated latent constructs. In total, 25 variables 
were defined and tested by the study. Factors and latent constructs were suggested by the 
literature discussed in previous sections. The fifth criterion of Quarantelli‘s effectiveness scale 
(1997) was examined in three dimensions in the survey as suggested. Table 1 demonstrates the 
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names and operationalization of 27 variables. Questions 18, 19, and 20 created a combined 
variable, which was used as a single factor in the statistical model. 









Title in statistical 
tools 
Survey Question Explanation 
Q1 Predictor Categorical Policy Changes 
after important 
events 
There has been important change(s) in 
my organization (structure, goals, and 
rules) because of an important event 
(Flood, terrorist attack, hurricane, bush 
fire, earthquake etc&) before. 
Variable tests flexibility of organization's goals and 
structures. If an important event changed 
something that failed to work during the process, 
this shows how adaptive and responsive an 
organization to environmental changes. 
Q2 Predictor Categorical Frequency of 
Important events 
There have been important events 
frequently up to now, which my 
organization should deal with. 
Variable checks if organizational experience keeps 
an important place in organizational memory in 
terms of effectiveness perception. If this question 
and perceived effectiveness is correlated, that 
would mean experience is important for 
organizational effectiveness. 
Q3 Predictor Categorical Intra-
organizational 
training efforts 
Intra-organizational training holds an 
important place in my organization. 
Variable looks for a relationship between 
organizational learning mechanisms and 
effectiveness perception. Intra-organizational 
training is hypothesized to have an impact on 
organizational effectiveness. 
Q4 Predictor Categorical openness to 
change 
My organization is open to change by 
any means. 
Variable seeks a correlation between openness of 
an agency and effectiveness perception of 
employees. This is different than the first variable 
since the prior one assumes coercion while the 
latter explains natural flexibility. 
Q5 Observed 
Factor 




I work with my coworkers to collectively 
solve the problems in the organization. 
Variable controls whether an employee work 
together with his friends or not. Some agencies can 
form individual groups which prevent collective 




Categorical have chance to 
talk informally 
and visit others 
I have the chance to talk informally and 
visit the other employees. 
Variable questions if informally visiting and 




Categorical socialize with 
coworkers outside 
of workplace 
I socialize with the coworkers outside of 
the workplace. 
Variable tests whether employees of examined 
agencies are socializing outside of workplace. This 











Title in statistical 
tools 
Survey Question Explanation 
promoted in personal time of employees. 
Q8 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical trust many 
coworkers a great 
deal 
I trust many coworkers a great deal. Variable tries to reveal the trust level of 




Categorical do not feel that 
any coworker is a 
true friend 
I do not feel any coworker is a true 
friend. 
Variable looks for a relationship that is exact 
opposite of previous question. If majority of 
employees do not agree with this, it would be 




Categorical formed strong 
friendships at 
work 
I formed strong friendships at work. Variable controls if relationships got better with 
time. Senior officials would have strong 








I work for the organization because 
she/he is here. 
Variable tests the strongest friendship variable of 
the study. Working for another soul in an agency 
states the strongest level of friendship. 
Q12 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical friendships make 
work a happier 
place 
Friendships make the workplace a 
happier place. 
Variable questions how much the employees 
believe that the friendships affected the workplace. 
If the quality of informal relationships is high, 
employees would generally agree with the 
statement the variable offered. 
Q13 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical friendships help to 
work 
cooperatively at 
times of stress 
Friendships help to work cooperatively 
with each other at times of stress. 
Variable tests if cooperative working is affected by 
friendships during stress times. Friendships are 
directly tested by this variable. 




Ratio Quality of 
informal 
relationships 
N/A This is the first latent construct of the study. 
Discussed nine questions estimate this latent 
variable. The correlations of estimating factors 
will indicate if the latent construct is successful 











Title in statistical 
tools 
Survey Question Explanation 
Q14 Observed 
Factor 





The employees of my organization know 
that each extreme event (terrorist 
bombings, flood, winter storm, 
earthquake, hurricane etc.) is different. 
My organization has plans and operates 
differently in each different extreme 
event. For example, we would use a 
different operational procedure for a 
flood than we would a terrorist bombing. 
Variable questions about respondents' knowledge 
on different perspectives of demands of an extreme 
event. If CM is affected by characteristics of a 
disaster agent, it would indicate a well-planned and 
effective CM and vice versa. 
Q15 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical carrying out 
generic functions 
My organization is ready to operate any 
generic emergency management 
functions (evacuation, temporary 
housing, alternative communication 
tools, warnings etc.). 
Variable tests the CM ability of the agencies. Cited 







My organization has plans to mobilize 
personnel (authorized employees and 
volunteers) and resources effectively. By 
effectively, I mean needed personnel and 
resources are well-identified in the crisis, 
they are located quickly and brought to 
bear correctly, and they are appropriate 
to the problems generated by the disaster. 
Variable questions the ability of a CM agency 
about whether it is capable to mobilize any means 
of resources to disaster areas effectively. This 
capability requires good and careful planning 











Title in statistical 
tools 
Survey Question Explanation 
Q17 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical delegation of tasks 
and division of 
labor 
My organization has a certain job 
definition during an extreme event. My 
organizations employees do not get 
involved in other kinds of labor during 
an extreme event different than the 
professionalization of my organization. 
Variable tests if the agency is supposed to conduct 
some certain labor that was planned before the 
incident. It would point out an ineffective CM if 








Information is processed adequately 
within my organization during a disaster. 
Communication tools and communicated 
material are satisfactory. 
Variable seeks a relationship between satisfaction 
level of processed information within an agency 







agency and other 
responding 
agencies 
Information is processed adequately 
between my organization and other 
responding organizations during a 
disaster. Communication tools and 
communicated material are satisfactory. 
Variable seeks a relationship between satisfaction 
level of processed information between an agency 










Information is processed adequately 
between my organization and affected 
citizens during a disaster. 
Communication tools and communicated 
material are satisfactory. 
Variable seeks a relationship between satisfaction 
level of processed information between an agency 












Title in statistical 
tools 






My organization keeps exercising 
decision-making properly in the crisis 
time as well. The organizational 
jurisdiction differences within or outside 
of the organization cannot be a problem; 
emergent groups and my organization do 
not have a conflict on organizational 
domains. Responsibility for new disaster 
tasks is not a problem that we cannot 
resolve easily. 
Variable tests whether an agency is applying 
proper decision-making processes with affected 
citizens, emergent groups and with other agencies 
even during an extreme event. Jurisdictional 
conflict are resolved within this process, which 
result in effective CM. 
Q22 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical developing overall 
co-ordination 
My organizations employees work 
coordinative with the other organization 
employees in the crisis scene. Leadership 
in critical phases is not a problem. Since 
community good is more important to us, 
the willingness to de-emphasize 
organizational claims of leadership is 
high in my organization. 
Variable controls if competition among agencies 
exist during a disaster. Competition and leadership 




Categorical blending emergent 
and established 
organizations 
My organization has plans to include the 
emerging resources into the 
organizational labor during a disaster. I 
and my other colleagues believe that 
volunteers and other emergent 
stakeholders are important sources to 
bring the social order back. My 
organization employees do not think that 
the emergent resources are useless 
because they are not controllable as we 
are. 
Variable questions ability of an agency about 
utilizing emergent groups and volunteers. It 
requires good planning to establish a CM system 
that would blend authorized and emergent 











Title in statistical 
tools 
Survey Question Explanation 
Q24 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical appropriate reports 
for the news 
media 
My organization supports the 
developments of relationships that are 
acceptable and beneficial to the 
responding organizations, the mass 
media and citizens in general. During 
extreme events, citizens are satisfied 
with the relatively accurate picture of 
what is going on via our broadcasting 
systems or press. 
Variable seeks a correlation between appropriate 
and reliable reports provided to media and others 
requested, and CM effectiveness perception. For a 
successful CM, it was hypothesized that 
respondents should agree with the statement. 
Q25 Observed 
Factor 
Categorical a well-functioning 
emergency 
operations center 
My organization works with an 
emergency operation center (EOC) 
during disasters. We are represented in 
EOC in the highest level possible, we 
work co-operatively with the other 
responders, we benefit from it since we 
know what the others are doing and how 
we can help them. 
Variable looks for a relationship between existence 
of an emergency operation center and CM 
effectiveness perception. The question emphasizes 
the importance of "well-operating" characteristic of 
EOC. 








N/A This is the dependent variable of the study. 
Perceived effectiveness of CM networks is 
estimated by ten discussed variables. The SEM 
model looks for the relationships between this 




Categorical N/A Information is processed adequately 
between my organization and affected 
citizens, between my organization and 
other responding organizations, and 
within my organization during a disaster. 
Communication tools and communicated 
material are satisfactory. 
Variable seeks a relationship between satisfaction 
level of processed information between an agency 
and other responding agencies, between an agency 
and affected citizens, and within an agency and 
effectiveness of CM. Variable combined Q18, 
Q19, and Q20 based on Quarantelli‘s (1997) 
suggestion. 
Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau (2000) pointed out that SEM (Structural Equation 
Modeling) is a second-generation statistics analysis tool that can answer single, systematic, and 
comprehensive research questions. The ability to model both dependent and independent variable 
constructs simultaneously differentiates SEM from first-generation statistical tools such as 
ANOVA as well as from regression analysis, which can only handle one dependent variable at a 
time. SEM can calculate the regression scores among related latent variables created by software 
in a single test. The test can be projected on a figure with regression scores next to each 
relationship. Latent (estimated) constructs are illustrated in circles, and observed (indicator) 
variables are illustrated in cornered shapes. Hypothesized correlation paths between latent and 
observed variables are represented as arrows in model. Latent constructs that are targets of other 
constructs‘ arrows are endogenous (dependent) variables, while affecting latent constructs are 
called exogenous (independent) variables. 
The study employed thirteen variables (nine informal relationship qualities and four 
organizational adaptations) to estimate the latent construct the quality of informal relationships 
within crisis management organizations. Another fifteen variables (four organizational 
adaptation variables, one latent quality of informal relationships, and ten perceived effectiveness 
variables) estimated the latent construct perceived effectiveness of interorganizational network. 
Both informal relationship and effectiveness constructs were endogenous variables while 




Figure 2. Proposed SEM Model for Comparative CM Analysis 
 
To validate the proposed model, various goodness-of-fit measures were examined to 
improve the fit of the model with the data. The goodness-of-model-fit statistics of an SEM model 
(Arbuckle, 2006) include X
2
 score (Chi-square fit index) tests if the given model‘s 
covariance/correlation matrix fits an unconstrained model. For that reason, chi-square fit index 
should not have a significant probability value, as this will mean the failure to reject null 
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because sample size directly affects its results. The greater the sample size, the easier it is to 
wrongfully reject the null hypothesis (Schumaker & Lomax, 2004). For that reason, other 
statistical tests were used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit measures in addition to the chi square 
test.  
Another test for Chi-square fit index is the likelihood ratio (LR), which is obtained by 
following formula; 
LR = x²/df 
LR is expected to be less than 4.0 for a good model fit.  The LR is also called normalized 
Chi-square index in the literature. It is better when the LR is closer to one. Bentler‘s comparative 
fit index (CFI) is another important test; it compares the given model against the independence 
model as a baseline model. The CFI can be between 0 and 1, though it is preferable for a model 
to get CFI value closer to one. The next test used in the study is the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). As can be understood from its name, RMSEA adds approximation 
errors to a given sample population and then tests whether the optimal sample size will fit when 
unknown parameter values are chosen. 
Rules of thumb suggest that the RMSEA should be less than .05. However, it is also 
suggested that the fit is acceptable if the RMSEA score is less than .08.  The GFI and AGFI 
(Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index) assess the squared residuals from prediction compared to the 
sample data. The GFI and AGFI statistics range from 0 to 1; greater than .9 is considered a good 
fit. There are also three important values for examining the individual effects of variables on 
latent constructs. The first of them is the critical ratio (CR). The CR is obtained by dividing an 
observed estimate to its own standard error. A significant CR value should be more than 1.96 if 
the effect is positive and vice versa. The other two individual assessment values are 
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unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients. Similarly to all other statistical tests, 
regression coefficients indicate the explained percentage of the variance in a tested variable 
(Byrne, 2001).  
To sum up the quantitative part of the study, the methodology portion contained three 
phases. The first method is the case-study analysis (Yin, 2003) method that helped to define four 
terrorist attacks from all over the world. Selecting cases, the research utilized social network 
analysis tables to discern the top-interacting organizations that took part in response and 
recovery operations after those incidents. Besides officially contacting the agencies, the 
researcher utilized snowball sampling for individual sampling from those organizations because 
it was unlikely to find the list of employees that were on duty that day. Lastly, the sample was 
surveyed and the results were interpreted in an SEM model (Byrne, 2001). 
The qualitative portion of the research examined the relationships among public 
administration systems, organizational attributes, and social-economical conditions of the 
countries and their emergency management systems. CM literature, official reports, and 
interviews with officials who actually took part in selected incidents were used in this qualitative 
portion to offer descriptive ideas, not to make figure-based comments.  
3.3 Increasing Reliability and Item Response Theory 
The surveys the study utilized directly affected the correlation results of this study. Any 
misinterpretation and/or miscalculation would lead to a failure in testing the hypotheses. 
Therefore, the survey questions should be designed carefully. Since informal relationship 
questions could generate biased answers, the researcher should consider giving enough response 
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space for the interviewee. Item Response Theory (IRT) argues that fewer or more answers than 
needed will fail the test (Baker, 2001). 
Instead, the researcher should add or subtract unrelated suggestive multiple choices from 
the test. For example, assume that an interview conducted within selected organizations will 
include a question asking how often somebody sees colleagues within the same organization 
during a given time period. This question is different from a question that asks whether the 
employee has the cell phone number of any other employee from the same organization. The 
second question will be answered by a ―Yes‖ or ―No.‖ The first question, however, will be 
answered by a number. Therefore, personal judgments can affect the response of the interviewee. 
In order to prevent this situation, the survey should include more than three answers. For 
example, answer choices of ―1,‖ ―2,‖ and ―3 and more‖ will not be sufficient to understand the 
relationship level of the interviewee.  
The multiple choices for this specific interview question can even be different in different 
countries. For example, shaped as it is by the religion of Islam, Turkish culture is less 
individualistic than the other countries surveyed through this study.  For that reason, Turkish 
crisis management employees could be more communicative with each other than other 
countries‘ employees. The multiple choice answers for the question discussed above should 
therefore be structured differently in Turkey. IRT suggests that the numbers used to answer that 
question should be greater in Turkey than the other countries because of the social characteristics 
of Turkey. If IRT were not utilized, the study would make erroneous conclusions.  
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3.3.1 Human Subjects 
Some of the surveys were conducted using the snowball sampling method, while some 
other respondents were reached directly. Informed consents from the survey participants were 
obtained before they filled out the surveys. In the consent forms, it was documented that the rules 
for the protection of human subjects would be strictly adhered to and results would be provided 
to the participants after the completion of the study. No personal identifiers were retained in the 
research file, so the confidentiality of the respondents was ensured. 
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 Qualitative Analyses 
Disasters were not realized as disasters by human beings for a long time in history. This 
public belief changed with modern science and its effect on public administration systems. 
Quarantelli (2000) classifies current societies in the world in three categories:  
1. Societies that think the disasters are inevitable. These societies generally link extreme 
events to supernatural powers. The mitigation and preparedness phases of CM are 
largely ignored in those public administration systems. 
2. Societies that accept disasters as natural occasions that can be mitigated but cannot be 
prevented in any way. 
3. Societies that argue that disasters can often be prevented. Mitigation and preparedness 
are the most important components of these CM systems. 
The historic development of public systems follows this path sequentially through time. 
Quarantelli (2000) summarizes these three perspectives and their historical development as ―Act 
of God‖ through ―Act of Nature‖ to ―Act of Human Beings‖ (2000, 4). Necessary precautions 
against disasters are not taken adequately until the last phase, which has generally worsened the 
situation in future disasters (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). Until World War Two, no society on 
earth had established an agency specifically dealing with disasters. Police, fire brigades, and 
others operated only to do their jobs and acted non-collectively. Quarantelli (2000) argued that 
ancient structures built to stop flood-type disasters were generally not successful and did not last 
long enough to establish CM systems. The air raids that caused many civilian deaths during 
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World War Two were the main reason for the development of civil defense (civil protection) 
strategies. Public alarms or sirens were primitive tools in air attack warnings. Shelters, search 
and rescue teams, and air raid wardens were connected to public agencies, which started the first 
CM policies (Quarantelli, 2000). Presently, mitigation and preparedness phases are increasingly 
receiving government attention.  
The public administration systems of selected countries are quite different from one 
another (Table 18/Appendix C). Although they can be grouped as European (Spain, U.K.), 
American (U.S.), and Middle Eastern (Turkey), this type of distinction is not enough to explain 
all of the differences. Roughly speaking, federal government involvement in Turkey is the 
strongest of the countries others in terms of local administrative involvement. The U.S. federal 
government can be assumed as the weakest at handling crises, since the U.S. local 
administrations have more power and authority than those of the European countries selected. 
Turkey and the U.S. do not have a royal family, while Spain and the U.K. have had royal 
institutions for hundreds of years. Explaining the differences in CM efforts and policies during 
selected incidents, as well as the public administration and CM systems of the case countries, 
will be presented in detail in this section. 
Different reports and interviews related to the incidents in selected countries may 
demonstrate how local and federal public, private, and nonprofit agencies acted in the incidents. 
Looking at those reports, one can discuss the procedures that CM network followed in crisis 
time. Official CM response frameworks were examined to see whether there is a difference 
between theoretical and practical crisis procedures. The differences caused by the presence of a 




Cold War tactics framed the first CM policies in the U.S. The Cold War-type disaster 
understanding is a centralistic-militaristic command-control perspective (Dynes, 1989). There 
are two versions of disaster management in command-control: pre-disaster normal term and 
disaster term. Chaos during disasters affects any kind of social order badly, so it must be 
reordered no matter the cost. During chaos, only central structures can be reliable, because they 
are authorized over all other structures and possess the most extensive power and technology. 
Ordinary management structures are not reliable because so many of them are trying to survive 
without sufficient information and sources. In the pre-disaster term, local authorities can be 
coordinated and supervised because it is easier to do so without a chaotic environment. However, 
during disasters there is no other possibility for reestablishing social order than command and 
control. 
4.1.1.1 History 
Dynes (1989) argues that the basic assumption of the command-control model, which 
supposes that an emergency declaration will reestablish social order, is wrong. He asserts that it 
requires a great deal of interorganizational effort even to estimate the actual scope of a disaster. 
Collaborative efforts are prevented by command-control systems because the central agency 
holding authority can deter others from gaining useful information. Since command-control 
management assumes that the disasters are obvious, it generally fails to detect them even after 
they began. Late detection of a disaster increases harm caused to affected entities. 
Another argument defended in command-control policies is that civilian forces cannot be 
adequate to respond to disasters. For that reason, responders should be military personnel or 
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paramilitary personnel such as law enforcement officials. Volunteers or victims of disasters 
cannot be of any help since they are outside the command chain. Dynes (1989) suggests that 
civilian forces are ignored in command-control systems since they are thought to be self-
centered, weak, panicked, and antisocial. The disorganization of non-military personnel is 
another argument in defense of command-control. Loosely coupled connections cannot be 
allowed, the better to stop chaos. Delivering resources to persons needed is the job of military, or 
at least paramilitary, personnel. Disorganized behaviors are targeted during the pre-disaster era 
with tough legislations.  
The discussion of command-control systems has taken almost the same route in all of the 
countries selected by the study. However, the U.S. example is so clear and so thoroughly 
discussed that it is mentioned under the U.S. part of this study. The primitive U.S. crisis handling 
system had a militaristic background because the aim of civil protection was to defend the 
community against nuclear attacks (Dynes, 1989). The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 
legislated against enemy attacks and held the Secretary of Defense responsible for crisis 
management. The Secretary of Defense then assigned CM duties to the Defense Civil 
Preparedness Agency. Because of the Cold War‗s influence on the U.S. CM perspective, the 
majority of employees in the agency were ex-military personnel. Over time, international tension 
reduced, but the military understanding of national defense did not change for a long time despite 
local administrations‘ participation in CM efforts.  
A series of natural disasters in the 1960s and 1970s (Hurricane Carla-1962, Alaskan 
Earthquake-1964, Hurricane Betsy-1965, Hurricane Camille-1969, San Fernando Earthquake-
1971, and Hurricane Agnes-1972) triggered new legislations specifically addressing natural 
disasters. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 tried to shift the enemy attack perspective of CM to 
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that of disaster assistance by authorizing and holding responsible local and state authorities for 
disaster assistance (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). FEMA‘s foundation during the Carter 
Administration in 1979 was a response to criticisms reminding the central government of its 
responsibility in disaster response. Many different disaster relief agencies were combined into 
FEMA, which also involved local and state authorities. These partnerships in time evolved CM 
into a loosely coupled system. Local, state and federal partnerships shifted from the command-
control approach to that of coordination-supervision. The debate between the two methods is 
ongoing, though scholars by and large support coordination-supervision (Dynes, 1989). 
Birkland and Waterman (2008) argued that the Reagan and Bush administrations (1981-
1993) ignored the importance of FEMA, which turned agency into a ―turkey farm‖ (2008, p. 
696). Although the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act clearly put FEMA in a leading 
role in CM, the agency could not do much without presidential support. The Stafford Act of 1988 
and the amendments to the Act in 1993 and 2000 did not change the notion of command-control 
system. The bills introduced a shared-governance idea; however, local and state governments 
remained limited to the role of first responders in any kind of extreme event, with their role in 
mitigation efforts ignored. The federal government still assumed primary responsibility, although 
the Stanford Act and its amendments tried to change this dynamic.  
FEMA‘s unsuccessful disaster assistance efforts were sharply criticized in the early 
1990s. Birkland and Waterman (2008, p. 697) quote a U.S. Senator who called FEMA officials 
―the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses‖ in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The 
Federal Response Plan of 1992 included many civilian organizations, such as the American Red 
Cross, as first responders in addition to the traditional first responders—police and fire 
departments. The Clinton Administration applied the lessons learned after Hurricane Andrew and 
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widened the definition of the term ―disaster‖ to make more disaster relief studies eligible for 
federal funding. In 1994 and 1997, hazard mitigation was specifically targeted by Mitigation 
Directorate, which started Project Impact.  
FEMA turned its attention to natural hazards, but manmade disasters such as terrorist 
attacks were not forgotten. The Office of Domestic Preparedness was established in 1998 under 
the Department of Justice; it focused on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Right after 
9/11, the natural-hazard perspective of CM policies was changed once again with the passing of 
the Patriot Act in 2001, and funding for Project Impact was cancelled. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) was established as a Cabinet office in 2002, and FEMA was 
transferred into this newly established federal office. In other words, 9/11 caused the federal 
government to change the natural-disaster-and-hazard-mitigation perspective of CM back to civil 
defense and command-control once again. Unfortunately, the transfer of FEMA into DHS did 
not make some senior FEMA officials happy; eventually many of them left the agency. The 
FEMA director‘s direct connection with the President was discontinued in new system, which 
left disaster management under the authority of the inexperienced DHS.  
Despite U.S. CM developments away from the natural hazard perspective, the four 
different hurricane disasters that hit Florida in 2004 were successfully managed by FEMA and 
Florida emergency management organizations. Birkland and Waterman (2008) suggest that this 
success was misleading because all four of hurricanes were respectively small and the state of 
Florida itself was prepared for hurricanes more than any other state in the country. Hurricane 
Katrina revealed the fact that FEMA and the federal government were actually ineffective in 
coordinating and supervising disasters. Their failure to evacuate victims, underestimation of the 
importance of mitigation efforts, and shortcomings in handling the chaotic environment in the 
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recovery phase resulted in heavy criticism of federal and local CM policies in the U.S. FEMA 
was criticized for being slow, DHS was criticized for constraining FEMA‘s ability, and the 
National Response Plan (NRP) adapted from the Federal Response Plan (FRP) was blamed for 
being extremely centralist. The NRP was prepared without FEMA‘s participation, and it was 
written in vague language that failed to clearly address the agencies authorized in disaster 
management. The focus of the NRP was terrorism or terrorism-related disasters, reminiscent of 
the 1950s‘ Cold War strategies. 
NRP was revised into the National Response Framework (NRF) after Hurricane Katrina, 
but the basic command-control routines remained. Cold War tactics and the terrorism focus are 
still dominant, although Katrina cost more in human lives and public damage than 9/11 did. 
FEMA is still underrepresented in the NRF. The NRF was also not discussed with local or state 
officials or any other professional emergency management organizations before going into 
effect. Homeland security still has priority over disaster preparedness in U.S. CM. The Obama 
Administration‘s first year did not bring any significant change in disaster management policies, 
except that the experienced director of the Florida Emergency Management Office was 
appointed to head FEMA. It is expected that FEMA will be taken out of DHS to give priority to 
natural hazards and shift the command-control back to that of coordination-supervision; 
however, the economic crisis seems to have postponed those changes for now.  
Birkland and Waterman (2008) argue that shifting CM attention from natural hazards to 
homeland security or vice versa is pure politics. Such moves actually stem from the clash 
between different understandings of federalism. Giving authority to state and local governments 
is a bad idea according to those who think the federal government should be superior, strong, and 
powerful all the time, in times of both peace and war. Although it remains relatively small in 
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size, the U.S. federal government takes critical aspects of its jurisdiction as givens, such as 
intelligence gathering and use, the gathering and use of any kind of other information source, 
unquestionable authority on any property and right inland, and the cooperation of local and state 
governments in these understandings. In terms of CM, local and state administrations are only 
first responders; they initiate response and recovery but then ask for federal help. Mitigation 
efforts are generally ignored or underrated.  
Others think the federal government should not be small, but instead cooperative, 
coordinative, and more a partner than a director. Natural hazards and disaster mitigation, in this 
perspective, should have federal importance equal to terrorism threats. Therefore, national plans 
should clearly define the roles of local, state, and federal agencies. In order to provide the highest 
efficiency, local emergency management agencies‘ participation is important to the planning 
process. Federal disaster assistance organizations have the highest possible representation in 
White House. Terrorist threats are also important and evaluated by other professional federal 
organizations. The basic philosophy of disaster management should, in this view, be 
coordination-supervision rather than command-control.  
4.1.1.2 Discussion 
The Federal Response Plan (FRP), which mobilizes Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 
during a disaster, was in effect during 9/11. Each first-responder organization has one or more 
roles in these ESFs. An agency is held primarily responsible for each ESF. Once a disaster is 
called in, the primary agency coordinates others and operates the action that has already been 
defined in the FRP. FEMA was supposed to be the main coordinator of all CM; therefore it was 
supposed to be the most central agency in 9/11 CM network. 
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The NY Emergency Management Office (NYEMO) was the main local coordination 
agency during the attacks. Its efficiency was questioned since NYEMO‘s establishment was in 
the World Trade Center 7 building, which also collapsed that day (J. Feal, personal 
communication, June 5, 2009). The local CM network was based on NYEMO, FDNY, and 
NYPD communication and coordination; however, NYEMO stayed off CM because of the 
attack, which badly affected local CM efforts (Asaeda, 2005). FBI and the U.S. Army did the job 
that was supposed to have been done by local organizations. Asaeda (2005) also mentions 
communication failure between the FDNY and the NYPD, as well as the demoralization of 
personnel because of the death of colleagues, as having a negative impact on local CM efforts. 
American Red Cross (ARC) established nine public shelters in Manhattan within 24 
hours of the attacks. The agency also started blood and money donation campaigns for victims 
immediately. The FRP suggested that other local and federal agencies should be in control in a 
terrorist attack; however, the ARC holds an important place in recovery studies. The Department 
of Design and Construction for the City of New York (DDC) and The Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey (PAPD) were other effective local agencies helped the life coming back to 
normal (M. Horn, personal communication, March 23, 2009). The FDNY lost 343 of their 
members in collapsed buildings (Asaeda, 2005), which shows that the agency was in a key 
position in the CM network. Fallen officials were accepted as a failure in the WTC response, but 
Asaeda (2005) argues that the attacks were completely unexpected. It was also mistakenly 
believed that the WTC buildings would not collapse because they had not in the 1993 bombings; 
as well, the local CM center was demolished and an alternative location had not been defined 
beforehand; finally, the first responders‘ communication devices did not work effectively.  
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Against all odds, local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) belonging to local and non-
profit agencies established the first triage units within ten minutes, right across the street from 
the North Tower. After the collapse of the buildings the triage units were drawn back from the 
incident site, but patients continued to be treated. One hundred four New York regional hospitals 
treated 6,538 patients, of which 477 were admitted. Of those who were admitted, only 16 
patients died in hospitals within a week (Asaeda, 2005). NY City has a population of 8,000,000, 
and Manhattan alone houses over 1,500,000 people. The WTC incident site is located in one of 
the busiest places in Manhattan—especially at morning rush hour, the time of the attacks. In 
terms of the scope and unexpectedness of such an attack, the response can be said to have been 
quite successful.  
Nonetheless, FRP and actual CM evaluation indicated that some agencies did not perform 
as well as they were supposed to, while others operated well above expectations. J. Feal 
(personal communication, June 5, 2009) evaluated federal government involvement inWTC 
attacks as weak at best. In the response and recovery phases, local operational agencies should 
have done more, as pointed out in the FRP (Now the NRF). Unfortunately, new developments in 
CM in the U.S. in 2002 did not apply the lessons learned from 9/11, and in fact worsened the 
situation by disregarding the roles of local and state authorities (Wise & Nader, 2002). This 
oversight caused the failure of CM in Hurricane Katrina (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).   
4.1.2 Turkey 
The Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War One, and almost all Anatolia was 
occupied by different countries‘ armies. A war of independence began in 1919 and succeeded in 
1922. Turkey abolished the monarchy in 1920 and changed her name from Ottoman Empire to 
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Turkish Republic. Since then, elections have been held every four years to elect the government, 
but the central government has remained strong in the public administration system. The highest-
level local public administrators in cities are appointed by the central government, and there is no 
local police force in Turkey. The heads of municipalities, mayors, are still elected, and 
municipalities are supposed to provide basic services such as water, electricity, and sewage. 
Local administrations‘ authority has increased steadily in the last decade and seems likely to 
increase in the near future. 
4.1.2.1 History 
Ninety-eight percent of the Turkish population lives in areas with a significant risk of 
earthquakes. Sixty-one percent of all the disasters that have happened in Turkey between 1931 
and the present have been earthquakes, and another 30% have been landslides and floods.  
Turkey tops the life-loss list of disasters of the last 60 years, along with China, Russia, Peru, and 
Iran. The latest major earthquakes to hit Turkey took place in Marmara on August 17 and 
November 12, 1999, leaving a total of 18,243 dead and 48,901 injured (Akdag, 2002). Terrorism 
is another threat to Turkish society; it has claimed 30,000 to 35,000 people in last 30 years 
(Rodoplu et al., 2005). The total death toll is not comparable to any other developed country on 
the planet. Turkish disaster management changed its course after the Marmara Earthquakes in 
1999.  
Akdag (2002) sorts the disaster management history of Turkey into four periods. The pre-
1944 period includes CM policies in the Ottoman Empire and early years of the Turkish 
Republic. In this period, the disaster-oriented policies were aimed solely at response and 
recovery. Although the majority of population lived in earthquake-prone areas, local and central 
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governments failed to address needs for stronger buildings. Victims rebuilt their houses without 
the necessary supervision. Akdag (2002) cites a law from 1509 outlawing non-wooden structures 
in Istanbul; clearly, these types of regulations were neither updated nor enforced. The greatest 
earthquake to hit Turkey was in 1939 in an eastern city, Erzincan; it claimed 32,962 lives. The 
quake was so strong that 116,720 buildings collapsed during the disaster and the city was 
relocated.   
Besides Erzincan, other strong earthquakes took place in Niksar, Adapazari, Tosya, and 
Bolu within five years of each other (between 1939 and 1944), resulting in over 43,000 deaths 
and 200,000 collapsed buildings. A mitigation law dated 1944 started the new period in CM in 
Turkey. Partnerships with universities were established, new regulations were created, and an 
earthquake risk map of Turkey was created in the following year. The 1944 legislation did not 
change the need for specific legislations for other specific disasters. However, it offered a strong 
basis for mitigation and preparedness efforts, especially against earthquakes. Building new 
structures was allowed only with control and permits after the 1944 legislation passed. 
These regulations were applied mostly by central agencies. However, confusion reigned 
among executive agencies because there was no primary agency to administer those efforts. In 
1958, The Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement was established in the Cabinet to pursue 
mitigation efforts in Turkey. Later, in 1983, the ministry was merged with The Ministry of 
Public Works and turned into The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. The third period of 
CM in Turkey (1958-1999) begins with establishment of this cabinet office. Additional 
regulations cancelled the maintenance of individual funds for each disaster; instead, a single 
fund, the Disasters Fund, was created for all past and future disasters managed by the above 
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ministry. Furthermore, all natural hazards were defined as disasters, including forest fires, floods, 
avalanches, earthquakes, landslides, storms, and the like.  
A series of earthquakes and other natural disasters continued to hit different Turkish 
regions and claim more lives in the third period. Specific legislations and disaster declarations 
for the affected regions were passed by Parliament. Earthquake funds were separated from other 
disaster funds. Minor changes in CM policies were made with amendments, but the 1958 
legislation remained largely the same until the 1999 Marmara Earthquakes, which started the 
most recent period of the Turkish CM system. These earthquakes differed from others because 
they affected a large area of land containing the majority of nation‘s population. The affected 
area was the most industrialized region of the country, and present-day policies failed because of 
the scope of disaster. The Cabinet immediately declared a state of emergency in the affected 
region, and a new CM legislation came into effect in ten days privatizing the supervision of 
building privately owned structures. All newly built structures were mandated to have valid 
insurance.  
The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement has been the major player in natural 
disasters management from the 1999 earthquakes up to now. The General Directorate of Disaster 
Affairs (GDDA), under the Ministry, coordinates CM in Turkey. In extreme events, CM is 
supervised by a committee called the Prime Minister Crisis Management Center (PMCMC), 
headed by the Prime Minister. The Secretariat in the PMCMC is the GDDA, providing 
coordination among central and local committees and subcommittees.  Member agencies of 
different committees or subcommittees do not change; the only change is in the ranks of the 




Red Crescent is an important agency in CM; almost any kind of primitive sheltering and 
food is provided by this organization. It is a nonprofit agency just like the Red Cross, which also 
heavily depends on donations. Red Crescent‘s duties are not limited to disaster relief; they also 
include delivering incoming aid material to those who need it, providing immediate medical 
assistance to victims, coordinating aid efforts with international disaster relief organizations such 
as the Red Cross, and campaigning for blood donations. Local and national Red Crescent 
officials take part in official CM committees.  
As a result of the 1999 earthquakes, a central CM office under the Prime Minister was 
established. The General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management (GDTEM) is a FEMA-
like agency that is responsible for coordinating CM when natural and manmade disasters 
threaten the nation. The GDTEM is assigned to establish CM units in local and central public 
agencies, to supervise and provide essential communication among them, to prepare disaster 
plans for national threats, and to administer further arrangements in future CM. The International 
Money Fund (IMF) funded many other mitigation projects after the 1999 earthquakes, and the 
establishment of GDTEM was a condition of receiving the credit. The government would not 
have gotten the IMF loan if the GDTEM had been established even one day later (Celik, 2007). 
Akdag (2002) argues that the GDTEM has not solved Turkey‘s CM problems. The GTDEM has 
a very limited number of personnel and insufficient resources and expertise, posing another 
obstacle for successful CM. 
Case-study city Istanbul established a local emergency management center, which also 
mobilizes disaster relief mechanisms during disasters occurring in the city. Although it has 
limited resources and limited authority, the Istanbul Disaster Coordination Center (AKOM) is 
coordinating with universities and other NGOs to prepare for future disasters. Besides AKOM 
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(which is controlled by an elected official) there exists another emergency management center 
belonging to the Governor of Istanbul (an appointed official). While AKOM lacks a law 
enforcement agency in the disaster plan, the Governor‘s CM center lacks a fire brigade service. 
As discussed in the beginning, this is a result of the central government‘s attitude toward the 
public administration system of Turkey.  
Some voluntary CM agencies play critical roles in Turkish CM, although they are 
underrated. The Search and Rescue Association (AKUT) and the Search, Rescue, and Research 
Association (AKA) are important civilian voluntary search-and-rescue teams in Turkey. These 
organizations generally recruit mountaineers. Volunteers belonging to those organizations are 
mobilized to disaster areas to search for and rescue survivors in inaccessible areas, such as 
building ruins after an earthquake or a high altitude location after a plane accident. Like the Red 
Cross, these organizations also operate in Turkey and will assist in any country if requested. 
AKA, AKUT, and the Red Cross provided disaster assistance to Taiwan in 1999, India in 2001, 
and Iran in the 2003 earthquakes. The Red Crescent donated $1.5 million to the American Red 
Cross for disaster assistance during Hurricane Katrina. Akdag (2002) suggests that the further 
involvement of voluntary nonprofit agencies in CM is a must for successful disaster response and 
recovery.  
CM coordinating agencies established after 1999 number so many that they nearly equal 
the number of CM participants. Therefore, coordination is not the issue in a possible disaster; the 
multiplicity of coordinating agencies is itself a problem. CM authorities do not have skills and 
expertise, while CM operatives do not have adequate authority to perform in disaster areas and to 
receive essential information. This is somewhat similar to the situation in the U.S. Unfortunately, 
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while both central and local organizations struggle for more authority and power it is the 
community who pays for the price of ineffective CM (Celik, 2007). 
4.1.2.2 Discussion 
It was discussed that it would be ineffective to have too many coordinating agencies 
instead of actual CM-performing agencies. Although AKUT and AKA are volunteer-based, 
donation-funded, small, and non-profit organizations, they were reported to have dominated the 
CM network in Istanbul Bombings in 2003 (K. Coban, personal communication, April 12, 2009). 
USAID Report (2005) claimed that AKOM, GTDEM, and GDDA did not perform enough to be 
considered in an effective place in the CM.  
The Medical Bureau, 112 Emergency Medical Service (EMS), and the Red Crescent 
provided immediate health assistance to victims. Although EMS officials failed to set up triage 
units in the incident site, Rodoplu et al. (2005) reported that medical intervention was successful. 
The Medical Bureau is under the municipality and a local agency. However, 112 EMS belongs to 
the Ministry of Health of federal government. All ambulance vehicles in Turkey use capital city 
Ankara‘s license plate codes. Kizilay, on the other hand, is a nonprofit agency that falls between 
a central and local agency. Fortunately, despite being responsible to different level of 
government agencies, all three medical agencies operated together.  
There is just one law enforcement agency operating in cities in Turkey. It is Turkish 
National Police.The agency is represented by local divisions that are connected to capital city 
Ankara. Therefore, Istanbul Police Department (IPD) is the only law enforcement agency that 
can fulfill crime scene protection and investigation efforts that started immediately after the 
attacks. Religious (Hezbollah, IBDA-C), Marxist (DHKP-C, PKK-KADEK), Ultranationalist 
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(Ergenekon) and many other different terrorist organizations have attacked civilians and 
government officials for own purposes for many years. The Turkish National Police (TNP) has 
an important role in terrorist-made disasters. 
Thanks to good medical services, the coordination agencies‘ ineffectiveness did not do 
any harm to CM; however, some other aspects of the response and recovery phase were 
eventually neglected. R. Kilic (personal communication, April 12, 2009) argued about 
impressive involvement of Istanbul Fire Department and other municipal services. Coordination 
and communication among first responders is anessential need which was largely neglected 
during the recovery phase in the Istanbul Bombings. 
Reports confirm ineffective CM from different aspects (Rodoplu et al., 2005). For 
example, medical units and other first responders rushed into bombing sites without considering 
the possibility that there might be a second bomb. Additionally, the poisonous gas ammonia that 
had been used for the blasts was still in the air when first responders took control of the scene. 
Volunteers, bystanders, and the press could not be kept out of crime scenes, endangering their 
own security. 112 EMS centers dispatched almost all of the available ambulances to incident 
sites, which left the city of Istanbul without emergency medical resources for a long time. The 
Istanbul Police could not provide security and clearance on the crisis scene for nearly half an 
hour. The heavy load placed on cellular lines prevented communication even among first 
responders, which also affected CM badly (wireless communication among first responder 
agencies is still not established in Turkey). 
Worst of all, there was no coordination agency through which the media could access 
essential information about the attacks. Blocked communication lines suddenly increased the 
importance of press coverage for the public. However, without a proper and reliable source, both 
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public and private TV networks continued to cover the incidents via the media agents‘ own 
experiences and knowledge. Several other bombings in Istanbul were reported which in fact had 
not taken place, which only increased the chaos. Hours later, the government banned live news 
reports covering the bombings. Turkish CM definitely needs a coordinative agency with both 
expertise and authority. To sum up, separated, loosely connected local and central CM forces did 
not create a successful CM network.  
CSI efforts played a very important role in the investigation of the Istanbul bombings. 
The Istanbul Police Department‘s CSI units rushed into the bombing sites within minutes of the 
attacks. R. Kilic (personal communication, April 12, 2009) implied that CSI units came in and 
secured the areas in a very short time. CSI efforts directly affected the results of the 
investigation. Perpetrators and others aiding and abetting the bombings were quickly brought to 
justice, thanks to CSI findings. Law enforcement‘s CSI examination is the only way to know 
about a terrorist attack. Figuring out the terrorists‘ tactics successfully deters future terrorist 
incidents. 
K. Durmus (personal communication, April 12, 2009) added that the CSI investigation 
may be the most important in a disaster scene, yet it does not get required attention. CSI units do 
not have a role in emergency plans; they lack direct communication with other first responders, 
and they are generally not the leaders of a crisis scene. R. Kilic (personal communication, April 
12, 2009) argues that even hierarchical superiors in law enforcement units may not understand 
the importance of CSI. Crisis scene leadership is a problem waiting for necessary regulations.  
Quarantelli‘s (1997) seventh criterion (Q22 of the study) deals with this leadership 
problem. It is not only significant for effective CSI effort, but also essential for all CM. CSI can 
document material damage after a disaster, which is important for insurance issues. Another use 
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of CSI is the identification of victims. K. Coban (personal communication, April 12, 2009) 
suggests that natural and manmade disasters can leave many people dead. After great disasters, 
identification of all the dead may not be possible by victims‘ relatives. From terrorist bombings 
to earthquakes, it is the government‘s responsibility to identify victims. Inefficient CSI would 
result in an unevaluated CM, which would create greater inefficiencies in future events. 
4.1.3 Spain 
Spain‘s transition from Franco‘s dictatorship to a modern democracy in the 1980s 
changed its public administration system completely. CM policies were rewritten because of 
democratic expectations. The Cold War tactics of dictatorship had remained until the end of 
Franco‘s term; civil defense was the only strategy employed, and disaster mitigation was not 
considered as a method. After 1980s, elected governments passed many CM laws to regulate CM 
efforts. The central government‘s effect on regional governments is very weak, and Spain‘s 
autonomous regions are almost like U.S. states. Local or regional emergencies are not handled 
by the central government. Regions are responsible for the response, recovery, preparedness, and 
mitigation phases of CM. Only a national emergency declaration mobilizes the central 
government‘s forces. 
4.1.3.1 History 
Bremberg and Britz (2007) date Spain‘s CM policies back to the 1940s. Like all other 
European countries, Spanish civil protection aimed to stop the killing of civilians in air raids. 
After it became a democracy with the creation of the 1978 Constitution, Spain decentralized 17 
regions within her borders. All regions and sub-regions have remained loyal to the King and the 
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government. The Law 2/1985, which came into effect in January 21, 1985, assigned the General 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency (Direccion General de Proteccion Civil y 
Emergencias, DGPCE) to execute National CM policies. All regions also have their own CM 
organizations, and coordination among them is operated by DGPCE. DGPCE has an education 
facility that trains CM officials in Spain. The National School of Civil Protection (la Escuela 
Nacional de Civil, ENPC) serves Spanish and other nationals in emergency management issues 
(MDI, 2009). 
The Operative Coordination Center (SACOP, Sala de Coordinación Operativa) is the 
highest CM council brought together during national emergencies. SACOP includes the Prime 
Minister and other delegated ministers. The DGPCE coordinates SACOP‘s meetings. In 2005, 
amendments gave authority to SACOP to mobilize the Military Emergency Unit (Unidad Militar 
de Emergencias, UME) which was used to evacuate the residents of Canary Islands during the 
2007 bushfires. UME mobilization is the last degree of national CM efforts (Bremberg and Britz, 
2007). Decentralizing public administration and CM efforts did not make them ineffective; local 
and regional administrations prepared for disasters with realistic plans. 
The City of Madrid has the Territorial Plan of Civil Protection of Madrid (Plan Territorial 
de Protección Civil de la Comunidad de Madrid, PLATERCAM), which was prepared and 
legislated in 1992 with Decree 85/1992 of 17 December. PLATERCAM was conducted during 
the 11-M bombings. Each first responder and other CM agencies have a role in the plan. 
PLATERCAM is directed by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice together 
(MDI, 2009). DGPCE is the coordinator agency of the plan. PLATERCAM‘s CM policy is 
operated on four levels. 
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Level 0 is for small-scale emergencies. The municipal first-responder agencies, such as 
local police and local EMS, are mobilized on this level. This is the normal procedure for any 
emergency reported. CM interactions in this level are similar to Level 1, with the difference that 
Level 1 procedures are headed by a central commander. In Level 1, even though the emergency 
is local, the whole CM action is operated and supervised by a central commander in the 
PLATERCAM center. This can happen on the director‘s own initiative or at the local first 
responders‘ request. The important thing in both Level 1 and Level 0 is that the CM actions do 
not require authority and sources at a level higher than the municipal level. 
Level 2 is declared when the emergency incident exceeds one local administration‘s 
region and authority. PLATERCAM‘s director takes over the control of CM in Level 2. 
Coordination is provided among all participating local first responder agencies by the 
PLATERCAM center. PLATERCAM‘s director is responsible for determining and reporting a 
higher emergency level if needed. Public information dissemination is also one of the duties of 
PLATERCAM‘s director. In this way, the media and citizens can get vital information about the 
incidents from the most reliable source.  
Level 3 goes into effect when a national emergency is declared. Level 3 is declared by 
the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior can declare such an emergency on its 
own or at the request of DGPCE‘s or PLATERCAM‘s director. Authority in the disaster region 
is given to SACOP, which also takes part in PLATERCAM‘s governing body. PLATERCAM 
has two groups of agencies in the CM action plan: the executive group and the action group. The 
executive group is formed of SECOP and subcommittees. This is very similar to the Turkish 
system discussed above. However, PLATERCAM‘s DGPCE has a history of more than ten 
years. The agency has an education facility which has good relationships with local and central 
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CM bodies. DGPCE works under the Ministry of the Interior; nonetheless, it reports to the Prime 
Minister, who is head of SECOP in national emergencies. This setup gives authority to director 
of DGPCE (Bolling et al., 2007). Because expertise and authority is combined within one 
agency, PLATERCAM is a powerful and efficient tool in Spanish CM. 
PLATERCAM‘s action groups are classified based on the type of response and recovery 
efforts they pursue. These include security, intervention, emergency health, technical support, 
and logistics groups. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies form the security group of 
PLATERCAM. Whether they are local or national, all law enforcement agencies on a disaster 
scene operate in this group. The intervention group is headed by the Chief Fire Officer, and 
includes fire departments, the Red Cross, and other local nonprofit agencies. The emergency 
health group is formed by agencies serving EMS. SUMMA (Servicio de Urgencias Médicas de 
Madrid) and SAMUR (Servicio de Asistencia Municipal de Urgencia y Rescate-Protección 
Civil) are the most important health agencies providing emergency medicine on the scene. They 
are coordinated by the 112 EMS center of Madrid in the PLATERCAM plan. Technical support 
and logistics groups are agencies coordinated by central command (DGPCE) to monitor the 
needs of other first-responder organizations.  
4.1.3.2 Discussion 
According to the CM plans discussed, the Ministry of the Interior is the head of CM 
system, because DGPCE serves for this ministry. SUMMA and SAMUR are the EMS 
organizations of the response. Bolling et al. (2007) reported that they did not perform triage at 
the bombing sites, since individual visual assessment of the victims was enough to adequately 
treat all of them. Additionally, there were four different incident sites, which may have made it 
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difficult to establish triage centers. The first ambulance arrived to Atocha Station in seven 
minutes. Hospital tents were set up within thirty minutes at all four bombing sites. The fist bomb 
went off at 7:39 AM, and more than 1,500 persons were injured in total. By 10:17 AM, there 
were no injured persons at the sites; all patients had been transferred to 15 different hospitals by 
that time. When the bombing alarm was given by the 112 Call Center at 7:45 AM, the hospitals 
in Madrid cancelled all surgical operations for that day and waited for the casualties of the 
bombings.  
Cancelling surgeries made many beds and medical personnel available, which prevented 
congestion in the hospitals. Another source of medical personnel was provided by the change in 
shifts. Night-shift personnel were not given permission to go home, which doubled the number 
of personnel available to care for bombing victims. The hospitals, 112 Call Center, and 
ambulances were connected to each other for a long time before the attacks; as a result, SUMMA 
and SAMUR‘s CM action was very coordinated. Madrid‘s train lines carry more than 800,000 
passengers daily from 93 stations. Considering the chaotic environment at attacks‘ time, the 
success of EMS is even clearer.  
The 112 Call Center conducted one of the most important duties of the CM network. 
Firstly, this center maintained communication among first responders, executive managers, and 
victims. Secondly, the 112 Call Center set up a special telephone service that provided 
information to the public about the attacks only one half hour after the attacks were confirmed. 
Victims, victims‘ relatives, the media, and other citizens were informed via this center. Public 
panic was prevented in this way. The cell phone lines‘ overload created a communication 
problem in the city for the first several hours. A new telephone line was set up among the 
hospitals after the attacks to eliminate this communication problem. 
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The Spanish law enforcement agencies in PLATERCAM are the Spanish National Police, 
the National Intelligence Center, the Madrid Police Department, and the Spanish Civil Guard. 
These agencies take part in PLATERCAM‘s action groups‘ security section. The Madrid Police 
Department is a local law enforcement agency, while the others operate nationally in Spain. 
Their quick deployment is similar to what occurred in the Istanbul case; since Spain has been 
experiencing terrorist incidents for more than 50 years. Law enforcement agencies, whether local 
or central, are well prepared for such incidents.  
The collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence led the prosecution to a 
building in Madrid on April 3, almost one month after the attacks. The neighborhood was 
evacuated, and the terrorists believed to be the masterminds behind the attacks blew themselves 
up inside the building. The police found enough evidence in the blasted building to track other 
terrorists linked to the attacks. The investigations continued throughout Europe, and Italian 
officials arrested another mastermind of the Madrid attacks in June 2004. Several other terrorist 
attacks planned in Spain were stopped before they occurred, thanks to law enforcement 
personnels‘ efforts (Bolling et al., 2007). 
CM organizations in Spain were ready for such an attack. The CM plans were prepared in 
the 1990s after the democratization of the country. Local authorities were empowered to the 
highest degree as a result of decentralization came with the democracy. Contrary to the centralist 
command-control argument, decentralization did not cause CM policies to fail, even if it did not 
make them more successful. The Madrid Bombings indicated that if central and local authorities 
are balanced carefully in CM plans, CM will be successful on the national as well as the regional 
level. One should note that Madrid CM personnel were experienced in terror attacks, which also 




The U.K., like Spain and Turkey, is a unitary state. The country is an island separated 
from the Europe mainland. A constitutional monarch governs the country similarly to Spain‘s 
royal family. Parliament has two branches, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The 
Prime Minister is the main wielder of executive power. There are four countries in the U.K.: 
Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England. London is the capital city of England. The 
public administration system is similar to the U.S. states‘ systems. Local authorities are 
autonomous, and the central government‘s effect on them is limited by regulations. The U.K. is 
the sixth greatest economy in the world with a population of over sixty million.  
4.1.4.1 History 
The U.K. was no exception when it came to passing Cold War CM policies in the 1950s. 
Heavily bombarded by Nazi Germany in World War Two, the British government passed the 
Civil Defense Act in 1948. The law aimed to reduce the number of casualties during air raids. 
Local administrations were allowed access to national resources in case of emergency, but CM 
planning and recovery operations were left completely to their authority (O´Brien & Read, 
2005). The coordination of local CM was not considered a national government responsibility. 
Based on Cold War politics, the only disaster that interested the national government was nuclear 
war. 
A series of mass-casualty disasters changed this perception in the 1980s. The King's 
Cross underground fire in 1987, Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster in 1987, Clapham Junction rail crash 
in 1988, and Hillsborough Stadium Disaster in 1989 pushed the central government to take a 
greater role in disasters. The Civil Defense in Peacetime Act of 1986 was altered with the 
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required amendments to give the central government a more coordinating role in local and 
regional emergencies. Local authorities were still responsible for CM mitigation and 
preparedness in beginning of the millennium.  
The U.K. Fuel Blockade Crisis in September 2000 resulted in a regulation effort by the 
Home Office (Ministry of the Interior). In July 2001, the lead role in CM was assigned to the 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCA) in the Cabinet Office. September 11, 2001 changed the 
scope of CM policies that already were being revised. New CM policies created a framework 
containing national, regional, and local perspectives in coordinating and collaborative language. 
The system was close to the Spanish CM system discussed above. The HSBC attacks and slaying 
of the British Consul in the 2003 Istanbul Bombings made it clear that the U.K. would be a target 
of future Al Qaeda attacks (HMG, 2006). As a result of increasing terrorist attacks against 
civilians in foreigncountries, the U.K. government applied the notion of resilience to CM 
policies and passed the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) in 2004 (HMSO, 2004).  
CCA divided CM personnel into two categories: ―core responders‖ and ―co-operating 
responders‖ (CCS, 2009, p. 8). Category 1 is formed by law enforcement personnel, EMS, fire 
brigades, search-and-rescue teams, local authorities, and other first-response teams. Electricity, 
gas, sewer, and water suppliers, as well as transportation authorities and telecommunication 
providers are in Category 2 (Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008). U.K. resilience is a proactive approach 
to CM. Resilience is a biological term referring to the idea that environmental changes are 
inevitable and organisms should be ready for them, whatever the impacts. Resilience does not 
mean that the victims should not prepare for those detrimental impacts from the environment. 
Instead, the target population should be ready for any kind of extreme event, and it should aim to 
return to normal life as soon as possible.  
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CCA categorizes emergencies into two types: terrorist contingencies and non-terrorist 
contingencies. Natural disasters and man-made disasters that are not sourced from a terrorist 
attack are considered non-terrorist contingencies. When it is declared a national disaster, a non-
terrorist contingency CM is managed by the related minister or Cabinet member. Terrorist 
contingencies, on the other hand, are managed directly by the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms 
(COBR) headed by the Prime Minister. The COBR‘s members can change depending upon the 
characteristics of the incident. Representatives of the Home Office, the Ministry of Defense, the 
Department of Transportation, the affected region‘s police and fire chiefs, and members of other 
relevant offices are likely members of COBR (CCS, 2009).  
4.1.4.2 Discussion  
The London Ambulance Service (LAS) is the main EMS agency in the CM network 
involved in the 2005 London Bombings. The British Red Cross and Saint John‘s ambulance 
services also served in the London bombings response; however, these organizations are 
volunteer-based. The LAS has vast resources in terms of personnel and equipment. The LAS is 
also prepared for such attacks because of the Irish Republican Army‘s (IRA) long lasting 
terrorist campaign. Additionally, the LAS is connected to the regional hospitals in the disaster 
plan, which make coordination efforts easier during a disaster. Just as in the Madrid bombings, 
when the 112 Center in London gave a bombing alarm at around 9:20 AM on July 7, 2005, 
hospitals cancelled all operations planned for that day. EMS organizations and hospitals did not 
accept blood donations, as it had been learned in the WTC attacks in 2001 and the Madrid 
attacks in 2004 that the blood donation process take the EMS‘s precious time where there is no 
need for extra blood. 
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It was argued that CM policies were changed and centralized especially for specific types 
of disasters with CCA legislation in 2004 in the U.K. The involvement of central government 
members shows the output of CCA‘s effect in CM. According to O´Brien and Read (2005), such 
central government involvement is the new face of CM in developed countries. Local disasters 
will continue to be evaluated and addressed by local authorities with central government‘s 
coordination. However, national-level disasters will be handled by strong government 
involvement in the future. The public‘s expectation for more efficient CM is increasing, 
especially for occasions that exceed local authorities‘ capability, such as Hurricane Katrina. The 
U.K. model of resilience for terrorism-related contingencies will continue to involve central 
government involvement (CCA, 2009).  
Main law enforcement agencies authorized in such an incident in London are the City of 
London Police (CLP) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). There is no uniformed 
national police force in the U.K. The Ministry of Defense has a national law enforcement agency 
called the Ministry of Defense Police (MDP), but this agency is not a uniformed police force; 
they only have just over 3,000 officers in the U.K. Because of the decentralized system, borough 
police organizations are the most important law enforcement agencies for the public. The MPS is 
responsible for the region known as the Greater London Area. The CLP‘s responsibility area is 
very small respectively, and the area is called the City of London. The CLP‘s territory is within 
MPS‘s territory geographically, but according to the agreement between agencies, MPS enters 
the CLP‘s jurisdiction only when requested. 
CLP and MPS showed a great coordination effort in London bombings response. The 
evacuation of victims and conducting of CSI efforts together was very successful. Panic did not 
cause any casualties in the London Underground Metro. Moreover, evidence led to a quick and 
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efficient investigation that revealed all the perpetrators behind the attacks. The 
telecommunication-line overload that plagued previous terrorist bombings was not experienced 
in London‘s response because of regulations passed by law enforcement officials before the 
attacks. According to those regulations, mobile phone companies were provided with a list of 
first responders beforehand. When needed, mobile phone companies cut communication for all 
customers but the numbers in first responders‘ list. Although the aim of this idea was to provide 
more effective CM by creating extra communication lines among first responders, it was 
reported that the phone number list of first responders was not updated, which led to 
communications failures for the majority of first responders, especially in EMS (Devitt & 
Borodzicz, 2008).  
Law enforcement agencies in the London response helped the public obtain reliable 
information. MPS‘s Chief joined the first COBR meeting, which took place just 15 minutes after 
the alarm was given by London Underground authorities. At 11:00 AM, the MPS Chief gave the 
first press briefing and confirmed that terrorist attacks had occurred at several sites. He also 
added that everything was under the control of the government and there was no reason to panic 
(HMG, 2006).  
London Fire Brigade (LFB) was another very important local agency in recovery phase 
of CM in the London Bombings. The LFB is also in Category 1 in the CCA plan. In coordination 
with the MPS, CLP, and LAS, the LFB served in all four bombing sites. A local coordination 
agency, Network Control Center (NCC) controls the traffic in the London Underground metro. 
Therefore, the NCC worked as a primary coordinator during the attacks. However, the NCC was 
criticized for its tardy reception of information about the incidents. Apparently, after the 
bombings took place at 8:50 AM, the NCC informed authorities only of a power shortage in 
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several lines, when the trains had in fact stopped because of the explosions. The NCC waited to 
call the MPS about a possible attack until 9:17 AM, which slowed the CM process significantly.  
4.1.5 Conclusions 
The case countries‘ public administration systems seem to affect CM systems deeply. 
The U.S., the U.K., and Spain have decentralized systems that left all CM stages to local 
administrations. Turkey has the strongest centralist system among the selected countries, and CM 
in Turkey developed in a centralist way as a result. Nonetheless, there is no clear correlation 
between decentralized CM policies and the effectiveness of CM networks. For example, 
centralist Turkish CM was not successful in terms of delivering necessary services to the 
neediest victims and offering the public reliable and useful information. On the other hand, the 
decentralized U.S. system failed to communicate and coordinate first responders, or to provide 
for the sufficient participation of all responders in response and recovery. 
Analyzed roughly, Spain and the U.K. CM networks seem to have performed better than 
the U.S. and Turkey CM networks. The U.S. and Turkey failed to empower local authorities in 
CM efforts. Although serious natural and man-made disasters had resulted in mass casualties 
before the analyzed cases in Turkey and the U.S., central and local governments and other 
authorities did not apply lessons learned. For example, the 1993 World Trade Center attacks 
clearly demonstrated that the first responders of New York City needed more effective 
communication devices (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Similarly, the 1999 Marmara Earthquakes in 




Democratization processes did not seem to have affect CM‘s efficiency, either. The 
oldest democracies in the selected cases are the U.K. and the U.S. Both of these countries have 
had political parties and national and regional elections for hundreds of years. Spain is the 
youngest democracy, having abolished its dictatorship only a few decades ago. However, along 
with the U.K., Spain conducted a very successful CM that is actually taken as an example by 
other CM organizations throughout the world (Cornall, 2005). Social-economical conditions are 
another dimension that explains organizational behaviors; however, they are not enough to 
explain the CM failures in the U.S. and Turkey.  
Historically, all four selected countries experienced their golden ages as world powers. 
Spain (the Spanish and Portuguese Empire) was a world power in the 15
th
 century. Turkey (the 
Ottoman Empire) ruled more than half of the known world in the 16
th
 century. The U.K. (Great 
Britain) was the strongest empire in the world in the 19
th
 century. The U.S. has been the 
superpower of the world since 1950s. Economically, the richest country is the U.S., while the 
poorest of the selected countries is Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkey and the U.S. did similarly badly 
in evaluated CM efforts. Socio-economical factors are argued to play an important role in 
underdeveloped countries (IRIN, 2005), but that was not the case for this study‘s evaluations. 
While looking for causes for CM effectiveness or ineffectiveness, different characteristics 
of the incidents should be taken into account. The terrorists used four passenger planes as bombs 
in the U.S., while they used four bomb-laden trucks in Turkey. In Spain, they used ten bomb-
loaded backpacks. Four bomb-loaded backpacks were used in the U.K. The limited capability of 
the terrorists forced them to conduct much smaller attacks. Although all selected incidents were 
inspired by the same terrorist organization and greatest civilian casualties were targeted, the 
perpetrators‘ methods of operation were different in style and in scale. The terrorists‘ tactics 
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evolved, and the CM systems encountering them were also evolving in response to previous 
attacks. Kenney (2007) defines this evolution as ―competitive adaptation‖ (2007, 6). After the 
WTC attacks in 2001, plane hijackings were prevented with high-security measures. Law 
enforcement agencies learned from the 2003 Istanbul bombings and deterred loaded trucks from 
going into crowded parts of cities. When terrorists understood that they would not be able to 
attack with car bombs, they used numerous backpack bombs aimed at smaller targets such as 
underground trains or passenger buses in Spain and in the U.K. The shift in terrorist tactics 
created an element of surprise that had a negative impact on the CM network‘s effectiveness.  
From this perspective, it is to be expected that the latest selected incident‘s response will 
be managed more effectively than the previous cases. Additionally, the WTC attacks‘ response 
should be expected to be the least effective, since such a suicide-attack style had not been 
previously experienced or even considered. After the WTC attacks not only the U.S. but almost 
all of the countries in the world also changed or revised their CM policies. Larger-scale disaster 
exercises were conducted in developed countries. More effective communication lines among 
first responders were established. Central coordination centers were strengthened and newer 
technologies were developed and adapted. For example, the British CM system learned to shut 
down mobile phone lines for people in a particular region except for the first responders from 
previous attacks such as the Madrid attacks and the WTC attacks. 
Assuming that previous CM actions will be less effective and later ones will be more 
effective makes sense from different aspects. However, ineffective CM efforts like the one that 
took place after Hurricane Katrina, which occurred years after the WTC attacks, indicate that 
applying lessons learned is aspect crucial aspect of successful CM policies. In other words, it is 
not enough simply to evaluate and point out mistakes with official or scholarly reports; applying 
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them to developed CM plans is also vital. Policy makers and experts should be contacted and 
listened to more fully in order to prevent CM failures in the future. 
Terrorist organizations learn just as CM networks learn. They adapt themselves to new 
conditions to reach their targets. For that reason, terrorist attacks are not like natural disasters 
that will do the same harm each time. CM networks can fail even in natural disasters if basic 
rules are disregarded, as they were in Hurricane Katrina, which make it absolutely normal to fail 
in terrorist attacks. It would be harsh to decide whether a CM network is ineffective or not, 
especially in a large-scale terrorist attack, merely by looking at a statistical tool‘s analyses. 
4.2 SEM Results 
In order to create the study‘s dataset, six organizations were selected from each case-
study country. The UCINET results in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 were used to define 
the target agencies. Organizations with a significant number of professional CM employees were 
chosen, rather than selecting the top six organizations regardless of their attributes. Specific 
government agencies, offices, or ministries, such as the President of the U.S., the Prime Minister 
of Turkey, or the Home Secretary of the U.K., were either unreachable by the study, or contain 
fewer persons than the targeted ten per agency. The eliminated agencies have been discussed in 
the text in detail.  
Online surveys were uploaded to a survey portal at www.surveygizmo.com. Selecting 
agencies from each country, the surveys‘ links were sent to them directly. When it became 
apparent that the agencies‘ response rate was lower than expected, scholars, web groups, mail 
groups, and other sources were used to find more respondents. Unfortunately, the Spanish and 
British CM agencies targeted were not responsive. Consequently, Spain and the U.K. were taken 
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out of the SEM analysis. To obtain the target sample size of 230 responses, the proposed sample 
size per agency was doubled. However, since the surveys were distributed as web links, and 
since for privacy reasons there was no ID control in the surveys, equal distribution per agency 
might not have been achieved. 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
4.2.1.1 U.S. 
FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the American Red Cross (ARC), the 
FDNY, and the U.S. Army were selected as respondent agencies for the surveys from Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Top Ten CM Organizations with Highest Degree Centrality Score in WTC Attacks 
  Degree Normalized Degree 
1. FEMA 71.00 4.418 
2. President Bush: The White House 31.00 1.929 
3. FBI 16.00 0.996 
4. American Red Cross 14.00 0.871 
5. NY City Government 13.00 0.809 
6. NY Fire Dept. 11.00 0.685 
7. NY State Government 11.00 0.685 
8. U.S. Congress 9.00 0.560 
9. U.S. Army 9.00 0.560 




President Bush, the New York State and New York City governments, the Secretary of 
State, and the U.S. Congress were eliminated as respondents, although they received an 
important place in the CM network of WTC attacks. Since the study proposed selecting six 
agencies per country, the New York Police Department (NYPD) was added to the selected 
agencies. NYPD is not in a central place in the CM network, according to Table 2; however, the 
literature and other resources suggested that NYPD was in fact a key organization in the 
response to the WTC attacks.  
Since the response reserve doubled, 20 (19.2 = 9.6 X 2) responses per agency selected 
were expected. Nonetheless, the research could utilize 115 responses from the U.S. in total. The 
organizations‘ descriptive statistics of respondents is indicated in Figure 3; respondents‘ 
positions in their agencies are demonstrated in Figure 4. Figure 16 (Appendix C) exhibits the 




Figure 3. US Respondent Organizations Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 3 shows no agency names. In order to unify the types of participating agencies in 
all case study countries, a classification scheme was applied in the surveys. Therefore, it cannot 
be determined which particular organization(s) did not respond to the surveys in the required 
amount. Although a specific classification category such as ―fire department‖ suggests groups 
such as the FDNY or ―emergency operations center‖ suggests FEMA, it is not certain that those 
specific types represent those agencies. For example, FEMA also contains Urban Search and 
Rescue (USAR) teams that participated in the recovery operations after the WTC attacks. 
Moreover, federal officials such as FBI employees may have worked in emergency operations 
centers and selected that option in response to the survey question. Other permutations of 




Figure 4. U.S. Respondent Employee Positions Descriptive Statistics 
 
As a result, it cannot be argued that each targeted organization responded at an equal rate. 
However, there is no reason to believe that certain agencies responded to the survey in 
significantly greater numbers than some others. For instance, three law enforcement agencies 
were targeted (the FBI, the NYPD, and the U.S. Army) that are in total numbers supposed to 
comprise half of all targeted agencies. There are, however, 31 law enforcement responses, which 
constitute only 27% of the U.S. sample. Nonetheless, it is quite possible that some of 
respondents from the FBI, the NYPD, or the U.S. Army selected ―emergency operations center,‖ 
―search and rescue team,‖ or ―health‖ as their employee organization. There is no specific search 
and rescue team or health organization among selected U.S. agencies; however, these options 
were chosen in 16 percent of the responses.  
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Figure 4 indicates that the majority of respondents are frontline workers. Although it was 
not specifically a goal of the survey, the other 49% of respondents are some type of managers. 
Thirty-eight (33%) of the respondents selected the option of ―supervisor,‖ which was the highest 
position name available in the survey. The fact that 33% of U.S. survey respondents considered 
themselves supervisors is important for the study because the response and recovery phases are 
utilized to generalize the results to the entire CM cycle. Half of the U.S. survey respondents are 
managers in some capacity, which would reflect effectiveness of CM organizations in mitigation 
and preparedness phases as well. 
4.2.1.2 Turkey 
Similarly to other countries‘ lists, the Turkish top-ten network centrality list (Table 3) 
also includes agencies, such as the Prime Minister and President, who could not be surveyed for 
the study. Skipping those two offices, the AKA, the AKUT, the IPD, the Medical Bureau of 
Istanbul, Red Crescent, and 112 EMS were selected from the list. Six organizations were sent 
official letters. After receiving very few, if any, responses from official agency contacts, related 
scholars, internet and email groups, and other relevant contacts were contacted. After doubling 
the targeted sample size per agency, 20 responses from each agency were expected.  
 
Table 3. Top Ten CM Organizations with Highest Degree Centrality Score in Istanbul-2003 Attacks 
  Degree Normalized Degree 
1.         AKUT        11 14.103 
2.         Prime Minister          5 6.41 
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  Degree Normalized Degree 
3.         AKA          4 5.128 
4.         112 EMS            4 5.128 
5.         Istanbul Police Department 3 3.846 
6.         Red Crescent          2 2.564 
7.         Medical Bureau           2 2.564 
8.         President 2 2.564 
9.         National Intelligence Agency  2 2.564 
    10.     Bogazici University 2 2.564 
 
One hundred twenty total responses from Turkish CM agencies were targeted; however, 
since the surveys could not be strictly controlled because of privacy issues, 122 responses were 
collected from Turkey. The unifying of agency types for comparative research purposes hindered 
the demonstration of exactly how many respondents from each organization were surveyed, as it 
did in the U.S. sample. However, when the numbers in Figure 4 are examined, it is apparent that 
35 respondents from search and rescue teams comprise 29% of the Turkish CM sample. AKA 
and AKUT were the only search and rescue teams among the selected agencies. The responses of 
these agencies combined were supposed to construct one third of the total Turkish sample in the 




Figure 5. Turkey Respondent Organization Descriptive Statistics 
 
Moreover, three health-related agencies were targeted: Red Crescent, 112 EMS, and the 
Medical Bureau. Half of the Turkish sample was supposed to be formed by health agencies. 
However, Figure 5 demonstrates that 33 responses came from health organizations, which 
constitutes only 27% of the sample. Nevertheless, the 12 responses for nonprofit CM 
organizations, 10 responses from emergency operations centers,  and 4 responses from education 
facilities, which in total constitute 21% of the sample, could be considered part of the health 
agencies targeted. Just as in the U.S. sample, it is impossible to claim for certain that each 




Figure 6. Turkey Respondent Employee Positions Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 6 indicates respondents‘ organizational positions in Turkish CM. In respect to 
American respondents, Turkish respondents have fewer supervisors and fewer frontline workers. 
Middle level managers are majority of Turkish CM respondents of the study. However, 92 
responses were filled out by some type of managers, comprising 75% of all responses. Middle 
managers were the largest group, with 36 responses (29 of the Turkish sample). Consequently, 





The same method of selecting agencies was used for Spain as for the U.S. and Turkey. 
The Spanish government was skipped for research purposes, although it held the most central 
place in the CM network during the Madrid attacks (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Top Ten CM Organizations with Highest Degree Centrality Score in Madrid-2004 Attacks 
  Degree Normalized Degree 
 1   Spanish Government 9 25.714 
 2   Spanish National Police 6 17.143 
 3   National Intelligence Center 5 14.286 
 4   Servicio de Urgencia Médica de Madrid 4 11.429 
 5   Madrid Police Department 3 8.571 
 6   Spanish Civil Guard 3 8.571 
 7   Servicio de Asist. M. de Urg. y Rescate 3 8.571 
 8   Ministry of Interior 2 5.714 
 9   Moroccan Intelligence Agency 2 5.714 
 10 Spanish Foreign Ministry 2 5.714 
 
As a result, the survey link for Spanish CM was sent to the official contact s of the 
Spanish National Police, the National Intelligence Center, SUMMA, the Madrid Police 
Department, the Spanish Civil Guard, and SAMUR. Unfortunately, no response was obtained, 
either positive or negative, from the agencies. Researcher has been to Spain and tried to find 
contacts for the research in person. Scholars, web groups, and other relevant contacts were also 
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contacted in order to gather respondents for the survey; however, no response from Spain was 
available for the study. For that reason, Spain‘s CM sample was removed from the SEM 
analyses. 
4.2.1.4 U.K. 
A similar process was utilized in the U.K. sample to define the target agencies from 
UCINET analyses (Table 5). The British government (2
nd





 place), and the Prime Minister (7
th
 place) were skipped. Accordingly, MPS, LAS, 
LFB, CLP, NCC and 7JAC were sent official letters to request participation in the study. 
Researcher has been to England in order to find respondents for the survey in person. Since there 
was no answer for a considerable time, the U.K. was dropped, along with Spain, from the SEM 
analyses. After doubling the U.S. and Turkey target sample sizes, 9 responses were obtained 
from British CM organizations.  
Three responses for ―fire department‖ (possibly LFB), one response for ―health‖ 
(possibly LAS), four responses for ―law enforcement‖ (possibly MPS or CLP), and one response 
for ―nonprofit CM agency‖ were obtained in total. Since the sample size is too small, the U.K. 
sample was not individually evaluated via SEM analysis. However, the responses were imported 




Table 5. Top Ten CM Organizations with Highest Degree Centrality Score in London-2005 Attacks 
  Degree Normalized Degree 
1   Metropolitan Police Service 16 28.07 
 2   British Government        9 15.789 
 3   London Ambulance Service         7 12.281 
 4   Home Office/ Home Secretary 5 8.772 
 5   COBR 5 8.772 
 6   London Fire Brigade 4 7.018 
 7   Prime Minister 4 7.018 
 8   City of London Police 4 7.018 
 9   Network Control Centre 3 5.263 
 10 7 July Assistance Service 3 5.263 
 
4.2.1.5 Total Sample 
In total, the final sample size was 246—16 more than the expected sample size. Figure 7 
demonstrates the organizational profile of the sample. The largest group of the sample is law 
enforcement employees, who form a quarter of the sample. Health officials follow law 
enforcement with 19% of the sample. Search and rescue teams, fire department, and nonprofit 
CM employees are nearly equal to one another, numbering 16, 15, and 14 respectively. Twenty-
three respondents in total served at emergency operation centers, which comprised only 9 percent 





Figure 7. Total Respondent Organization Descriptive Statistics 
 
From an organizational perspective, the sample represents a first responder population. 
The affiliated organizations are the ones that CM literature and various CM reports frequently 
suggested as first responders. In other words, it is not surprising to see firefighters, police 
officers, emergency health personnel, and search-and-rescue teams in a CM research study 
sample.  
An important limitation of the study was generalizing the results for the response and 
recovery phases of CM to mitigation and preparedness phases, which require much more time 
and effort. Finding respondents who have higher positions in selected institutions could be a 
solution to this problem. Privacy issues prevented the study from contacting particular 
individuals from particular organizations. The surveys were delivered to groups to provide 
confidentiality. Although it was not planned beforehand, Figure 8 indicates that only 34% (85 
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people) of the sample were frontline workers. Twenty-one percent (53 people) of the sample 
were supervisors, and 66% of the sample identified themselves as some type of manager. The 
high rate of manager participation reduces the effect of argued limitation and makes the study 
results more generalizable. 
 
Figure 8. Total Respondent Employee Positions Descriptive Statistics 
 
A disproportionate number of male respondents replied from the survey. Figure 18 




4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Survey Results 
Table 6 demonstrated the simple descriptive statistics of the sample. Q18a is the 
combined version of Q18, Q19, and Q20. The fifth criterion Quarantelli (1997) suggested was 
represented by Q18a in the SEM models in the study. 
All questions asked in the surveys received answers ranging from 1 (Completely Agree) 
to 5 (Completely Disagree). A distribution from all perspectives of respondents is shown. 
Furthermore, only five questions (questions #9, #10, #11, #12, and #13) had a mean of less than 
two or more than three. Other questions generated a mode between two and three, indicating that 
the answers fall in the neutral agreement area. Questions #9, #10, #12, and #13 have a mean 
value of more than 1.90, which shows that they have relatively normal answers. However, the 
mean for question 11 is 3.69. This value is close to ―Agree.‖ The respondents overwhelmingly 
agreed upon this question‘s statement. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Results 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
     Statistic Std. 
Error 
Rate Statistic Std. 
Error 
Rate 
Q1 246 1 5 2.55 0.47 0.16 3.03 -0.76 0.31 -2.45 
Q2 246 1 5 2.39 0.60 0.16 3.86 -0.67 0.31 -2.18 
Q3 246 1 5 2.17 0.87 0.16 5.60 -0.07 0.31 -0.23 
Q4 246 1 5 2.58 0.42 0.16 2.70 -0.93 0.31 -3.00 
Q5 246 1 5 2.26 0.90 0.16 5.80 0.24 0.31 0.78 
Q6 246 1 5 2.12 0.87 0.16 5.60 0.52 0.31 1.69 
Q7 246 1 5 2.25 0.83 0.16 5.32 0.05 0.31 0.15 
Q8 246 1 5 2.13 0.75 0.16 4.86 -0.04 0.31 -0.14 
Q9 246 1 5 1.98 1.03 0.16 6.63 0.57 0.31 1.85 
Q10 246 1 5 1.98 1.12 0.16 7.21 1.02 0.31 3.29 
Q11 246 1 5 3.69 -0.70 0.16 -4.51 -0.11 0.31 -0.35 
Q12 246 1 5 1.97 1.08 0.16 6.94 1.06 0.31 3.44 
Q13 246 1 5 1.91 1.21 0.16 7.77 1.52 0.31 4.93 
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
     Statistic Std. 
Error 
Rate Statistic Std. 
Error 
Rate 
Q14 246 1 5 2.34 0.72 0.16 4.63 -0.37 0.31 -1.20 
Q15 246 1 5 2.35 0.58 0.16 3.73 -0.54 0.31 -1.74 
Q16 246 1 5 2.24 0.77 0.16 4.97 -0.06 0.31 -0.20 
Q17 246 1 5 2.53 0.47 0.16 3.04 -0.75 0.31 -2.42 
Q18 246 1 5 2.56 0.48 0.16 3.06 -0.71 0.31 -2.28 
Q19 246 1 5 2.81 0.29 0.16 1.88 -0.88 0.31 -2.86 
Q20 246 1 5 2.89 0.10 0.16 0.64 -0.90 0.31 -2.90 
Q21 246 1 5 2.76 0.43 0.16 2.78 -0.63 0.31 -2.04 
Q22 246 1 5 2.61 0.42 0.16 2.71 -0.73 0.31 -2.36 
Q23 246 1 5 2.67 0.42 0.16 2.68 -0.68 0.31 -2.19 
Q24 246 1 5 2.61 0.52 0.16 3.36 -0.46 0.31 -1.48 
Q25 246 1 5 2.26 0.71 0.16 4.60 -0.08 0.31 -0.25 
Q18a 246 1 5 2.76 0.21 0.16 1.34 -0.67 0.31 -2.18 
 
Question 11 represents the variable working for organization because of someone else. 
The responses for the question were reversely coded to prevent possible negative correlations in 
the model. Therefore, the overwhelming ―Agree‖ response actually shows an overwhelming 
―Disagree‖ response to the question. In other words, the majority of sample population does not 
work for their agencies because of someone else. It was noted that question #11 represented the 
strongest form of friendship; apparently that level of friendship exists rarely in the examined 
agencies. Other statistical interpretations of this variable will be made in the following chapters.  
Kurtosis and skewness statistics are also represented in Table 6. Although the kurtosis 
and skewness values are not too large (the greatest skewness is 1.21 and the greatest kurtosis is 
1.52), the distribution of the sample is not considered normal by definition unless the skewness 
and kurtosis values are equal to zero. Rule of thumb suggests that the ratio of skewness and 
kurtosis to their standard deviation should not exceed (-) 2.00. Table 6 indicates that a number of 
variables violate this assumption. As a result, many study variables are skewed to right or left, 
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and some are platykurtic (flatter than the corresponding normal curve) or leptokurtic (more 
peaked than the normal curve). For this reason, SEM tests were conducted by controlling the 
non-normality of data distribution.  
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Responses 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Q1 Count 53 84 50 39 20 
% 21.5 34.1 20.3 15.9 8.1 
Q2 Count 61 97 32 44 12 
% 24.8 39.4 13 17.9 4.9 
Q3 Count 82 90 36 26 12 
% 33.3 36.6 14.6 10.6 4.9 
Q4 Count 52 87 39 49 19 
% 21.1 35.4 15.9 19.9 7.7 
Q5 Count 58 115 36 25 12 
% 23.6 46.7 14.6 10.2 4.9 
Q6 Count 62 122 37 21 4 
% 25.2 49.6 15 8.5 1.6 
Q7 Count 61 110 37 28 10 
% 24.8 44.7 15 11.4 4.1 
Q8 Count 75 98 44 24 5 
% 30.5 39.8 17.9 9.8 2 
Q9 Count 96 89 38 16 7 
% 39 36.2 15.4 6.5 2.8 
Q10 Count 85 110 28 17 6 
% 34.6 44.7 11.4 6.9 2.4 
Q11 Count 12 24 54 95 61 
% 4.9 9.8 22 38.6 24.8 
Q12 Count 80 118 27 17 4 
% 32.5 48 11 6.9 1.6 
Q13 Count 91 108 30 11 6 
% 37 43.9 12.2 4.5 2.4 
Q14 Count 62 100 36 34 14 
% 25.2 40.7 14.6 13.8 5.7 
Q15 Count 64 88 48 35 11 
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  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
% 26 35.8 19.5 14.2 4.5 
Q16 Count 70 94 47 24 11 
% 28.5 38.2 19.1 9.8 4.5 
Q17 Count 52 88 47 42 17 
% 21.1 35.8 19.1 17.1 6.9 
Q18 Count 44 96 46 44 16 
% 17.9 39 18.7 17.9 6.5 
Q18a Count 26 84 72 52 12 
% 10.6 34.1 29.3 21.1 4.9 
Q19 Count 27 90 53 54 22 
% 11 36.6 21.5 22 8.9 
Q20 Count 30 70 65 58 23 
% 12.2 28.5 26.4 23.6 9.3 
Q21 Count 27 92 64 39 24 
% 11 37.4 26 15.9 9.8 
Q22 Count 42 91 52 44 17 
% 17.1 37 21.1 17.9 6.9 
Q23 Count 39 86 61 38 22 
% 15.9 35 24.8 15.4 8.9 
Q24 Count 36 96 61 34 19 

























Responses for individual questions were represented in Table 7. ―Strongly Disagree‖ was 
the least selected option by respondents, with 6.2 % average per question. ―Agree‖ was the most 
selected choice (37.9% average). The second most selected option was ―Strongly Agree,‖ at a 
rate of 22.7 percent. The non-normality of the sample statistics can be understood by looking at 
the affirmativeness of the respondents. The statements the survey offered were generally favored, 
which created a positively skewed dataset. AMOS controls the non-normality and reports if non-
normality distorted statistical results occur. 
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4.2.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
 The data from the respondents to the U.S., U.K., and Turkey surveys were merged to 
form a complete dataset, using SEM. The analysis was then performed for each country. 
However, individual analysis for the U.K. respondents was not done because of its small sample 
size. 
CFA is used to create a generic measurement model for each latent construct. This study 
has two latent constructs. CFA models help to eliminate unrelated variables before the complete 
model computation. Hypothesized correlations are demonstrated as arrows, latent constructs as 
squares, and observed variables as circles. During CFA, researcher also has a chance to indicate 
correlated observed variables. The capability to demonstrate correlations among measurement 
errors and perform the factor analysis based on those correlations is an important advantage of 
SEM analysis.  
4.2.3.1 Latent Construct # 1 – Quality of Informal Relationships 
Since the survey has two groups, the CFA was done for both of them separately. Figure 
19 (Appendix C) shows the CFA model for the quality of informal relationships, a latent 
construct. Normally, a relationship between an indicator and its common factor equal to or less 
than .20 is considered to be a weak association and must be removed from the analysis (Byrne, 
2001). Therefore, the observed variable of work for organization because of someone else was 
removed from the measurement model. 
Other indicators seem to be significantly associated with the latent construct. The 
strongest factor (1.00) is the observed variable for Question 10, formed strong friendships at 
work, whereas the least correlated indicator (less than .20) is Question 11, work for organization 
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because of someone else. If the observed variable for Question 11 is eliminated from the model, 
the standardized regression coefficients of the first latent construct of the study change from .43 
to 1.00, which shows a strong latent construct formed by the hypothesized indicators.  
Table 8 shows the default model statistics for the Chi-square fit index of the generic 
model in Figure 19 (Appendix C) and the developed model in Figure 9 (p. 119). The chi-square 
fit shows the model fit for the CFA model. The probability level of this fit is expected to be more 
than .05 to reject the null hypothesis. In this case, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (p= 
.001). The low probability value means that the model fit needs improvement.  
Table 8 presents the comparative fit index (CFI), which is expected to be close to one. 
The CFA model‘s CFI is close to 1 (.916) but can be developed with better assessments. The 
likelihood ratio is acceptable (=2.1) and the GFI is close to the accepted level (=0.955). 
However, the GFI and AGFI still need improvement to yield the suggested estimations. The 
RMSEA is also a little bit over (.017) the expected model fit. 
 
Table 8. Goodness of Model Fit of CFA of Quality of Informal Relationships 
 Criterion AMOS 




Chi-square (x²) Low 56.705 11.78 
Degrees of freedom (df) > 0 27 15 
Probability >0.05 .001 .696 
Likelihood Ratio (x²/df) <4.0 2.1 0.785 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) >.95 0.955 0.988 
Adjusted GFI (AGFI) >.90 0.925 0.971 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >.95 0.916 1 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation (RMSEA) 




Table 15 indicates the error correlations (modification indexes) among tested variables in 
the CFA model. The CFA model has five different correlations, according to the table. Based on 
these calculations, the measurement errors of variables representing question #5 and question #7, 
question #7 and question #6, question #7 and question #12, question #5 and question #9, and 
question #12 and question #13 were correlated in the final CFA model of the quality of informal 
relationships.  
The developed CFA model is presented in Figure 9. Correlations established among the 
suggested variables are represented as double-headed arrows. Table 8 gives the model fit values 
for the developed final CFA model of the quality of informal relationship latent construct. The 
chi-square value went down to 11.78, and the probability level increased to well above .05 
(.696). Degrees of freedom also dropped to 15. LR got a lower value of .78. The GFI and AGFI 
values became closer to 1. The RMSEA was over .05 and went down to 0. The best advance was 
for CFI, which went up to 1, indicating a perfect fit for the model.  
Removing an observed variable and correlating the relevant variables increased the 
success of the model fit. The final CFA model supports the literature, and confirms related 
hypotheses regarding the quality of informal relationship model. This final model was used in 
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Figure 9. Final CFA Model for Quality of Informal Relationships 
4.2.3.2 Latent Construct # 2 – Perceived Effectiveness of CM Networks  
Figure 20 (Appendix C) demonstrates the CFA model for the other latent construct of the 
study. Both groups‘ observed variables‘ relationships on latent construct have values over .2. 
As a result, no observed variable was removed from the CFA model to further develop it. 
Table 9 gives selected goodness-of-model-fit measurements. The probability level is below .05 
and the model needs improvement to be able to reject the null hypothesis. Other tests‘ values in 
the generic CFA model are not satisfying, either. LR shows a good model fit (=3.041) besides 
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the GFI and CFI, which are over .9 (0.914 and 0.911, respectively). However, the AGFI is not 
over .9, although it is very close (=0.865). RMSEA is the other indicator that needs an 
improvement; it is over the expected .05 (=0.091). Although these values do not match the 
criterion values selected, it should be noted that they are still within acceptable levels. 
  
Table 9. Goodness of Model Fit of CFA of Perceived CM Network Effectiveness 
 Criterion AMOS 




Chi-square (x²) Low 106.422 18.366 
Degrees of freedom (df) > 0 35 23 
Probability >0.05 .000 .737 
Likelihood Ratio (x²/df) <4.0 3.041 .799 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) >.90 0.914 0.985 
Adjusted GFI (AGFI) >.90 0.865 0.965 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >.90 0.911 1 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation (RMSEA) 
<.05 0.091 0 
 
Table 16 provided possible developments that can be made in the CFA model in order to 
increase the probability level. In light of the suggestions in Table 16, correlations were 
established with error residuals of observed variables representing question #23 and question 
#24, question #23 and question #22, question #23 and question #21, question #16 and question 
#24, question #23 and question #16, question #15 and question #24, question #23 and question 
#15, question #22 and question #22, question #15 and question #16, question #14 and question 
#22, question #14 and question #16, and question #14 and question #15. 
Figure 10 presents the developed CFA model for perceived CM network effectiveness. 
Some correlations have negative values, which reflect that there is a negative correlation among 
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some of the observed variables of CM network effectiveness. All these values were interpreted in 
the structural model. 
The suggestions from Table 16 clearly helped to improve the model fit. The chi-square fit 
index dropped to 18.3 from 106.4. This is a clear development, because it automatically reduced 
LR as well. Although the degrees of freedom fell from 35 to 23 with the added correlations, it 
did not do so as much as the chi-square fit index; as a result, LR came closer to 1 (dropping from 
from 3.041 to .799). The probability value also increased to an insignificant .737 from a 
significant 0.00. Therefore, the null hypothesis of having no relationships between the observed 
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Figure 10. Final CFA Model for Perceived CM Network Effectiveness 
 
The AGFI result also increased from .865 to .965 in the developed CFA. Therefore, 
besides the GFI, the AGFI score also indicates a good model fit level (>.9). The GFI score 
indicated a good model fit in the previous model; however, it improved and surpassed .95 
(=.985). On the other hand, the CFI test score improved, as expected, to over .95. The CFI was 
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.91 in the primitive CFA model and went up to 1 in the developed final CFA model. The 
RMSEA made an improvement and fell down to 0.0 from an unacceptable .091. 
4.2.4 The Main Model 
The main model is created by combining two latent construct CFAs and the previously 
proposed predictor variables. The developed models of the CFAs were added to the structural 
model; therefore, removed variables and correlated observations were inherited in the final 
model. In Figure 2, a model was suggested with 23 observed and 2 latent variables. However, 
one observed variable from the Quality of Informal Relationship latent construct was omitted 
from the test. Figure 21(Appendix C) represents the generic structural model. 
The structured model includes 22 observed and 2 latent constructs. Correlations are 
imported from the discussed developed CFA models. All correlations from the observed 
variables to the latent constructs are positive. On the other hand, it is apparent that some of the 
correlations among some error residuals of the observed variables have negative values, 
indicating that some of the observed variables are negatively correlated with each other. 
Before interpreting individual regression scores, goodness of model fit was examined. As 





Table 10. Goodness of Fit Statistics of Structural Models 
 Criterion AMOS 
  Generic Model Developed Model  
Chi-square (x²) Low 386.435 278.742 
Degrees of freedom (df) > 0 187 183 
Probability >0.05 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio (x²/df) <4.0 2.066 1.523 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) >.90 0.878 .910 
Adjusted GFI (AGFI) >.90 0.835 .875 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >.90 0.872 .938 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation (RMSEA) 
<.05 0.066 .046 
 
The goodness-of-fit measures generally need improvement in Table 10. The chi square 
value is high; however, the LR is within accepted levels (=2.066). The probability value is low, 
suggesting a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The GFI, AGFI, and CFI are not over .9, but 
they are close to the accepted level (0.878, 0.835, and 0.872 respectively). The RMSEA is also 
high (=0.066), which means that the model needs an improvement.  
Table 17 indicates the suggestions coming from modification indices table in AMOS. 
Byrne (2001) suggested that the modification indices can be used only if they are backed by the 
theory utilized. The majority of the correlation suggestions in Table 17 are not hypothesized in 
the study. It is possible to correlate all of the correlation suggestions in a measurement model 
because CFA models are already hypothesized by a theoretical discussion. However, the 
structural model utilizes all observed and latent constructs, and theory cannot allow all the 
factors to be correlated. The study used the correlation suggestions among predictor variables. 
No other suggestions in Table 17 can be supported by the theory because those suggestions 




Looking at the correlations in Table 17, the developed structural model correlated 
predictor variables that represent Question #3 and Question #2, Question #3 and Question #4, 
Question #3 and Question #1, and Question #1 and Question #2. The developed model is 
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The probability value for the developed structural model did not go over .05 confidence 
level in developed model, which indicates that the model fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
However, Schumaker and Lomax (2004) pointed out that chi square test statistics are highly 
affected by sample size; therefore, they are only reliable when evaluated with other goodness-of-
model-fit tests. The chi square value reduced to 278.74 from 386.43, which shows an 
improvement in the developed model despite the fact that the probability value did not change. 
Moreover, the LR also became smaller; it was already under the accepted level (=1.523). 
The GFI and CFI also went over the accepted level of .90 (.91 and .94 respectively). The AGFI 
stayed under .90 (=.875); however, it was close to the accepted level. The RMSEA was another 
measure that improved well enough to support a good model fit (=.046). Based on these 
measures, the model is accepted as having a good model fit. 
AMOS was discussed as having the ability to test whether non-normality in the dataset 
significantly distorts statistical findings. Table 11 demonstrates the non-normality tests of the 
latest SEM model.  
 
Table 11. AMOS’ Assessment of Non-Normality Test 




Q4 0.416 2.665 -0.933 -2.987 
Q3 0.864 5.531 -0.094 -0.301 
Q2 0.596 3.816 -0.684 -2.189 
Q1 0.467 2.99 -0.765 -2.45 
Q25 0.709 4.542 -0.101 -0.323 
Q24 0.518 3.317 -0.472 -1.513 
Q23 0.414 2.648 -0.688 -2.202 
Q22 0.418 2.675 -0.739 -2.366 
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Q21 0.429 2.748 -0.643 -2.059 
Q18a 0.207 1.324 -0.684 -2.188 
Q17 0.469 3.001 -0.759 -2.43 
Q16 0.766 4.907 -0.086 -0.275 
Q15 0.576 3.687 -0.55 -1.761 
Q14 0.715 4.576 -0.388 -1.242 
Q5 0.895 5.729 0.211 0.676 
Q6 0.864 5.532 0.487 1.559 
Q7 0.821 5.258 0.022 0.071 
Q8 0.75 4.801 -0.068 -0.217 
Q9 1.023 6.552 0.537 1.719 
Q10 1.112 7.123 0.973 3.116 
Q12 1.071 6.858 1.018 3.258 
Q13 1.199 7.679 1.469 4.703 
Multivariate     124.081 29.944 
 
The rule of thumb of AMOS suggests that a critical ratio value different from zero 
indicates the non-normality of the dataset in Table 11. However, critical ratio values for 
skewness and kurtosis are negligible when less than one. In order to have a severe non-
normality, critical ratio values should go over ten. No critical ratio value in Table 11 violates this 
assumption. The greatest critical ratio for skewness (7.7) and kurtosis (4.7) value belongs to 
question #13. Therefore, the test results would be considered to have moderate non-normality 
that does not distort statistical results. 
4.2.5 Latent Constructs 
Table 12 demonstrates the test results of the developed SEM model. Correlations 
representing study hypotheses were evaluated in the following section. All of the factors 
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estimated in latent constructs of the study produced statistically significant coefficients. The 
probability values of those correlations were significant at the .01 confidence level.  
 
Table 12. Individual Effects among Variables in SEM model 
 Developed Structural Model 
Correlation Direction URC SRC S.E. C.R. p 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q1 0.08 0.147 0.042 1.911 0.056 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q2 0.132 0.233 0.044 2.99 0.003 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q3 0.088 0.151 0.043 2.041 0.041 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q4 0.026 0.048 0.039 0.661 0.509 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q1 0.068 0.108 0.036 1.892 0.059 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q2 0.012 0.018 0.038 0.309 0.758 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q3 0.177 0.262 0.038 4.626 *** 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q4 0.252 0.402 0.036 6.92 *** 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.459 0.394 0.083 5.535 *** 
Q13 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.756 0.535 0.106 7.135 *** 
Q12 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.688 0.494 0.107 6.46 *** 
Q10 <--- Q. o. I. R. 1 0.68    
Q9 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.748 0.483 0.117 6.391 *** 
Q8 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.998 0.651 0.117 8.513 *** 
Q7 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.975 0.601 0.128 7.617 *** 
Q6 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.425 0.302 0.104 4.1 *** 
Q5 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.838 0.517 0.126 6.634 *** 
Q15 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.874 0.597 0.101 8.645 *** 
Q16 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.826 0.583 0.097 8.513 *** 
Q17 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.941 0.612 0.102 9.236 *** 
Q18a <--- P. E. o. C. N.  1 0.739    
Q21 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.964 0.657 0.098 9.854 *** 
Q22 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.835 0.559 0.101 8.261 *** 
Q23 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  1.023 0.678 0.104 9.855 *** 
Q24 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.973 0.672 0.098 9.966 *** 
Q25 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.806 0.589 0.091 8.871 *** 
Q14 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.811 0.544 0.101 8.048 *** 
Note: *** = Correlation significant @ p ≤ .01 
Note: U. R.C. = Unstandardized Regression Coefficients; S. R. C. = Standardized Regression Coefficients; S. E. 
= Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio; Q. o. I. R.: Quality of informal relationships; P. E. o. C. N. = Perceived 




The greatest unstandardized regression coefficient score for the latent construct quality of 
informal relationships belonged to question #10, which was 1 (.68 for the standardized 
regression coefficient). Question #10 represented the observed variable formed strong 
friendships at work. This question was followed by the trust many coworkers a great deal factor 
with a .998 unstandardized regression coefficient score (.65 for the standardized regression 
coefficient). The lowest value for estimating factors came from question #6, with .42 of the 
unstandardized regression coefficient score (.30 for the standardized regression coefficient). 
Question #6 represented the observed variable have chance to talk informally and visit 
others. One should notice that although there is a difference among the correlations‘ strength in 
estimating the quality of informal relationships, all of them are high for a social science study, 
and all of them are strongly significant. The informal relationship scale asked a similar question, 
as expected, but the correlations with the latent construct should be considered in one piece. The 
only variable left out of the study was the observed variable working for organization because of 
someone else, which indicated the highest degree of friendship. Therefore, it can be said that the 
CM employees had informal relationships to a significant degree within the agencies, but not 
friendships of the highest level. 
Factors estimating the perceived effectiveness of CM networks were much stronger than 
the ones estimating the independent variable. The lowest unstandardized regression coefficient 
was for the last question of the survey, which asked about a well-functioning emergency 
management center, with an unstandardized regression coefficient score of .81(.59 for the 
standardized regression coefficient). This indicates how important all ten criteria are for CM 
networks. Ten criteria factors had an average unstandardized regression coefficient score of .91. 
It would be misleading to discuss which one of them is superior to the others. Therefore, 
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Quarantelli‘s (1997) ten criteria should be applied without preferring one over another. All 
suggested factors are proven to be important for the effectiveness of CM networks.  
4.2.6 Hypothesis Testing 
The study utilized five hypotheses; they are evaluated in this section. The standardized 
and unstandardized regression coefficients for each given relationship in the structural model are 
demonstrated in Table 12. 
H1: A higher quality of informal relationships within crisis management organizations 
will increase the effectiveness of crisis management efforts. 
The analysis results show that the model supported this hypothesis. Table 12 presented 
that the suggested relationship has a .46-unstandardized regression coefficient value and a .39 
standardized regression coefficient value, which are statistically significant at the .01 confidence 
level. It means that when the quality of informal relationships latent construct goes up by 1, the 
perceived effectiveness of the CM network goes up by 0.46. Unstandardized regression 
coefficients can be misleading because they are related to other relationships of the measured 
variable. On the other hand, the standardized regression coefficient value of the relationship 
suggests that when the quality of informal relationships latent construct goes up by 1 standard 
deviation, the perceived effectiveness of CM network goes up by 0.394 standard deviations.  
.39 is a high correlation for examined latent constructs. The test is statistically significant 
at a high confidence level, as well. It can be suggested that each intervention aiming to increase 
the quality of relationships among CM personnel can increase the perceived network 
effectiveness by almost 40 percent. For a social science project, this is a considerably high value. 
Therefore, the study rejects the null hypothesis for H1 and accepts the hypothesis. 
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H2- The openness of CM organization to change has a positive effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of CM networks. 
Openness of change was assessed by Question #4 in the surveys. In Table 12, the 
highlighted values show that this relationship was proved to be correct at the .01 confidence 
level. The correlation has a .25unstandardized regression coefficient value and a .40 standardized 
regression coefficient value. Similarly to the first hypothesis, this correlation is also a very high 
value for social science research. The correlation basically suggests that the more open a CM 
organization is to change, the more effective it will be perceived to be.  
Table 12 suggests that when the openness of an organization value goes up by 1 standard 
deviation, the perceived effectiveness of the CM network goes up by 0.40 standard deviations. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and H2 of the study is proven to be correct. 
H3- Changes in CM policies due to important events will positively affect CM 
effectiveness. 
This hypothesis was operationalized with question #1 in the surveys. The unstandardized 
and standardized coefficients‘ values are low relative to the prior hypotheses (.07 and .11 
respectively). Moreover, the correlations do not have a significant probability value, which 
violates the .95 confidence level (=.059). Although the probability value is very close to the 
accepted confidence level, the weak correlation for the observed variable representing changed 
CM policies due to an important event fails to reject the null hypothesis of H3. Therefore, the 
study fails to prove that the H3 is correct. In other words, the study cannot find statistical proof 
that changed CM policies due to an important event affect the perceived effectiveness of a CM 
network based on proposed the SEM model.  
H4-Intra-organizational training of CM personnel will lead to more effective CM. 
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H4 was represented by question #3 in the surveys. The observed variable has a weak 
correlation on perceived effectiveness (unstandardized regression coefficient = .18, standardized 
regression coefficient = .26). Although this can be considered a low degree of effect, it is 
statistically significant at the .01 confidence level. When the intra-organizational training 
variable‘s value goes up by 1 standard deviation, the perceived effectiveness of the CM network 
goes up by 0.26 standard deviations. This is a relatively high score in terms of the social science 
perspective.  
Therefore, the study proved that the null hypothesis of H4 was rejected. To put it 
differently, it is been supported by the study that intra-organizational efforts statistically increase 
the perceived effectiveness of the CM network.  
H5- Frequent actual CM experiences increase CM effectiveness. 
H5 was represented in the surveys with question # 2. A very weak correlation with 
.01unstandardized regression coefficient value and .02 standardized regression coefficient value 
shows that there was almost no relationship between the observed variable representing frequent 
CM experiences and the perceived effectiveness of CM network. Moreover, the relationships 
probability value violates the confidence interval (=.76). The literature suggests that real CM 
experiences with other organizations based on real scenarios do increase CM effectiveness. This 
study‘s result is controversial, given what the literature suggested. Possible reasons for this 
controversy will be discussed in the conclusion of this study. Finally, the study claims that the 
null hypothesis for H5 could not be rejected. The hypothesized correlation in H5 does not exist, 
based on statistical model‘s findings. 
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4.2.7 Group Comparisons 
In this part the American and Turkish groups‘ differences were examined based on the 
same structural SEM model. The developed model in Figure 11 was used to provide consistency 
in the results. The groups‘ differences were discussed in regards to the socio-economical 
characteristics of the groups and other reasons that could stem from the organizational 
differences of employees. 
The American groups‘ standardized regression coefficients based on the proposed final 
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Figure 12. Developed Structural Model for American Group 
The Turkish groups‘ standardized regression coefficients based on the proposed final 
model are shown in Figure 13. There are small differences in the scores of correlations among 
the given model‘s observed and latent variables. Although the figures change for the same 
variables, the directions of the correlations remain similar, which shows that although the same 
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Figure 13. Developed Structural Model for Turkish Group 
 The small sample size affected the goodness of fit of the group models. Table 13 





Table 13. Goodness of Fit Statistics of Structural Models of American and Turkish Groups 
 Criterion AMOS 




Chi-square (x²) Low 534.819 278.742 
Degrees of freedom (df) > 0 366 183 
Probability >0.05 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio (x²/df) <4.0 1.461 1.523 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) >.90 .840 .910 
Adjusted GFI (AGFI) >.90 .778 .875 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >.90 .894 .938 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation (RMSEA) 
<.05 .044 .046 
  
When the same model was divided into two groups, the chi square (=534.82) and degrees 
of freedom (=366) values doubled because of decreased sample size per group. The probability 
value did not change. Therefore, the model is still not fit, according to a probability value that is 
less than .01. LR, and the RMSEA improved in the groups‘ model (1.46 and .044 respectively). 
These two figures are the only measures that offer a good model for the given model.  
 The CFI fell under the .9 acceptance level (=.894) but it still represents a close fit model. 
The GFI is the other variable that worsened; however, it too stayed over .80 (=.84). The AGFI 
dropped to .778, also failing to show a good model fit in the developed model. Since there are 
measures indicating a good model fit, and since the reduced sample size of the model is expected 
to yield a poorer model fit than the general structural model, the study examined the individual 
correlations of each group comparatively. Table 14 demonstrates the discussed differences.  
Table 14. Individual Effetcs among Variables in SEM model  
 
American Group Turkish Group 
Correlation Direction URC SRC S.E. C.R. p URC SRC S.E. C.R. p 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q1 0.134 0.237 0.063 2.137 * 0.017 0.032 0.053 0.314 0.754 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q2 0.072 0.116 0.068 1.067 0.286 0.171 0.318 0.059 2.89 *** 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q3 0.021 0.038 0.059 0.362 0.718 0.16 0.26 0.062 2.581 *** 
Q. o. I. R. <--- Q4 -0.042 -0.08 0.056 -0.761 0.446 0.155 0.244 0.062 2.496 * 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q1 0.11 0.176 0.064 1.719 0.086 0.035 0.061 0.039 0.879 0.38 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q2 0.037 0.055 0.067 0.555 0.579 -0.007 -0.011 0.045 -0.149 0.882 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q3 0.131 0.212 0.06 2.176 * 0.177 0.261 0.049 3.636 *** 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q4 0.194 0.331 0.059 3.299 *** 0.181 0.258 0.049 3.71 *** 
P. E. o. C. N.  <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.312 0.284 0.125 2.492 * 0.614 0.558 0.126 4.876 *** 
Q13 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.854 0.516 0.181 4.714 *** 0.644 0.533 0.128 5.031 *** 
Q12 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.727 0.601 0.138 5.25 *** 0.565 0.377 0.156 3.619 *** 
Q10 <--- Q. o. I. R. 1 0.683 
 
  1 0.657  
  Q9 <--- Q. o. I. R. 1.039 0.642 0.182 5.698 *** 0.691 0.462 0.159 4.348 *** 
Q8 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.977 0.595 0.18 5.424 *** 1.005 0.691 0.161 6.255 *** 
Q7 <--- Q. o. I. R. 1.184 0.66 0.21 5.634 *** 0.778 0.514 0.163 4.781 *** 
Q6 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.56 0.353 0.172 3.257 *** 0.348 0.267 0.133 2.617 *** 
Q5 <--- Q. o. I. R. 0.61 0.381 0.182 3.358 *** 1.007 0.594 0.186 5.41 *** 




American Group Turkish Group 
Correlation Direction URC SRC S.E. C.R. p URC SRC S.E. C.R. p 
Q16 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.803 0.526 0.174 4.612 *** 1.036 0.675 0.14 7.414 *** 
Q17 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.891 0.524 0.185 4.819 *** 0.933 0.611 0.136 6.872 *** 
Q18a <--- P. E. o. C. N.  1 0.685 
 
  1 0.761  
  Q21 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.834 0.53 0.172 4.855 *** 1.083 0.7 0.137 7.907 *** 
Q22 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.692 0.423 0.179 3.876 *** 1.032 0.661 0.141 7.318 *** 
Q23 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.857 0.546 0.18 4.754 *** 1.131 0.71 0.145 7.787 *** 
Q24 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.971 0.6 0.184 5.281 *** 1.007 0.694 0.131 7.696 *** 
Q25 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.727 0.48 0.163 4.453 *** 0.975 0.678 0.126 7.716 *** 
Q14 <--- P. E. o. C. N.  0.707 0.413 0.188 3.765 *** 0.989 0.651 0.137 7.214 *** 
Note: *** = Correlation significant @ p ≤ .01, * = Correlation significant @ p ≤ .05 
Note: U. R.C. = Unstandardized Regression Coefficients; S. R. C. = Standardized Regression 
Coefficients; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio; Q. o. I. R.: Quality of informal 
relationships; P. E. o. C. N. = Perceived Effectiveness of CM Network 
 
It should be noted that the latent constructs‘ correlations with the observed variables that 
created them are statistically significant in both groups. The CFA models of latent constructs 
were so successful that reduced sample size did not change the correlations‘ statistical 
significance. Before looking at the latent constructs, the proposed hypotheses were examined 
from the groups‘ perspectives. 
The main hypothesis of the study, H1, was supported in each group statistically. The 
Turkish group‘s standardized regression coefficient for H1 (=.59) more than doubled the one 
belonging to the American group (=.28). Quality of informal relationships meant more to the 
Turkish group than the American group in terms of perceived effectiveness. The individualistic 
culture of the American people may have affected this perception negatively for the American 
group. The opposite of this judgment is also possible: the Turkish group may have shown this 
high correlation for H1 because of the influence of collectivism. 
American society is ranked #1 on the individualistic culture scale of Hofstede (2001), 
with a score of 91. The lower the individualism score on Hodstede‘s scale, the more collectivist a 
society is. Turkey‘s score is 31, and the median score on the scale is forty-three. The collectivist 
society of Turkey may have affected the perceived effectiveness of the CM network, thus a high 
quality of informal relationships is important for effective CM in Turkey. Although it is lower 
than the Turkish group‘s score, it should be noted that the American group‘s correlation for H1 is 
also strong from the social science perspective, as well as statistically significant. 
H2 was tested with question #4 in the surveys. There is not much difference between the 
standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients. The Turkish group has a slightly lower 
(=.26) value than the American group (=.33) for the given test. The correlations were significant 
at the .01 confidence level. The question regarded the respondent‘s opinions about CM agencies‘ 
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openness to change. The American group‘s respondents thought that openness to change was 
more important for the effectiveness of a CM network than Turkish group did; however, the 
results are close to each other, and considering the standard error of correlations (.06 for the 
American and .05 for the Turkish group), it can be assumed that the groups answered this 
question in almost the same way. 
H3 was represented by question #1 of the study, regarding policy changes after important 
events. The general structural model could not find a statistically significant correlation for H3. 
Table 14 demonstrates that the group model statistics also failed to find a statistical relationship 
for H3. The standardized regression coefficient for the given variable in the American group is 
low (=.18) and not statistically significant (p =.09). Similarly, the Turkish group‘s correlation for 
H3 is also low (=.06) and insignificant (p =.4). Both groups agreed that policy changes after 
important events do not have a significant effect on perceived effectiveness.  
Question #3 operationalizes H4, and the groups have close significant values for this 
hypothesis. The American group‘s standardized regression coefficient (=.21) is a little less than 
theTurkish group‘s (=.26). The American group‘s correlation for H4 is significant at the .05 
confidence level, while the Turkish group‘s correlation is more statistically significant at the .01 
confidence level. Question #3 discusses an important predictor variable: intra-organizational 
training efforts. Both groups felt that intra-organizational training holds an important place in 
perceived CM network effectiveness. 
H5 was rejected in the developed structural model. Question #2 was utilized to prove this 
hypothesis. The groups‘ statistical values also rejected H5. The standardized and unstandardized 
regression coefficients are very low for the American (=.04 and =.05 respectively) and Turkish 
groups (= -.01 and = -.01 respectively). Additionally, the probability values for the American 
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(=.55) and Turkish (=.88) groups also violate the .05 confidence level. The frequency of 
important events has no relationship to the perceived effectiveness of CM networks, according to 
the findings in Table 14. 
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5 IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The study discussed both qualitative and quantitative results. The SEM results helped to 
illuminate possible socio-economical and technical aspects of differences from one country to 
another. The discussed variables‘ importance in terms of CM agencies was analyzed in detail. 
Several hypotheses, including the primary one, were found to be statistically significant with 
AMOS software. 
5.1 Implications 
5.1.1 Policy Implications  
The qualitative discussions revealed that terrorist events disrupt public administration 
mechanisms. Whether the examined CM systems were ready for a terrorist attack or not, chaos 
and disorder occurred right after the events. The case countries developed similar processes 
relevant to their own public administration systems to block interruptions in public services. The 
politically decentralized countries prepared for extreme events differently from the politically 
centralized ones. However, the results were not related to whether a system was centralized or 
not. CM policies did not fail or achieve in their totality in any single country. Instead, some parts 
of CM networks failed in each country, while some others were extremely successful. 
Communication failures were the most important deficiency in all observed cases; they 
resulted in management failures. The command structure of first responders was lost in the WTC 
attacks, and it took significant time to restore the hierarchical management structure in New 
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York City after the event. In the Istanbul bombings, the first responder faced similar 
communication shortages. The reaction of emergency health agencies in Istanbul was so 
uncoordinated that a significant part of the city was left without emergency health services 
during the response phase. Blood donors kept the Spanish emergency services busy, which 
resulted in a relatively ineffective emergency medical response.  
London was prepared for communication failures. British CM agencies included even 
private telecommunication services in their CM plans for the sake of a successful emergency 
communication. However, an out-of-date first responder phone list left health officials in 
particular without personal communication capability. The London bombings showed that even 
the most well-crafted CM plan can partially fail. Communication is an important element of 
coordination, which is crucial to a successful CM policy. 
Al-Qaeda began to use suicide bombers to kill civilians after the WTC attacks, which 
mobilized especially the western world to prepare against such tactics. Coordination agencies 
were given authority to provide connectedness and continuity in the response and recovery 
phases of CM. Central-command policies were applied differently; in the U.S. and Turkey, 
command-control was preferred to coordination-supervision because of the political turbulence 
that these countries were experiencing. Spain and the U.K. took a different stand on this issue 
and chose coordination-supervision over command-control.  
Centralization or decentralization is not adequate to explain why the U.S. and Turkey do 
not favor the coordination-supervision approach. Since their public administration systems are 
similar, besides the U.K., Spain appeared to have the same CM structure as the U.S. Spain has 
another similarity with Turkey: the Mediterranean culture. However, it was the U.K. and Spain 
that provided effective resources and adequate authority to regional and local administrations. 
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Even complex and expensive processes of mitigation and preparedness are in the control of 
regional authorities in these countries.  
After the Obama administration took office in the U.S., changes in the CM system were 
expected. The global economic crisis affected public policies, but a shift to coordination-
supervision can only occur in a one-way direction, according to some scholars (McNabb, 2009). 
Turkish CM policies were also criticized after a helicopter accident killed five people on board, 
including a political party leader. Because of ineffective search and rescue operations, the 
incident location could not be found for a long time, despite enormous budget support to central 
CM agencies (Referans, 2009). A new direction favoring local and regional authorities was 
pointed out for CM in Turkey after the accident; this approach is still advancing. 
On the other hand, the quantitative assessments of this study offered another important 
and practical lesson, especially for first responders of CM. Improving the quality of relationships 
among CM personnel can provide better CM. Improved friendships among personnel will 
provide more open communication lines, which eventually will help the agencies stand and serve 
in a chaotic environment. A sample population selected from British, American, and Turkish first 
responders showed that the presence of friendships within their agencies improved the perceived 
quality of CM efforts significantly. This correlation had been pointed out before, but not proven 
with statistical tests.  
Events that increase friendships in a CM organization will help the employees to be in 
touch with other employees, no matter how chaotic the environment becomes. CM policies 
should address this specific need of CM agencies. Sporting events, picnics, traveling, 
associations, and other social activities can enrich informal relationships within and among 
agencies. Holding those events is inexpensive relative to many other collaboration-enriching 
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methods; based on the results of the study, it is entertaining, trust-building, and very effective, no 
matter how individualist or collectivist the society. 
The adaptation capabilities of CM agencies were tested in the study as well. The selected 
four aspects of adaptation were tested via the hypotheses. Openness to change had the greatest 
impact on perceived CM effectiveness. It is not surprising to see such a result, since the 
theoretical background suggested an evolutionary path for organizations. If a CM agency is not 
open to developments and to adapting to changes in environment, sooner or later it will fail. 
However, if the agency is open to change, not only it will continue to proceed, but it will also run 
more effectively. CM policies should be created with local and regional authorities‘ participation 
to give them freedom to change their structures. The top-down approach will prevent openness to 
change, which will negatively affect CM organizations‘ performance during an extreme event. 
Moreover, the interior dynamics of CM agencies should also be designed to provide flexibility in 
management and production. Therefore, openness to change is essential in order for a CM 
agency to perform effectively, and the support for it must come from both inside and outside the 
agency. 
Another important perspective of adaptation found to have a significant impact on CM 
effectiveness is intra-organizational training efforts. Although it has a weaker correlation than 
the prior hypothesis discussed above, the relationship between intra-organizational training and 
the perceived effectiveness of the CM network is statistically significant. From the adaptation 
perspective, intra-organizational training helps agencies to have the most updated information 
and thus to evolve through changes in the environment. Therefore, institutional memory 
advances through new social and technological developments. Agencies that disregard intra-
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organizational training will face ineffective CM efforts because they failed to go forward by 
using changed environmental components.  
The informal relationship scale (Nielsen et al., 2000; Morrison, 2004) and the perceived 
effectiveness of CM network scale (Quarantelli, 1997) were successful in defining latent 
dependent and independent variables. The correlations between observed variables and latent 
constructs were high and statistically significant in all CFA and structural models. Even the 
reduced sample size in the groups‘ models did not change the significance of the correlations 
defining latent constructs. It shows the validity of models run and statistical constructs built in 
the study. Policy makers should target the cited factors for each latent construct in order to 
operate more effectively. 
The top three correlations with the quality of informal relationships variable were 
socialize with coworkers outside of workplace, formed strong friendships at work, and trust 
many coworkers a great deal. Social events will allow these variables to improve the quality of 
informal relationships more than others will. Creating trust should be a priority of those social 
activities. Picnics, sporting events, and other activities were only some of the suggestions made 
by the study. Policies regulating these activities should be developed professionals in order to 
improve the quality of intra-organizational friendships. 
Factors representing ―appropriate reports for the news media,‖ ―blending emergent and 
established organizations,‖ and ―adequately processing information‖ had the greatest impact on 
the perceived CM effectiveness of first responders. When appropriate reports are not made 
available to news sources, the chaotic environment will become larger than it actually is. The 
examined Istanbul bombings showed that when public officials avoid sharing information during 
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times of crisis, it produces a poor CM effort whether the ground units at incident sites perform 
successfully or not. 
Emergent sources are either volunteer-based resources or victims directly affected by 
extreme events. Cold War tactics did not suggest any plans to involve those resources in CM 
plans. Recent policies have offered methods to include emergent resources in CM plans, and they 
have achieved that to a certain degree. The respondents to the study surveyed showed that 
including emergent sources is one of the most important effectiveness factors in utilizing and 
managing these resources. Policy makers should make CM plans based on the assumption of 
emergent source existence.  
Adequately processing information has three layers, according to Quarantelli‘s scale 
(1997). The factor utilized all three dimensions with the statistical software‘s help. Three 
different questions were combined into one factor. For this reason, the implication of this 
variable has three dimensions as well. Information obtained during an extreme event should be 
shared within the agency, with other agencies, and with affected citizens. Regulations should aim 
first to employ communication methods that make it possible to process information. Second, 
CM plans should be designed to share and process information within the agency, with other 
agencies, and with affected citizens.  
5.1.2 Theoretical Implications 
This study will contribute to the network effectiveness area. Network theory and its 
implications are still in progress. It is known that interorganizational efforts are hard to define 
and evaluate with conventional methods used to assess individual organizations. The methods 
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utilized in this study are fairly distinctive in the literature, which will contribute to 
interorganizational network studies.  
Additionally, CAS had not been utilized with such quantified methods before. Recently 
introduced to the social sciences, CAS needs more research and applications. CAS‘s suggestions 
were combined with network theory literature to explain adaptiveness, nonlinear relationships, 
developed communication lines, and effectiveness within CM organizations and networks. The 
theory‘s methodological application is another contribution, because the adaptation perspective 
of the theory was utilized as a predictor variable while the quality of informal relationships 
construct represented more open communication lines as an independent variable.  
Methodologically, SEM was successful in showing complex relationships‘ correlation in 
a given model. Correctly applied, SEM can demonstrate multiple regression tests in one model, 
which can contribute to both CAS and CM studies. CAS, like network literature, requires the 
employment of many different variables and perspectives to explain social occasions. CM 
networks are also dependent on various social factors as cited in the study, which require more 
than a simple regression test. SEM is powerful and reliable enough to serve in more research in 
those areas. 
This study will also improve crisis management efforts. Informal relationships within 
crisis management organizations should be improved to better crisis management efforts 
worldwide. The diversity of cultures included in the study increases the chance of replicability. 
More importantly, improved crisis management efforts will allow the emergency networks to 




This study evaluated the crisis management operations implemented after four different 
terrorist attacks performed in New York in 2001, in Istanbul in 2003, in Madrid in 2004, and in 
London in 2005. The immediate collaborative emergency response and recovery efforts 
conducted by local, national, and international organizations after each attack were examined as 
a sample of CM efforts that actually consisted of mitigation and preparedness along with 
response and recovery against natural and manmade disasters.  
Public administration systems, historical facts, and social-economic conditions were 
found to affect the effectiveness of CM policies. The CM structures, CM policies, and CM 
coordination changed in the countries examined. Central-regional or federal-local government 
competition not only affected the style and processes of CM, but also the effectiveness of CM. 
Centralization and decentralization clearly affected CM performance, but the direction of this 
effect was not clear. The study suggested that a well-planned, combined decentralization and 
centralization can be the best CM intervention.  
Organizations selected based on social network analysis results were surveyed to measure 
the hypothesized correlations. The perceived effectiveness of interorganizational efforts was 
shown to have been affected by the quality of informal relationships within crisis management 
organizations. Two of the adaptation factors that CAS theory suggested were also proven to 
create effective CM in a chaotic environment.  
The increased effectiveness of interorganizational efforts among crisis management 
organizations will lead to a successful crisis management methodology worldwide. More than 
half of the respondents were managers; as a result, the findings can be generalized to all CM 
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efforts. Additionally, the study examined cases from all over the world, which increases the 
chance to apply the results universally.  
5.3 Limitations 
The study faced serious limitations stemming from the theory, methodology, statistical 
tools, and difficulty of studying controversial terrorist cases. CAS is a recently developed theory 
that is still growing. The methodology includes several assumptions that can be a threat to 
external and internal validity. AMOS and UCINET are discussed to have certain limitations. 
Moreover, the selected CM cases were terrorist cases, which minimized the probability of 
finding available survey respondents. 
CAS was first developed for use in biology. Leading scholars of the theory are also 
famous for their studies on microorganisms and evolution. CAS‘s social science and public 
affairs standpoint is new and needs development. The non-linear relationship clause is applicable 
in biology but needs more application in social science. In addition to that limitation, CAS 
assumes that a relationship between an organization and its environment is based on positive and 
negative feedbacks. This can explain cybernetic systems like simple organisms, but 
organizations do not necessarily receive clear positive or negative signals from the environment. 
The term complexity also needs more research. How complex a system must be in order 
to be called a complex system is an important question for further research in CAS. Although it 
is a new theory, CAS explained many perspectives of the study. CAS also contributed to the 
research with four predictor variables. Since the study employed a network approach in the 
dependent variable, CAS was used to its latest extent in the study. 
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The methodology used a three-fold path. The multiple-case study method was used to 
find CM cases from the world. By using those cases, informal relationships were tested to see 
whether they had an impact on perceived CM effectiveness. Four terrorist bombing cases were 
conducted by the same terrorist network with different methods. It can be argued that terrorist 
bombing cases do not represent all CM efforts. Also, only the response and recovery phases were 
utilized, which left the mitigation and preparedness phases out of the study. 
However, the research focused on CM efforts that were conducted by reliable CM 
systems. Many other great natural disasters have claimed hundreds of thousands of people‘s 
lives, such as Iran-Bam earthquake in 2003 that killed 43,000, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 
that killed over 230,000, the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake in Pakistan that claimed over 85,000 
lives, and the recent Sichuan earthquake in 2008 that took 70,000 lives in China. Manmade 
disasters also cost many human lives. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, which was the case 
studies‘ point of commonality in this study, has conducted many other deadly attacks in Saudi 
Arabia, Congo, Sudan, Bali, and some other Arabic and African countries. Nonetheless the study 
did not employ any but the four cases examined in the text.  
It should be noted that the unselected countries did not have a proper CM system. 
Moreover, the cases did not have reliable official and/or news reports. Even the death tolls of 
cited events are questionable because of the political conditions of those countries. Without 
proper knowledge resources, the study could not provide an adequate literature review should 
any of those cited events be selected as case studies. 
The response and recovery phases were chosen to represent all CM cycles, which also 
includes mitigation and preparedness. The response and recovery phases take much less time to 
complete than the other two phases of CM. From that perspective, the study results have a 
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limited capacity for generalization. However, more than half of the survey respondents were 
managers. Unlike frontline workers, managers of CM organizations can shape the strategies of 
mitigation and preparedness. Therefore, the results should not be limited to response and 
recovery; instead, they should be generalized through other phases based on the characteristics of 
the study sample. 
 Another method used in the study was snowball sampling. In the SEM section of the 
study, the survey respondents were asked to name names of their coworkers to identify more 
respondents. The reason was simple: it has been a long time in the case countries since the 
incidents took place, and many possible respondents have left their jobs, retired, or died. A 
limited but unknown number of respondents could be found out with this method. However, one 
of the latent variables of the study was quality of relationships. This variable could be affected 
since the respondents would likely name their own friends in the organizations.  
Snowball sampling did not significantly affect the results of the study. For example, the 
only observed variable left out of the study was ―working for the organization because of 
someone else.‖ Moreover, the quality of informal relationships latent construct‘s correlations 
with the factors that created it was not stronger than the correlations created by the effectiveness 
latent construct. Additionally, in Appendix B, www.surveygizmo.com provides a map for the 
surveys that demonstrates the geographical locations of respondents. The maps showed that the 
respondents came from many different regions in the case countries. Finally, it took a very long 
time to gather all responses. Had some friend groups performed all the surveys, the study would 
have reached many people within a considerably shorter time and with less effort. 
The number of selected agencies can also be cited as a limitation of the study. The 
literature offered studies utilizing UCINET to explain the relationships within a selected 
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network. Utilizing UCINET as a sampling tool to find the most interacting agencies in a network 
was not utilized in the literature. Therefore, the decision regarding the number of selected 
organizations for each country was made based on a logical interpretation of current sampling 
methods. The number six was reached after discussions with dissertation committee members. 
The statistical software used presented problems as well. UCINET analyses are as 
relevant as the contents used. If the researchers are not sure what they are looking for in which 
content, UCINET will not help them. Content selection is even more important than the scientific 
results of UCINET analyses because the results are directly shaped by the content. The UCINET 
analyses of the study were created by a professional research team. Almost all of the results 
corroborated with the literature. However, 7JAC was in the top-ten list of degree centrality 
scores of London Bombings (Table 5) even though it was established more than one month after 
the incident. NYPD‘s absence from the list (Table 2) was also questioned by a number of survey 
respondents because the agency was very active during the WTC attacks and lost a significant 
number of its members. However, the weakness of the software was evaluated in the study and 
the required adjustments were made while interpreting the analyses.  
Selecting terrorism cases may also have affected the findings of the study. Since terrorist 
cases are top-secret security issues, the respondents were not very eager to participate in the 
study. Even though the survey instruments clearly stated that the research had nothing to do with 
terrorism, people were reluctant to respond to the surveys. For that reason, the study could find 
very few participants in the U.K. and Spain. Possible respondents could not be contacted to 
explain that the research was purely about factors affecting crisis management effectiveness.  
As a result, the study had to remove two case countries from the quantitative SEM 
discussions. Reducing the cases by half might have had a negative impact on the proposed 
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results. Logically, four cases are more universally generalizable than two cases. Using only two 
cases unquestionably limited the generalization capacity of the results. Every method was tried to 
reach possible respondents in the U.K. and Spain. Personal official contacts, familiar scholars, 
word of mouth, internet groups, social network websites, and other available methods were 
employed. The translations of the surveys and invitation messages were prepared by professional 
translators. None of these tactics helped the study gather responses from those countries. The 
number of respondents from two countries was consequently doubled to provide a testable 
sample. However, selecting only the U.S. and Turkey offered sufficient opportunity to compare 
very different public administration systems and cultures in terms of CM. Centralist-decentralist, 
developing-developed, European-American, Middle Eastern-Anglo Saxon, and Old World-New 
World comparisons evaluated CM systems adequately.  
A significant amount of time had passed since the incidents, which created another threat 
to the study‘s external validity. The surveys included questions regarding the past circumstances 
of the CM organizations. The respondents could have forgotten the organizational situation at the 
time of the attack. Moreover, bad experiences such as an illness because of the incident or the 
loss of a beloved colleague in those events may have changed mentality of the respondents for 
organizations negatively. The opposite of this also possible: rewards after those incidents may 
have altered the perspective of the respondents positively. The surveys and the invitation letters 
emphasized passages specifically targeted to eliminate the retrospective approach problem of the 
study. 
Comparing the Turkish and American groups, the study‘s results cannot be argued to be 
distorted by this problem. The American group lost almost 500 members in the WTC attacks. 
This generated great physiological depression for the first responders to the WTC attacks. 
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Moreover, casualties continued over time because of poisonous gases inhaled by them in 
response and recovery operations. All these obstacles were supposed to produce very negative 
answers for selected variables of the study. The Turkish respondent group did not experience any 
of those circumstances because of the smaller scale of the attacks. Nonetheless, the compared 
statistical tests generated nearly the same results. Differences originated from social-economic 
conditions, not the retrospective perceptions of the respondents.   
5.4 Future Research 
More cases will be needed in future research based on this study. Since the multiple-case-study 
approach is implied, the CM response to recent Al-Qaeda attacks in India in 2008 may be 
considered as a part of future studies. Moreover, natural disasters can be selected as case studies. 
However, those studies should make sure that the target cases have a proper CM system. In 
addition to that, all CM cycles can be studied to grasp the big picture in CM. It will take more 
time and effort to study the mitigation and preparedness stages as well, but it is certainly a valid 
direction for future studies.  
Future studies could also include more respondents from more organizations. Although 
the almost 250 respondents to the study resulted in statistically significant results, half of the 
predictor variables used to explain adaptiveness could not be found statistically significant. A 
higher sample size could have led to better and more significant results. Moreover, including 
more agencies could prevent incorrect assessments from being made with the statistical tools 
employed. Additionally, more organizational or network variables could be used as predictor 
variables in future research. Organizations‘ budgets, size, characteristics, and other attributes will 
add important perspectives from an organizational viewpoint.  
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5.4.1 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations (US) 
 
============================================= 
 RESEARCH USE INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
=============================================  
 
Researcher Information:                   Bahadir Sahin 
                                          Department of Public Affairs 
                                          bahadir@mail.ucf.edu 
                                          + (1) 646-220-0628 (cell) 
                                     
I.   PROJECT TITLE:  Factors Influencing Effectiveness of Crisis 
Management Networks: A Comparative Perspective 
                                   
II. INTRODUCTION: Increased number of manmade and natural disasters forces 
the policy makers to make more effective crisis management policies. Since 
the crisis management cannot be conducted by one single entity, it is a 
collaborative network effort among first responder public organizations, 
nonprofit disaster relief institutions and other public and private 
entities. Ineffective crisis management policies coordinating the response 
and recovery efforts will result in failures that cost numerous human 
lives and great material damages to public and private infrastructures. 
The disasters will occur in a more increasing rate in the future (e.g. 
Iowa Floods in June 2008). The crisis management policies and 
organizations should be ready for worse conditions to be more effective 
and to save more human lives and hinder more property damage in future 
disasters. 
      Based on this information from the literature, you will be asked 25 
questions regarding the organizational conditions you are in. It will 
probably take 10 minutes of your time. Your participation is greatly 
appreciated. If you requested it (by mail, e-mail, or phone, the 
researcher will also provide a copy of consent form to you. 
 
III.   Your confidentiality will be guarded.   
If you have any questions about participation into this research project, 
you may file a claim with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and 
Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 32816-3500 (407) 823-6300.   
 




Professor and Director 
Doctoral Program in Public Affairs 
twan@mail.ucf.edu 
 + (1) 407-823-3678 
  
I have read and understood the information in this form. I am at least 18 
years of age. I consent to take part in this research entitled “Factors 
Influencing Effectiveness of Interorganizational Networks among Crisis 





 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations 
=============================================  
This survey examines the effectiveness of emergency operations during the 
WTC attacks in New York City. The survey takes about 15 minutes to 
complete. Your responses are confidential, and will not be revealed 
without your consent; only aggregate results will be made available. We 
are happy to make a copy of final results available to you. 
 
Employee Organization: 
 ( ) Health 
 ( ) Law Enforcement 
 ( ) Search and Rescue Team 
 ( ) Non-profit EM (Red Cross...) 
 ( ) Education Facility 
 ( ) Fire Department 
 ( ) Emergency Operation Center 
 
Employee Position: 
 ( ) Supervisor 
 ( ) Middle Manager 
 ( ) Frontline Manager 
 ( ) Assistant Supervisor 
 ( ) Team Leader 
 ( ) Frontline Worker 
 
Gender 
 ( ) Male 





Important Note: All the questions below will be asked for the time BEFORE 
9/11 WTC Attacks took place in the US. Please answer the questions for the 
situation in your organization before the incident.  
 
1. There has been important change(s) in my organization (structure, 
goals, and rules) because of an important event (Flood, terrorist attack, 
hurricane, bush fire, earthquake etc.) before. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
2. There have been important events frequently up to now, which my 
organization should deal with.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 




3. Intra-organizational education holds an important place in my 
organization.   
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
4. My organization is open to change by any means. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
5. I work with my coworkers to collectively solve the problems in the 
organization. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
6. I have the chance to talk informally and visit the other employees. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
7. I socialize with the coworkers outside of the workplace. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
8. I trust many coworkers a great deal. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
9. I do not feel any coworker is a true friend. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
10. I formed strong friendships at work. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
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 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
11. I work for the organization because she/he is here. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
12. Friendships make the workplace a happier place. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
13. Friendships help to work cooperatively with each other at times of 
stress. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
14. The employees of my organization know that each extreme event 
(terrorist bombings, flood, winter storm, earthquake, hurricane etc.) is 
different. My organization has plans and operates differently in each 
different extreme event. For example, we would use a different operational 
procedure for a flood than we would a terrorist bombing.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
15. My organization is ready to operate any generic emergency management 
functions (evacuation, temporary housing, alternative communication tools, 
warnings etc.). 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
16. My organization has plans to mobilize personnel (authorized employees 
and volunteers) and resources effectively. By effectively, I mean needed 
personnel and resources are well-identified in the crisis, they are 
located quickly and brought to bear correctly, and they are appropriate to 
the problems generated by the disaster.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
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 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
17. My organization has a certain job definition during an extreme event. 
My organization’s employees do not get involved in other kinds of labor 
during an extreme event different than the professionalization of my 
organization. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
18. Information is processed adequately within my organization during a 
disaster. Communication tools and communicated material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
19. Information is processed adequately between my organization and other 
responding organizations during a disaster. Communication tools and 
communicated material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
20. Information is processed adequately between my organization and 
affected citizens during a disaster. Communication tools and communicated 
material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
21. My organization keeps exercising decision-making properly in the 
crisis time as well. The organizational jurisdiction differences within or 
outside of the organization cannot be a problem; emergent groups and my 
organization do not have a conflict on organizational domains. 
Responsibility for new disaster tasks is not a problem that we cannot 
resolve easily. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
22. My organization’s employees work coordinative with the other 
organization employees in the crisis scene. Leadership in critical phases 
is not a problem. Since community good is more important to us, the 
willingness to de-emphasize organizational claims of leadership is high in 
my organization.  
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 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
23. My organization has plans to include the emerging resources into the 
organizational labor during a disaster. I and my other colleagues believe 
that volunteers and other emergent stakeholders are important sources to 
bring the social order back. My organization employees do not think that 
the emergent resources are useless because they are not controllable as we 
are. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
24. My organization supports the developments of relationships that are 
acceptable and beneficial to the responding organizations, the mass media 
and citizens in general. During extreme events, citizens are satisfied 
with the relatively accurate picture of what is going on via our 
broadcasting systems or press. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
25. My organization works with an emergency operation center (EOC) during 
disasters. We are represented in EOC in the highest level possible, we 
work co-operatively with the other responders, we benefit from it since we 
know what the others are doing and how we can help them. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
Please give names and email addresses of at least 3 (three) other 
employees that took part in recovery efforts at WTC Attacks from your 











































 Thank You! 
=============================================  
 






5.4.2 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations (Turkey) 
======================================= 




 ARAŞTIRMAYA RIZAYLA KATILIM FORMU  
=============================================  
 
Araştırmacı Bilgileri:         :          Bahadir Sahin 
                                          Department of Public Affairs 
                                          bahadir@mail.ucf.edu 
                                                 + (1) 646-220-0628 (cep) 
 
I.        Proje Başlığı: Afet Yönetimi Kurumlarının Verimliliğini Etkileyen 
Nedenler: Karsılaştırmalı bir Yaklaşım 
                                   
II.       Giriş:   Sayıları artmakta olan doğal ve insan-kaynaklı afetler, 
kanun koyucuları daha verimli afet yönetim politikaları geliştirmeye 
zorlamaktadır. Afet yönetimi yalnızca bir kurum tarafından 
gerçekleştirilemediğinden, ilk müdahaleyi yapan devlet kurumları, kar amacı 
gütmeyen afetle mücadele kuruluşları ve diğer kamu ve özel kuruluşların 
müşterek olarak gerçekleştirdiği bir faaliyettir. Arama-Kurtarma 
çalışmalarını düzenleyen verimsiz kriz yönetimi politikaları, kamu ve özel 
yapılara büyük zararlar doğuracak ve yüksek miktarda can kaybına yol 
açacaktır. Afetler, gelecekte artan miktarda meydana gelmeye devam edecektir 
(mesela Haziran 2008’deki Iowa Selleri). Kriz yönetim politikaları ve 
kurumları, gelecekteki afetlerde daha verimli olmak ve daha fazla can 
kaybıyla maddi zararı engelleme amacıyla daha kotu durumlar için hazır 
olmalıdır. 
          Bilimsel kaynaklardaki bu bilgilerin ışığında size kurumsal 
durumunuzla ilgili 25 soru sorulacaktır. Anket muhtemelen 10 dakikanızı 
alacaktır. Katılımınız nedeniyle müteşekkiriz. İstemeniz halinde (postayla, 
e-posta ile, ya da telefonla), araştırmacı size bu formun bir kopyasını 
tedarik edecektir. 
  
III.      Gizliliğiniz koruma altındadır.   
 Eger bu arastirmaya katilimla ilgili bir sorunuz varsa, bunu bu adres ve 
telefona yapabilirsiniz; UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and 
Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 32816-3500 (407) 823-6300. 
 
IV.       Eğer başka bir sorunuz varsa, ayrıca birincil araştırma 
sorumlusuyla da görüşebiliriniz: 
 
Thomas Wan 
Profesor and Direktor 
Doctoral Program in Public Affairs 
twan@mail.ucf.edu 




Bu formu okudum ve bilgileri anladım. 18 yaşında ya da daha büyüğüm. “Afet 
Yönetimi Kurumlarının Verimliliğini Etkileyen Nedenler: Karsılaştırmalı bir 
Yaklaşım” başlıklı araştırmada yer almayı kabul ediyorum. 
 
============================================= 
 Acil Durum Yönetimi Çalışmalarında Bulunan Kurumlar için Anket 
=============================================  
Bu anket İstanbul-2003 Terörist saldırıları esnasında uygulanan acil durum 
yönetimi çalışmalarının verimliliğini araştırmaya yöneliktir. Anketin 
tamamlanması yaklaşık 15 dakika sürecektir. Cevaplarınız gizli tutulacak, ve 
sizin rızanız haricinde kesinlikle açıklanmayacaktir; sadece toplu anket 
sonuçları araştırma bitiminde kamuyla paylaşılacaktır. Araştırma 
sonuçlandıktan sonra neticeler, size de ayrıca duyurulacaktır.  
 
Çalışanın Kurumu: 
 ( ) Sağlık   
 ( ) Emniyet 
 ( ) Arama-Kurtarma Timi 
 ( ) Kızılay   
 ( ) Eğitim Kurumu  
 ( ) İtfaiye  
 ( ) Afet Koordinasyon Merkezi 
 
Çalışanın Pozisyonu: 
 ( ) Müdür    
 ( ) Müdür Yardımcısı    
 ( ) Orta Kademe Yönetici    
( ) Tim Lideri  
 ( ) İşçi/Memur    
 ( ) Kurumun Olay Yeri Sorumlusu  
 
Cinsiyeti: 
 ( ) Erkek 
 ( ) Bayan 
 




Önemli Not: Aşağıdaki sorular 2003’teki İstanbul Saldırılarının ÖNCESİNDEKİ 
kurumsal durumunuz gözönüne alınarak sorulacaktir. Lütfen sorulara 
kurumunuzun 2003 İstanbul Saldırılarından ÖNCEKİ durumu itibariyle cevap 
veriniz.  
 
1. Bu saldırı öncesinde, kurumumda önemli bir afet (Sel, terörist saldırı, 
fırtına, yangın, deprem vs..) nedeniyle önemli değişiklikler (yapısal 
değişiklikler, kurumun amacında ya da kurallarında meydana gelen 
değişiklikler) yaşandı.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 




2. Saldırı öncesine kadar kurumumun uğraşması gereken önemli afet olayları 
sıklıkla gerçekleşmekteydi.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
 
 3. Hizmet-içi eğitim kurumumda önemli bir yer tutar.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
4. Kurumum her yönüyle değişime açıktır.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
5. Kurumumdaki problemleri işyerindeki arkadaşlarımla beraberce çalışarak 
çözüyorum. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
6. İstediğim zaman diğer çalışanlarla gayri resmi olarak görüşebiliyor ve 
onları ziyaret edebiliyorum.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
7. Diğer çalışanlarla işyeri dışında ilişkilerimi devam ettiriyorum. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
8. İşyerindeki çoğu mesteklaşıma önemli oranda güveniyorum. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
9. Benim, bu kurumda gerçek anlamda arkadaşım yok.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
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 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
10. Bu kurumda güçlü arkadaşlıklar edindim. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
11. O (arkadaşım) burada olduğu için bu kurumdayım. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
12. Arkadaşlıklar bu kurumu daha huzur verici bir yer yapıyor. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
13. Arkadaşlıklar, gergin anlarda dahi birbirimizle koordineli çalışmamıza 
olanak sağlıyor. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
14. Kurumumun çalışanları, afetlerin (Terörist saldırılar, sel baskınları, 
fırtınalar, depremler, vb.) birbirinden farklı olduğunu bilirler. Kurumumun 
her farklı afet için bir planı vardır ve biz kurum olarak her değişik olayda 
farklı hareket ederiz. Mesela bir sel baskını için takip ettiğimiz prosedür 
ile bir terörist bombalama sırasında takip ettiğimiz prosedür birbirinden 
farklıdır. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
15. Kurumum temel acil durum yönetimi prosedürlerini (insanları toplu bir 
şekilde bir yerden başka bir yere tahliye, geçici iskan sağlama, alternatif 
iletişim cihazları kurup kullanabilme, erken uyarı sistemleriyle halkı 
uyarma, vb.) ihtiyaç duyulduğunda icra edebilir. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 




16. Kurumum, istendiğinde, görevli personeli (kendi personeli ve gönüllüler) 
ve diğer kaynakları etkin bir biçimde seferber edecek planlara sahiptir. 
Etkin bir biçimde ifadesinden kasıt, ihtiyaç duyulan insan gücünün ve diğer 
kaynakların kriz esnasında doğru belirlenmesi, hızlıca bulundukları yerden 
doğru ihtiyaç sahiplerine ulaştırılmaları, ve gönderilen bu kaynakların 
ihtiyaç sahiplerinin afetten doğan ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilecek seviyede 
olmalarıdır. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
17. Kurumum acil bir durum karşısında daha önceden belirlenmiş iş tanımına 
göre hareket eder. Kurumdaki meslektaşlarım acil bir durum esnasında 
kurumumun uzmanlık alanının dışında başka bir işlerle meşgul olmaz. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
18. Afet yönetimi esnasında, bilgi (enfermasyon) kurum-içinde yeterli şekilde 
değerlendirilir. Bu amaçla kullanılan iletişim araçları ve iletilen bilgiler 
tatmin edicidir. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
19. Afet yönetimi esnasında, bilgi (enfermasyon) kurumum ve diğer kurumlar 
arasında yeterli şekilde değerlendirilir. Bu amaçla kullanılan iletişim 
araçları ve iletilen bilgiler tatmin edicidir. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
20. Afet yönetimi esnasında, bilgi (enfermasyon) kurumum ve afetten 
etkilenmiş vatandaşlar arasında yeterli şekilde değerlendirilir. Bu amaçla 
kullanılan iletişim araçları ve iletilen bilgiler tatmin edicidir.  
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
21. Kurumum, kriz zamanında da karar-üretim mekanizmasını düzenli bir şekilde 
uygulamaya devam eder. Kurum-içi ya da diğer kurumlarla kurumum arasında 
görevsel ya da bölgesel yetki kargaşası yaşanmaz; ayrıca olay yerinde 
kendiliğinden oluşan gruplarla kurumum arasında da kurumsal yetki konusunda 
karışıklık olmaz. Afetle ilgili ortaya çıkan yeni problemlerin sorumluluğunun 
kime ait olacağı üstesinden gelinemeyecek zor bir problem değildir.  
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( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
22. Olay yerinde kurumumun ve diğer kurumların görevlileri koordine şekilde 
çalışırlar. Kritik safhalardaki bu kollektif çalışmaya kimin liderlik edeceği 
problem oluşturmaz. Kamu yararı daha ön planda tutulduğu için, kurumsal 
anlamda liderliği öne çıkarmamaya yönelik isteklilik, kurumumda had 
safhadadır. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
23. Kurumumun olay yerinde kendiliğinden ortaya çıkan insan gücü kaynağını 
kendi kaynaklarına dahil etmeye dair planları vardır. Ben ve diğer 
meslektaşlarım, gönüllülerin ve kendi kendine ortaya çıkan yardım gruplarının 
kamu düzenini tekrar sağlamada çok önemli kaynaklar olduğuna inanırız. 
Meslektaşlarım, bu grupların bizim kadar kontrol edilebilir olmamasınden 
ötürü gereksiz olduklarını düşünmezler. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
24. Kurumum, diğer afet yönetimi kurumlarına, medyaya, ve genelde 
vatandaşlara yararlı olacak makul ilişkilerin gelişirilmesini destekler. 
Afetler esnasında, vatandaşlar, bizim ya da basının yayınları dolayısıyla 
genel itibariyle nelerin meydana gelmiş olduğunu doğru bir şekilde 
öğrenirler. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
25. Kurumum, afet esnasında, bir afet yönetim merkeziyle çalışır. Kurumum, bu 
merkezde en üst seviyede temsil edilir, diğer ilk-müdahale ekipleriyle 
beraber çalışırız. Biz bundan yararlanırız çünkü böylece hem diğer kurumların 
ihtiyaçlarını, hem de bizim onlara nasıl yardım edebileceğimizi biliriz. 
( ) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 
 ( ) Katılıyorum 
 ( ) Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Katılmıyorum 
 ( ) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 
 
Lütfen bize bu anketi doldurmak suretiyle yardım edebilecek kurumunuzda 
2003’teki saldırılar itibariyle görevli bulunan en az 3 meslektaşınızın 































5 Email Adresi 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
6  Adı 
 ____________________________________________ 
 












5.4.3 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations (Spain) 
======================================= 




 CONSENTIMIENTO PARA PARTICIPAR EN UN ESTUDIO DE INVESTIGACIÓN 
=============================================  
 
Información del investigador:            Bahadir Sahin 
                                      Departamento de Asuntos Públicos 
                                      bahadir@mail.ucf.edu 
                                             + (1) 646-220-0628 (Móvil) 
 
I.        Título del estudio:      Factores que influencian la eficacia de 
las redes de la gestión de crisis: Una perspectiva comparativa 
                                   
II.       INTRODUCCIÓN: El número creciente de desastres artificiales y 
naturales fuerza a los responsables políticos a hacer políticas más eficaces 
de la gestión de crisis. Puesto que la gestión de crisis no puede ser 
conducida por una sola entidad, es un esfuerzo de colaboración de la red 
entre organizaciones públicas del primer respondedor, instituciones no 
lucrativas de ayuda humanitaria y otras entidades del público y privadas. 
Ineficaz gestión de la crisis políticas coordinar la respuesta y esfuerzos de 
recuperación se traducirá en fracasos que costaron numerosas vidas humanas y 
grandes daños materiales a público y privado infraestructuras. Los desastres 
se producirán en un mayor aumento de la tasa en el futuro (por ejemplo, 
Inundaciones en Iowa en junio de 2008). La gestión de las crisis políticas y 
organizaciones debe estar lista para peor condiciones para ser más eficaces y 
salvar más vidas humanas y dificultar más daños a la propiedad en futuros 
desastres. 
            Sobre la base de esta información de la literatura, se le pedirá 
25 preguntas sobre las condiciones de organización usted está en. Se tardará 
10 minutos de su tiempo. Su participación es muy apreciada. Si usted le pidió 
que (Por correo, e-mail o por teléfono), El investigador también 
proporcionará una copia del formulario de consentimiento a usted. 
  
III.      Su confidencialidad será vigilado.   
Si tiene alguna pregunta acerca de su participación en este proyecto de 
investigación, Usted puede presentar una reclamación con UCF Environmental 
Health & Safety, Risk and Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 
32816-3500 (407) 823-6300. 
 
IV.       Si usted tiene alguna otra pregunta, usted también puede contactar 
el Investigador principal: 
 
Thomas Wan 
Profesor y Director 




+ (1) 407-823-3678 
 
He leído y entendido la información en esta forma. Estoy más de 17 años de 
edad. Doy mi consentimiento para tomar parte en esta investigación titulada 
“Factores que influencian la eficacia de las redes de la gestión de crisis: 
Una perspectiva comparativa”. 
 
============================================= 
Encuesta para las Organizaciones que Manejan Emergencias 
=============================================  
 
Esta revisión examina la eficacia de operaciones de la emergencia durante la 
matanza del 11M en Madrid. La revisión toma aproximadamente 15 minutos para 
completar. Sus respuestas son confidenciales, y no serán reveladas sin su 
consentimiento; sólo resultados agregados serán hechos disponibles. Somos 
felices hacer una copia de final le pasa disponible.  
 
Organización del Empleado: 
 ( ) Salud 
 ( ) Aplicación de la Ley 
 ( ) Equipo de Buscar y Rescatar 
 ( ) Organización de Dirección de Emergencia No lucrativa (Cruz Roja...) 
 ( ) Institución de Educación 
 ( ) Cuerpo de Bomberos 
 ( ) Centro de Crisis 
 
Posición de Empleado: 
 ( ) Supervisor 
 ( ) Gerente Medio 
 ( ) Gerente de Primera línea 
 ( ) Asistente del Supervisor 
 ( ) Líder de Equipo 
 ( ) Trabajador de Primera línea 
 
Género de Empleado: 
 ( ) Masculino 





Aviso Importante: Todas las siguientes preguntas cubrirán el tiempo ANTES de 
que ocurriera la matanza del 11M en España. Por favor conteste las preguntas 
para la situación en su organización ANTES de la matanza del 11M. 
 
1. Hubo cambio (s) importante en mi organización (estructura, objetivos, y 
reglas) debido a un acontecimiento (Inundación, ataque terrorista, huracán, 
fuego de arbusto, terremoto etc.…) importante. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 




2. Hubo acontecimientos importantes con los cuales mi organización debería 
tratar con frecuencia hasta ahora. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
3. La educación intraorganizativa sostiene un lugar importante en mi 
organización. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
4. Mi organización está dispuesta a adaptar cualquier medio de cambios. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
5. Trabajo con mis compañeros de trabajo para colectivamente solucionar los 
problemas en la organización. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
6. Tengo la posibilidad de hablar y visitar a los otros empleados 
informalmente. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
7. Socializo con los compañeros de trabajo fuera del trabajo. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
8. Confío mucho en mis compañeros de trabajo. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
9. No pienso que algún compañero de trabajo sea un amigo verdadero. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
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 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
10. Formé grandes amistades en el trabajo. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
11. Trabajo para la organización porque ella/él está aquí. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
12. Las amistades hacen más feliz el lugar de trabajo. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
13. Las amistades ayudan a uno trabajar cooperativamente durante tiempos de 
tensión. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
14. Los empleados de mi organización saben que cada acontecimiento extremo 
(bombardeos terroristas, inundación, tormenta de invierno, terremoto, huracán 
etc.) es diferente. Mi organización tiene planes y actúa diferentemente en 
cada acontecimiento extremo. Por ejemplo, usaríamos un procedimiento 
operacional diferente para una inundación que para un bombardeo terrorista. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
15. Mi organización está lista para cualquier función de manejos de 
emergencias (evacuación, alojamiento temporal, instrumentos de comunicación 
alternativos, advertencias etc.) 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 




16. Mi organización tiene planes de movilizar el personal (empleados 
autorizados y voluntarios) y recursos con eficacia. Con eficacia, quiero 
decir que el personal y los recursos necesarios son bien identificados 
durante la crisis, son localizados y obtenidos rápidamente y correctamente, y 
son apropiados para los problemas generados por el desastre. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
17. Mi organización tiene cierta definición de trabajo durante un 
acontecimiento extremo. Los empleados de mi organización no se envuelven en 
otros tipos de trabajo durante un acontecimiento extremo que sea diferente a 
la profesionalización de mi organización. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
18. La información es procesada adecuadamente dentro de mi organización 
durante un desastre. Los instrumentos de comunicación y el material 
comunicado son satisfactorios. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
19. La información es procesada adecuadamente entre mi organización y otras 
organizaciones que responden durante un desastre. Los instrumentos de 
comunicación y el material comunicado son satisfactorios. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
20. La información es procesada adecuadamente entre mi organización y los 
ciudadanos afectados durante un desastre. Los instrumentos de comunicación y 
el material comunicado son satisfactorios. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
21. Mi organización también sigue tomando decisiones correctamente durante el 
tiempo de crisis. Las diferencias de jurisdicción organizativas dentro de o 
fuera de la organización no pueden ser un problema; los grupos emergentes y 
mi organización no tienen conflicto en esferas organizativas. La 
responsabilidad de nuevas tareas de desastre no es un problema que no podemos 
resolver fácilmente. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
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 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
22. Los empleados de mi organización trabajan juntos con los empleados de las 
otras organizaciones durante la crisis. El mando en fases críticas no es un 
problema. Como el bien de la comunidad es más importante para nosotros, el 
deseo de subrayar las reclamaciones organizativas del mando son altas en mi 
organización. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
23. Mi organización tiene planes de incluir los recursos emergentes en el 
trabajo organizativo durante un desastre. Mis otros colegas y yo creemos que 
los voluntarios y los otros accionistas emergentes son fuentes importantes 
para devolver la orden social. Los empleados de mi organización no piensan 
que los recursos emergentes son inútiles porque no son controlables como 
somos nosotros. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
24. Mi organización apoya el desarrollo de relaciones que son aceptables y 
beneficiosas para las organizaciones que responden, los medios de 
comunicación y los ciudadanos en general. Durante acontecimientos extremos, 
los ciudadanos están satisfechos con el retrato relativamente exacto proveído 
vía nuestros sistemas radiofónicos o de la prensa de lo que está ocurriendo. 
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
25. Mi organización trabaja con un centro de dirección de emergencia (EOC) 
durante desastres. Somos representados en EOC en el nivel más alto posible, 
trabajamos cooperativamente con los otros respondedores, nos beneficiamos de 
ello ya que sabemos lo que los demás hacen y como podemos ayudarles.  
  
 ( ) Completamente de acuerdo 
 ( ) De acuerdo 
 ( ) Neutro 
 ( ) Desacuerdo en parte 
 ( ) No estoy de acuerdo 
 
Por favor dé nombres y direcciones de correo electrónico de al menos 3 (tres) 
otros empleados de su organización que puedan ayudarnos con este estudio a 





1 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
1 Correo electrónico  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
2 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
2 Correo electrónico  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
3 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
3 Correo electrónico  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
4 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
4 Correo electrónico  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
5 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
5 Correo electrónico  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
6 Nombre, Título  
 ____________________________________________ 
 















5.4.4 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations (UK) 
 
============================================= 






Researcher Information:                   Bahadir Sahin 
                                          Department of Public Affairs 
                                          bahadir@mail.ucf.edu 
                                          + (1) 646-220-0628 (cell) 
                                     
I.   PROJECT TITLE:  Factors Influencing Effectiveness of Crisis 
Management Networks: A Comparative Perspective 
                                   
II. INTRODUCTION: Increased number of manmade and natural disasters forces 
the policy makers to make more effective crisis management policies. Since 
the crisis management cannot be conducted by one single entity, it is a 
collaborative network effort among first responder public organizations, 
non-profit disaster relief institutions and other public and private 
entities. Ineffective crisis management policies coordinating the response 
and recovery efforts will result in failures that cost numerous human 
lives and great material damages to public and private infrastructures. 
The disasters will occur in a more increasing rate in the future (e.g. 
Iowa Floods in June 2008). The crisis management policies and 
organizations should be ready for worse conditions to be more effective 
and to save more human lives and hinder more property damage in future 
disasters. 
      Based on this information from the literature, you will be asked 25 
questions regarding the organizational conditions you are in. It will 
probably take 10 minutes of your time. Your participation is greatly 
appreciated. If you requested it (by mail, e-mail, or phone, the 
researcher will also provide a copy of consent form to you. 
 
III.   Your confidentiality will be guarded.   
If you have any questions about participation into this research project, 
you may file a claim with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and 
Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 32816-3500 (407) 823-6300.   
 




Professor and Director 
Doctoral Program in Public Affairs 
twan@mail.ucf.edu 
 + (1) 407-823-3678 
  
I have read and understood the information in this form. I am at least 18 
years of age. I consent to take part in this research entitled “Factors 
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Influencing Effectiveness of Interorganizational Networks among Crisis 
Management Organizations: A Comparative Perspective” 
 
============================================= 
 Survey for Emergency Management Organizations 
=============================================  
This survey examines the effectiveness of emergency operations during the 
Metro Bombings in London 2005. The survey takes about 15 minutes to 
complete. Your responses are confidential, and will not be revealed 
without your consent; only aggregate results will be made available. We 
are happy to make a copy of final results available to you. 
 
Employee Organization: 
 ( ) Health 
 ( ) Law Enforcement 
 ( ) Search and Rescue Team 
 ( ) Non-profit EM (Red Cross...) 
 ( ) Education Facility 
 ( ) Fire Department 
 ( ) Emergency Operation Centre 
 
Employee Position: 
 ( ) Supervisor 
 ( ) Middle Manager 
 ( ) Frontline Manager 
 ( ) Assistant Supervisor 
 ( ) Team Leader 
 ( ) Frontline Worker 
 
Gender 
 ( ) Male 





Important Note: All the questions below will be asked for the time before 
London Metro Attacks took place in the UK. Please answer the questions for 
the situation in your organization BEFORE the incident in 2005.  
 
1. There has been important change(s) in my organization (structure, 
goals, and rules) because of an important event (Flood, terrorist attack, 
hurricane, bush fire, earthquake etc.) before. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
2. There have been important events frequently up to now, which my 
organization should deal with.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
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 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
3. Intra-organizational education holds an important place in my 
organization.   
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
4. My organization is open to change by any means. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
5. I work with my co-workers to collectively solve the problems in the 
organization. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
6. I have the chance to talk informally and visit the other employees. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
7. I socialize with the co-workers outside of the workplace. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
8. I trust many co-workers a great deal. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
9. I do not feel any co-worker is a true friend. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
10. I formed strong friendships at work. 
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 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
11. I work for the organization because she/he is here. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
12. Friendships make the workplace a happier place. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
13. Friendships help to work cooperatively with each other at times of 
stress. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
14. The employees of my organization know that each extreme event 
(terrorist bombings, flood, winter storm, earthquake, hurricane etc.) is 
different. My organization has plans and operates differently in each 
different extreme event. For example, we would use a different operational 
procedure for a flood than we would a terrorist bombing.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
15. My organization is ready to operate any generic emergency management 
functions (evacuation, temporary housing, alternative communication tools, 
warnings etc.). 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
16. My organization has plans to mobilize personnel (authorized employees 
and volunteers) and resources effectively. By effectively, I mean needed 
personnel and resources are well-identified in the crisis, they are 
located quickly and brought to bear correctly, and they are appropriate to 
the problems generated by the disaster.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
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 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
17. My organization has a certain job definition during an extreme event. 
My organization’s employees do not get involved in other kinds of labour 
during an extreme event different than the professionalization of my 
organization. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
18. Information is processed adequately within my organization during a 
disaster. Communication tools and communicated material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
19. Information is processed adequately between my organization and other 
responding organizations during a disaster. Communication tools and 
communicated material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
20. Information is processed adequately between my organization and 
affected citizens during a disaster. Communication tools and communicated 
material are satisfactory. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
21. My organization keeps exercising decision-making properly in the 
crisis time as well. The organizational jurisdiction differences within or 
outside of the organization cannot be a problem; emergent groups and my 
organization do not have a conflict on organizational domains. 
Responsibility for new disaster tasks is not a problem that we cannot 
resolve easily. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
22. My organization’s employees work coordinative with the other 
organization employees in the crisis scene. Leadership in critical phases 
is not a problem. Since community good is more important to us, the 
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willingness to de-emphasize organizational claims of leadership is high in 
my organization.  
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
23. My organization has plans to include the emerging resources into the 
organizational labour during a disaster. I and my other colleagues believe 
that volunteers and other emergent stakeholders are important sources to 
bring the social order back. My organization employees do not think that 
the emergent resources are useless because they are not controllable as we 
are. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
24. My organization supports the developments of relationships that are 
acceptable and beneficial to the responding organizations, the mass media 
and citizens in general. During extreme events, citizens are satisfied 
with the relatively accurate picture of what is going on via our 
broadcasting systems or press. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
 ( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
25. My organization works with an emergency operation centre (EOC) during 
disasters. We are represented in EOC in the highest level possible, we 
work co-operatively with the other responders, we benefit from it since we 
know what the others are doing and how we can help them. 
 ( ) Strongly Agree 
 ( ) Agree 
( ) Neutral 
 ( ) Disagree 
 ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
Please give names and email addresses of at least 3 (three) other 
employees that took part in recovery efforts at WTC Attacks from your 













































 Thank You! 
=============================================  
 














































d3 <--> d1 5.612 -0.139 
d3 <--> d2 9.909 0.169 
d8 <--> d3 4.342 -0.101 
d9 <--> d8 8.285 0.121 





Table 16. Correlation Statistics of CFA - Perceived CM Network Effectiveness 
Correlations 
Modification 
indexes Par Change 
e8 <--> e9 10.034 0.167 
e7 <--> e8 22.262 0.274 
e6 <--> e8 5.085 -0.121 
e3 <--> e9 4.087 -0.106 
e3 <--> e8 4.08 -0.11 
e2 <--> e9 4.633 -0.116 
e2 <--> e8 13.899 -0.207 
e2 <--> e7 4.056 -0.119 
e2 <--> e3 12.816 0.198 
e1 <--> e7 12.647 -0.221 
e1 <--> e3 7.75 0.162 




Table 17. Correlation Statistics of CFA - Perceived CM Network Effectiveness 
Correlations 
Modification 
indexes Par Change 
Q3 <--> Q4 36.649 0.548 
Q2 <--> Q3 5.091 0.194 
Q1 <--> Q3 4.585 0.191 
Q1 <--> Q2 54.933 0.678 
e5 <--> Q4 14.729 0.229 
e5 <--> z1 11.389 -0.112 
e2 <--> Q4 6.455 -0.179 
d1 <--> Q4 7.426 0.206 
d1 <--> e7 4.817 0.123 
d1 <--> e5 4.331 -0.096 
d1 <--> e3 4.319 0.111 
d1 <--> e2 12.066 -0.189 
d2 <--> z2 9.07 0.099 
d2 <--> e5 4.487 0.09 
d2 <--> e3 4.063 -0.098 
d3 <--> e5 7.032 -0.114 
d3 <--> e3 9.505 0.153 
d3 <--> e2 4.648 -0.109 
d4 <--> e9 7.207 -0.122 
d6 <--> Q2 7.044 0.155 
d6 <--> e9 6.471 0.109 
d6 <--> e6 4.325 -0.093 
d8 <--> Q3 4.426 -0.123 
d9 <--> z2 4.632 0.064 
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